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1Executive summary
Introduction
Labour taxes make up a substantial share of overall labour 
costs in all developed countries. Reducing taxes on labour, 
in particular on the employer side, could be one way of 
inducing employers to hire more workers or to retain 
staff that might otherwise have been let go. Employment 
subsidies for hiring new workers operate in a similar way 
by increasing incentives for employers to create new jobs. 
Both types of measure – employment incentives and 
reducing employer non-wage labour costs – have been 
deployed in many EU Member States since the onset of 
the crisis. They have been used either as a general labour 
demand-enhancing measure or else targeted at specific 
categories. These are often groups with limited labour 
market attachment such as the young, low-skilled or low-
paid and the long-term unemployed.
The main aim of this report is to assess the effectiveness 
of employer-side incentives in generating positive labour 
market outcomes. The report summarises the current 
state of knowledge on the effectiveness of shifts in 
employer social security contributions, employer payroll 
taxes and functionally equivalent employer incentives 
as employment-generating policy interventions. The 
assessment involved a review of 68 methodologically 
robust evaluations of specific policy interventions, 
including a detailed meta-analysis. The evaluations 
covered relate largely to policies implemented in EU 
Member States from 2000 onwards. The report also 
presents an overview of more recent (2008–2014) policies 
implemented in different Member States.
Policy context
In a period of high unemployment, strong fiscal pressures 
and low growth, EU policymakers have underlined the 
importance of identifying policy reforms – including labour 
taxation reforms – that are growth- and employment-
friendly. This has been a common theme of the EU’s 
European Semester policy coordination process. Country-
specific recommendations to many Member States in 
recent years have included specific guidance about reform 
to the system of labour taxation, with the emphasis on 
shifting taxes away from labour to other tax bases. These 
include property, consumer spending and environmental 
taxes. In a context of depressed labour demand, the 
policy emphasis was on reducing the tax burden on 
employers, especially from 2011 to 2013–2014. As the 
policy review indicates, there has been a greater tendency 
than previously to target measures – even if the targeted 
categories are not always those where the evaluation 
literature indicates the likelihood of more positive 
employment impact.
Key findings
Across the evaluation studies covered, the employment 
effects from lower employer social contribution rates or 
functional equivalents such as hiring subsidies tend to 
be modest. In just over 40% of the employment effect 
estimates covered in the meta-analysis, no significant 
positive impact was identified. However, the policy 
is effective when it works: in cases where there was 
a positive employment outcome, it was strongly positive.
Policies targeted at a specific group were more effective 
than general or non-targeted policies. The target groups 
most likely to benefit are the long-term unemployed and 
fixed-term contract employees (conversion to permanent 
status). Reforms targeted at younger and older workers 
were less effective, as were measures targeting specific 
groups of companies (categorised by sector, company size 
or region).
The meta-analysis results indicate that positive 
employment impacts are more likely to be observed in 
the short term rather than over the medium or long term, 
suggesting that employment effects may tend to dissipate 
over time.
The report also highlighted potential drawbacks that limit 
the effectiveness of such measures. There were particular 
concerns about waste or inefficiency in implementation, 
opportunistic behaviour by benefiting companies, and 
the potential countervailing or distortionary impact on 
non-participating companies or economic players. Each 
can potentially undermine the cost-effectiveness of the 
measures or compromise policy objectives. Deadweight 
losses (jobs created that would have been created 
anyway without the subsidy) in particular are likely to be 
considerable, though well-targeted measures are likely to 
reduce such losses.
Policy pointers
¢ Employer-side incentives were successful from 
an employment perspective in a majority of 
the individual evaluation estimates, but not an 
overwhelming majority.
¢ Strong positive employment impacts were more 
likely from policies based on reduced employer social 
security contributions (compared with measures 
such as hiring subsidies) and from policies embedded 
in a package of reform measures (compared with 
standalone measures). Overall, however, there was 
little to suggest that any one policy out of all those 
considered systematically led to better employment 
outcomes than any other.
¢ Reduced employer taxes or increased subsidies need 
to be financed. The requirements of budget neutrality, 
an especially important constraint at a time of severe 
public spending restrictions, may require new taxes, 
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for example on consumer spending. Second-order 
employment effects from these may offset positive 
gains resulting from employer tax reductions.
¢ Such potential countervailing impacts – as well as 
deadweight and displacement effects – are not easy to 
estimate, but are critical to making an effective cost-
benefit assessment of such policy interventions. Very 
few existing evaluations include such calculations.
¢ A positive macroeconomic context appears to enhance 
the probability that employer cost reduction measures 
achieve their goal of stimulating employment.
This final point could be an argument against the use of 
such measures when they are in theory most appropriate 
and in practice most needed – in recessionary or post-
recessionary periods of depressed labour demand. It also 
implies that they may be more effective at times such 
as the present – with modestly improving output and 
employment growth.
3Introduction
In a period of high unemployment, strong fiscal pressures 
and low growth, EU policymakers have underlined the 
importance of identifying policy reforms – including 
labour taxation reforms – that are conducive to both 
economic growth and employment creation. This has been 
a common theme running through recent documentation 
supporting the EU’s European Semester policy 
coordination process (European Commission, 2015a). 1
Aggregate EU labour market performance has begun to 
improve since 2013 as evidenced by higher employment 
rates (up from 64.1% to 65.6% in 2015, EU28) and steady 
declines in unemployment. But growth is slow and there 
were still fewer people at work in the EU in 2015 than 
in 2008 – before the global financial crisis. Employment 
rates in particular remain low for certain categories such 
as younger workers, low-skilled workers, lone parents 
and female workers. And among the unemployed, almost 
one in two of all unemployed had been without work 
and actively seeking a job for 12 months or more in 2015 
(48.5%) compared with 37% pre-crisis. Increasing the 
incentives for employers to take on new workers may help 
to alleviate some of these problems.
Reducing the employer’s social security contributions or 
payroll taxes is one form of labour taxation reform that 
aims to increase labour demand by decreasing the overall 
labour costs for employers – and hence facilitate the 
creation of new jobs. Employment subsidies for hiring new 
workers operate in a similar way, increasing incentives for 
employers to create new jobs.
The aim of this report is to review the current state of 
knowledge on the effectiveness of shifts in employer 
social security contributions, employer payroll taxes 
and functionally equivalent employer incentives as 
an employment-generating policy intervention. The 
assessment is carried out through a review of selected 
evaluations of specific policy interventions, including 
a detailed meta-regression analysis. The evaluations 
covered relate largely to policies implemented in EU 
Member States from 2000 onwards. The report also 
presents an overview of more recent (2008–2014) policies 
implemented in different Member States.
Employment and labour taxes
Labour taxes make up a substantial share of the labour 
costs in all developed countries. This means that labour 
taxation is inevitably a factor that influences labour supply 
and labour demand decisions, particularly in the formal 
economy. Labour taxes drive a wedge between the cost of 
labour to employers and the final post-tax consumption 
wage of employees. High levels of labour taxation may 
engender increased levels of informal employment or 
undeclared work outside the obligations and protections 
of the formal economy. They may also impact negatively 
on employment levels by encouraging changes to more 
capital-intensive forms of production.
Tax revenue, however, is essential to support the role 
of the state as a consumer of goods and services and as 
a direct and indirect employer of nearly one-third of all 
workers in some developed countries. Current taxation 
levels and methods are the result of historical path 
dependencies and represent social choices in developed 
democracies and preferences, for example, regarding 
state provision in sectors such as health and education. 
The power to levy taxes is a key prerogative of individual 
Member States and the EU has limited powers in this 
area. One consequence is that there are wide variations in 
the percentage share of taxation in total gross domestic 
product (GDP) across the EU28, in the proportion of tax 
revenue generated by labour taxes and in the distribution 
of labour tax among different tax types and economic 
players (personal income tax, employer social security 
contributions, employee social security contributions and 
payroll taxes2).
An important initial observation is that there is no direct 
connection between high taxation levels and weak 
employment performance. Some of the countries with 
the highest levels of tax, including labour taxes, are also 
characterised by strong labour market performance 
indicators. In this area, the Nordic countries continue to be 
exemplary.
Nonetheless, regardless of starting labour taxation levels, 
there may be scope to stimulate employment creation by 
means of policies that set out to reduce the tax burden. 
And such policies are considered especially appropriate at 
a time of weak labour demand and high labour supply.
An important empirical support for moves towards 
lower labour taxes has been country panel data showing 
evidence of superior average labour market performance 
(or higher average hours worked) in countries with lower 
tax wedges. An illustrative comparison has been that 
between the USA, with low tax wedges, and the generally 
higher tax wedges that have tended to prevail in the 
recent past in many EU Member States. In influential 
contributions, American Nobel laureate economists have 
pointed to differences in payroll tax levels in the EU and 
the USA (Phelps, 1994) and differences in overall labour 
taxation levels (Prescott, 2004) to explain the divergences 
in natural unemployment rates (non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment or NAIRU) and total labour input per 
1 The European Semester is the EU’s yearly cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination. Each year, the European Commission publishes the Annual Growth 
Survey and the Alert Mechanism Report and analyses EU Member States’ plans for budgetary, macroeconomic and structural reforms, and offers country-specific 
recommendations for the next 12–18 months.
2 Employer payroll tax is often used in the literature as a synonym for employer social security contributions (SSCs), but there are at least two broad differences 
worth signalling. Payroll taxes are generally levied on a company’s total wage or salary bill – rather than on individual workers – and do not confer entitlement to 
social benefits, while employers’ SSCs confer an explicit entitlement to social benefits (Econpubblica, 2011).
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head between Europe and the USA, respectively. Higher 
labour taxes in the EU translated into fewer hours worked 
and higher unemployment. According to Nickell (2003), an 
increase in the tax wedge of 10% reduces employment on 
average by 2%.3
With the support of such research, reducing labour taxes is 
a long-standing and widespread policy recommendation 
for raising employment, evidenced, for example, in the 
influential OECD jobs study (OECD, 1994). Reducing 
labour taxes may ‘make work pay’ and help to bypass 
‘unemployment traps’ that result from high effective 
marginal tax rates for low-paid workers. It may also 
operate on the labour demand side by decreasing 
total labour costs for employers and thus raising their 
propensity to hire.
It is important to recognise, however, that the relationship 
between taxes and employment is inevitably a complex 
one. There is little consensus on the extent to which 
lowering taxes translates into better employment 
outcomes and, in particular, on whether lowering 
employer-side or payroll taxes has sizeable beneficial 
effects. In a comprehensive review of policy measures in 
the EU and six other countries including the USA in the 
period 1990–2008, one of the main findings was that ‘the 
impact of the policies on the unemployment rate, the 
employment rate, the inactivity rate and the weekly hours 
of work, is very weak if any’ (Econpubblica, 2011). The 
authors concluded that tax policy can play only a minor 
role in determining labour market outcomes; however, 
where they are deployed, an approach targeting specific 
groups of workers (for instance low-skilled, older or female 
workers) is preferable. This latter consideration relates 
to the large costs and deadweight losses when reduced 
labour taxes are applied across the board.
The emphasis on targeted measures is also justified by 
evidence of variations in labour demand elasticity across 
different categories of the working population. This is a key 
metric in that it offers some a priori basis for assessing the 
relative cost-effectiveness of taxation changes. The more 
responsive demand for a specific category is to a given 
change in labour cost, the greater is the likely employment 
dividend in devoting available budget to measures 
targeted at that category. In a recent meta-analysis, 
labour demand elasticities were highest for low-skilled 
workers and for atypical (fixed contract) workers (Lichter 
et al, 2015). Analysis by the European Commission based 
on simulation results from the Labour Market Model 
developed by the Directorate-General for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG-EMPL) suggests that 
measures targeted at specific groups would be more 
successful than non-targeted measures in employment 
terms (European Commission, 2014b). This finding is 
based on simulations of the effect of reduced employer 
social security contributions equivalent to 0.1% of GDP on 
the employment levels of three underrepresented groups 
in the labour market: younger workers, older workers and 
low-skilled workers. The analysis has a longer time horizon 
(20 years) than possible in most retrospective evaluation 
studies. For all three target groups considered, the median 
employment outcome across the 14 Member States 
covered was positive (although with negative outcomes for 
labour productivity and output for low-skilled and younger 
workers).
As many of the measures evaluated in the material covered 
later in this report are based on a targeted approach, they 
can help to assess to what extent reductions in the tax 
wedge may have positive employment outcomes and for 
which categories of workers positive impacts may be the 
strongest.
Policy context
In the context of the annual European Semester policy 
coordination process, country-specific recommendations 
to many Member States in recent years have included 
specific orientations about reforming the system of 
labour taxation. The emphasis has been on shifting 
taxes away from labour to other tax bases including 
property, consumption and environmental taxes. This 
policy orientation is based substantially on a ranking of 
the distortionary impact of taxes on economic growth 
(OECD, 2010), where labour and corporate taxes have been 
considered especially distortionary.
The integrated guidelines that accompany the EU2020 
strategic targets include employment guidelines. The 
emphasis on employment-friendly labour taxation 
measures was made more explicit in the proposed 2015 
revision of these guidelines. The original 2010 guidelines 
included the following provision:
In order to increase competitiveness and raise 
participation levels, particularly for the low-skilled ... 
Member States should review tax and benefit systems 
and the capacity of public services to provide the 
necessary support.
(European Commission, 2010a, p. 21)
The proposed 2015 revision, however, included the 
following, more specific orientation:
The tax burden should be shifted away from labour 
to other sources of taxation that are less detrimental 
to employment and growth while protecting revenue 
for adequate social protection and growth enhancing 
expenditures. Reductions in labour taxation should be 
aimed at the relevant components of the tax burden and 
at removing barriers and disincentives to labour market 
participation, in particular for those furthest away from 
the labour market.
(European Commission, 2015b, p. 2)
The key features of the new guidelines are the emphasis on 
shifting taxes away from labour and targeting reductions 
3 Tax wedge is ‘a measure of the difference between labour costs to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee – which is calculated by 
expressing the sum of personal income tax, employee plus employer social security contributions together with any payroll tax, minus benefits as a percentage of 
labour costs’ (OECD, 2014).
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in the labour tax burden to enhance employment 
possibilities, particularly for the long-term unemployed 
and for underrepresented workforce categories (low-
skilled workers and younger, older and female workers).
Recent reviews by the European Commission have 
indicated that progress towards implementing such 
tax shifts has been limited so far. Member States have 
been more active in following the guidance in relation 
to lower labour tax burdens but less active in relation 
to balancing increases in consumption taxes and other 
taxes. Where Member States have followed the tax shift 
guidance, it has been by levying higher consumption 
taxes rather than property-based or ‘green’ taxes. But 
consumer spending taxes are also to a significant extent 
borne by workers. Transferring tax burden from labour to, 
for example, indirect taxes such as value added tax (VAT) 
raises consumer costs. This has a negative impact on the 
real consumption wage, just as the reduced tax wedge 
may have a positive impact. The extent to which one 
measure dominates the other or both cancel each other 
out should therefore be an important consideration for 
policy evaluation, though this lies beyond the scope of the 
present report.
Labour taxes can be levied on the employer or employee 
side. An emphasis in the period 2011–2013 was on 
reducing employer-side taxes. On the basis that employer 
incentives are more likely to increase labour demand while 
employee incentives (reduced personal income tax or 
employee social security contributions) are more geared to 
increasing labour supply, the former are considered more 
appropriate in a post-recessionary context of depressed 
labour demand. Reducing labour costs for employers 
should help to generate more new employment and/or 
maintain existing employment relationships. Additional 
empirical support for such approaches comes from 
recent academic work on labour taxation which shows 
that labour demand elasticities have tended to increase 
over time. This is possibly because globalisation and 
technological change offers employers greater possibilities 
of substituting away from domestic labour (Lichter et 
al, 2015). The increasing sensitivity of labour demand 
to labour costs should tend to make measures reducing 
employer labour costs relatively more effective as a policy 
intervention.
More recently, since 2013, there has been a greater 
prevalence of targeted reductions for employees within 
the personal income tax system: increased tax-free 
allowances, extended tax credits and reduced rates. 
This shift in policy could be related to the resumption 
of employment growth and the beginnings of the first 
sustained (if still modest) economic recovery since the 
global financial crisis. In these circumstances, incentives 
on the labour supply side are likely to be increasingly 
effective. Apart from any positive employment effects, 
such incentives – depending on how they are targeted – 
could also boost incomes and raise living standards at 
the bottom of the income distribution. Between mid-2013 
and mid-2014, 13 Member States took such measures 
while a much smaller number implemented reductions 
in employer social security contributions (European 
Commission 2014d).
Scope of report
This report reviews the evidence on the effectiveness of 
measures that reduce the employer part of the tax wedge 
in stimulating positive labour market outcomes. It adopts 
a broad focus to encompass not just changes in the 
applicable rates of employer social security contributions, 
or of payroll taxes levied on employers, but also measures 
that the authors deem are functionally equivalent. These 
include incentives or subsidies to employers to generate 
new employment. The conflation of the two categories 
can be justified on the basis that many reductions of 
employer social security contributions are considered to 
be a form of employment subsidy (Econpubblica, 2011) 
and many hiring subsidies take the form of reduced 
employer tax liabilities. The scope of the project, therefore, 
includes policies whose effect is to incentivise employers 
by reducing their labour costs in order to increase 
employment levels more than they would otherwise have 
done.
This approach reflects the orientation of the European 
Commission’s Labour market policy database. For its 
purposes, expenditure on labour market policies in 
general and on employment incentives in particular 
refers both to ‘transfers in the form of cash payments or 
reimbursements’ (for instance employer subsidies) and 
‘amounts of revenue foregone through reductions in 
obligatory levies, which should be valued as the amount of 
revenue foregone compared to that normally payable’ (for 
example, in reductions in employers’ tax liabilities).
It brings together measures that would generally fall 
under the heading either of labour taxation policy and/or 
of active labour market policy. The only condition is that 
the measures should involve direct or implicit transfers 
from the state to employers to raise labour demand and 
facilitate increased hiring.
Outline of contents
Chapter 1 presents a non-exhaustive mapping of recent 
policy interventions over the period 2008–2014. This 
is based on two main sources. The first is a Eurofound 
comparative analytical report (entitled Do reduced non-
wage labour costs lead to more and better jobs?) carried 
out in 2015 in collaboration with its network of European 
correspondents, based on feedback to a structured 
questionnaire. The second is the European Commission’s 
Labour Market Reforms (LABREF) database for the period 
2008–2014. The LABREF database is maintained by the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
(DG-ECFIN) and covers labour market reforms in the 
Member States under a variety of headings including – 
of specific interest to this report – labour taxation and 
employment incentives.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide an overview of the existing 
evaluation literature assessing policy measures that 
reduce the employers’ tax burden with the intention 
of creating labour demand. The focus here is largely 
on earlier policy measures where adequate data were 
available over a significant period to make possible 
a methodologically sound empirical analysis of the specific 
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employment effects that can be attributed to the measure 
itself. Chapter 2 provides a brief literature review including 
a narrative review of selected individual policy evaluations. 
Chapter 3 presents a methodical meta-analysis of the 
evaluation studies selected according to specified criteria. 
A meta-analytical approach is increasingly used in labour 
market policy impact evaluation (Card et al, 2010; Melguizo 
and González-Páramo, 2013). This approach treats each 
selected evaluation as one observation in a dataset where 
outcome variables (positive, negative or non-significant 
employment outcomes) can be associated statistically 
with given characteristics of the measure being evaluated 
(such as targeted category of measure, magnitude, country 
and period covered) and indeed of the evaluation itself (for 
instance, econometric approach or publication type). This 
approach potentially offers the advantage of statistically 
robust conclusions about the efficacy or otherwise of 
a given type of policy intervention based on all relevant 
studies that comply with objectively specified selection 
criteria. In this sense, it represents a scientifically sound 
summary of the best available research.
The final chapter draws some conclusions primarily from 
the analysis of the evaluation literature and provides some 
relevant policy pointers.
71 Recent employer-side measures to 
stimulate labour demand
This chapter provides an overview of the reforms in 
non-wage labour cost that have been adopted since 2008 
across the EU Member States in an effort to stimulate 
labour demand. It focuses on those reforms aimed at 
reducing labour costs for employers. These policies have 
been prominent in the policy agenda of the European 
institutions and have played a very important role in the 
labour market reform priorities of Member States in recent 
years.
Background
The tax burden on labour is relatively high in many 
European Member States compared to other developed 
countries (OECD, 2014). Against the background of 
above-average unemployment experienced in many EU 
Member States, European policymakers have advocated 
a reduction in the tax wedge on labour. Pressure for such 
measures has increased since the onset of the economic 
crisis in 2008. Recent evidence has shown that high taxes 
on labour provide disincentives on both the labour supply 
and demand side.
In the early stages of the crisis, the European Economic 
Recovery Plan aimed to deploy quick responses to the 
negative consequences of the crisis on labour markets. 
Among the measures adopted were reductions in labour 
taxes and social contributions on labour, since the 
European Commission argued that:
… lower social contributions paid by employers can have 
a positive impact on job retention and creation while lower 
taxation of labour income can support purchasing power in 
particular for low wage earners.
(European Commission, 2008, p. 8)
This plan required Member States in particular to ‘consider 
reducing employers’ social charges on lower incomes 
to promote the employability of lower skilled workers’ 
(European Commission, 2008).
After the initial efforts to address the immediate effects 
of the crisis on labour markets and to protect the most 
vulnerable groups, policy action focused on improving the 
robustness of European economies and labour markets by 
correcting imbalances. Lower non-wage labour costs – in 
the form of lower employer social security contributions 
(SSCs) and other payroll taxes – have been advocated as 
a way to improve job creation, since they reduce the cost 
of labour without affecting the net wage of employees. 
Since the start of the European Semester in 2011, reducing 
taxes on labour to stimulate labour demand (and supply 
too, by increasing incentives to work) emerged as a priority 
in many countries, especially for low-paid work.
The key strategy commonly referred to in the European 
policy debate on labour taxation reforms is that of a tax 
shift. This concept was already mentioned in the Europe 
2020 Strategy, according to which the tax systems should 
be more ‘growth-friendly’ by avoiding growing levels of 
labour taxation and by levying instead higher shares of 
tax on property, consumer spending and resource use 
(European Commission, 2010b).
The theoretical rationale for a tax shift from labour to 
other sources is based on two main ideas. Taxes would 
cover a broader tax base since almost everybody pays 
consumption taxes, while labour taxation only applies 
to the working population. However, some forms of 
taxation – notably labour taxation – are considered to be 
more negative for growth than others, such as ‘recurrent 
property, environment and consumption taxes’ (European 
Commission, 2014b). A tax shift away from labour intends 
to encourage growth and employment by reducing 
the potential negative impact of labour taxation on job 
creation and work incentives (Pestel and Sommer, 2016). 
The concept of tax shift is recurrent in the overarching 
communications that the European Commission has 
published every year since 2011 and in the country-
specific recommendations within the European Semester 
framework.
Changes in the tax wedge
The concept that best measures the extent of labour 
taxation as a share of total labour costs is that of the tax 
wedge: the difference between what employees take home 
in earnings and what it costs an employer to employ them. 
The tax wedge is the sum of personal income tax and 
employee plus employer SSCs together with any payroll 
tax less cash transfers, expressed as a percentage of labour 
costs. The tax wedge varies widely among European 
countries, from levels of around 50% of the total labour 
cost of an employee earning the average wage (in Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary and Italy) to around 
30% or less (in Ireland, Malta and the UK).
Figure 1 (overleaf) presents data on the evolution of the 
tax wedge and its components during the period 2001–
2015 for the EU average. The European policy emphasis 
on the need to reduce labour taxation, spurred on by 
the economic crisis and the way it affected European 
countries, provides a useful background to interpret the 
observed trends in labour taxation and its components. Up 
to 2010, the tax wedge was gradually reduced, particularly 
between 2007 and 2010, during the initial stages of the 
crisis, when expansionary fiscal policies were adopted. As 
a result of constrained public finances, these policies were 
reversed, reflected in an increase in the tax wedge between 
2010 and 2013. This uneven progress towards the goal of 
reducing labour taxation in these years is reflected in the 
overarching communications published by the European 
Commission and in the country-specific recommendations 
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within the European Semester framework, where 
references to lack of progress are common.4 In more 
recent years, a major emphasis on the need to reduce 
labour costs through more systemic tax reforms seems to 
be emerging and can be seen in the reductions in the tax 
wedge observed from 2013 onwards.
The three components of the tax wedge show varying 
trends. The SSCs paid by employees remained relatively 
constant between 2001 and 2015 due to moderate 
increases in the pre-crisis years and large reductions in 
the initial years of the crisis. Personal income tax levels 
fell strongly in the initial years of the crisis following fiscal 
stimulus measures, but have increased significantly from 
2010 against a background of fiscal consolidation. Lastly, 
employer SSCs – the component covered in this report – 
show a declining trend during the whole period, only 
interrupted between 2010 and 2012, the years when fiscal 
consolidation efforts were strongest. Moreover, the data 
show that the reductions in employers’ SSCs have been 
greater for employees earning lower wages, reflecting the 
policy emphasis placed on stimulating labour demand for 
this group of employees.
The EU average for the evolution of employer SSCs is 
broadly in line with the trends in a majority of countries 
(Figure 2). Employer SSCs were reduced in the first part 
of the previous decade in most countries, particularly 
in some eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia). This trend continued across 
most countries at the onset of the crisis and in some 
there were significant cuts in employer SSCs (Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Slovenia and 
Sweden), reflecting the policies targeted at encouraging 
labour demand that were implemented at that time. Only 
in a small set of countries – Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Luxembourg and Romania – did contributions increase.
The trend changed from round 2010, coinciding with the 
beginnings of the sovereign debt crisis and the turn in 
policy towards fiscal consolidation. This explains why 
levels of employer SSCs increased in most countries in 
this period, significantly so in Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, 
the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia. Lastly, the relative 
easing of financial conditions and the weak labour 
market situation in many Member States may explain why 
employer SSCs started to decrease again after 2012 in 
many countries, notably in Estonia, France, Greece and the 
Netherlands.
4 ‘Insufficient attention has so far been given to reducing the tax wedge on labour’ (European Commission, 2011d); ‘there is no evidence of an overall reduction in 
labour taxation’ (European Commission, 2012b).
Figure 1: Tax wedge components for a single individual (EU average)
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Reforms in employer-side labour 
taxes
As indicated earlier, the European policy debate on 
non-wage labour costs in recent years has advocated 
a reduction in labour taxation levels as a way to 
strengthen labour demand (and supply) and improve 
employment outcomes. A reduction in non-wage labour 
costs borne by the employer has been particularly 
present in the debate within the EU as a way to stimulate 
labour demand. For equity and efficiency reasons, such 
measures have been considered especially appropriate 
when targeted at categories where labour demand and 
supply elasticities are high – for instance, the low-paid, 
low-skilled and female workers.
Labour market reform activity across European countries 
can be mapped with the LABREF database. This is 
an inventory of reforms, understood as a change in 
a policy area as a result of a legislative, executive or 
administrative act, agreement or court ruling. Although 
the dataset offers only qualitative information and the 
number of reforms is not necessarily a good indicator of 
their importance, it is a useful tool to observe how the 
reform emphasis varies across policy domains and over 
time and across countries.
Figure 3 (overleaf) presents LABREF data for the period 
2000–2013 in some of the main labour market policy 
domains. Two main facts are worth noting. First, labour 
taxation and active labour market policies (ALMP) are 
the two labour market areas with the highest reform 
intensity in the last decade, both before and after the 
crisis. These are the two policy areas where the measures 
covered by this report are included (employer SSCs 
within the labour taxation domain and employment 
subsidies within the ALMP domain). Second, three 
different subperiods are discussed that can be identified 
in the post-crisis period (2008 onwards) (Turrini et al, 
2015 and European Commission 2015a).
In the initial years (2008–2009), reforms attempted to 
address the negative impact of the crisis on employment 
Figure 2: Change in employer SSC levels over different periods between 2001 and 2015
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and income by adopting fiscal stimulus policies and 
measures such as targeted reductions in labour costs and 
wage subsidies to support employment. This is reflected 
in the high number of measures under the labour 
taxes and ALMP headings. In a second stage, as fiscal 
policy shifted from stimulus to consolidation, budget-
neutral interventions – such as reforms in employment 
protection legislation and wage-setting – assumed 
greater prominence while interventions in labour 
taxation and ALMP declined in relative importance. 
Finally, in the most recent years covered by LABREF (2012 
and especially 2013), Member States appear to have 
responded to the challenging labour market situation by 
strengthening labour demand and supporting incomes 
through tax and social security reforms, including better 
targeted ALMPs and cuts in the tax wedge.
A similar modulation over time can be seen in the 
number and direction of the interventions that are 
the particular focus of this study (Figure 4). The 
majority of interventions – involving employers’ labour 
costs (including employer SSCs), payroll taxes and 
employment subsidies for employers – were aimed at 
reducing such costs during the period 2000–2013. But 
again, different subperiods are visible. In the run-up to 
the crisis, almost all measures were intended to reduce 
labour costs for employers, but from 2008 onwards it is 
possible to observe increased policy activity overall – 
including measures that increase taxation – and the level 
of stimulatory, tax-reducing measures declined sharply 
in 2011 before beginning to grow again as budgetary 
concerns became less pressing. Although untargeted 
reductions occurred in several countries, the relative 
importance of cuts targeted at specific, generally 
disadvantaged, labour market categories tended to 
increase from 2008 to 2013.
A selected review of measures taken from 2008 to 2015 
across European countries in the area of employers’ 
labour costs is presented next, collected through 
Eurofound’s Network of European correspondents 
and complemented by the European Commission’s 
LABREF and Taxation reforms database.5 The review 
distinguishes between untargeted and targeted reforms.
Figure 3: Average number of reforms per year in the EU by policy domain
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Figure 4: Number of reforms in employer SSCs and employment subsidies by direction of reforms in the EU
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Untargeted reforms in employers’ labour 
costs
Reductions of a general character affecting the labour 
costs borne by the employer are not as common as those 
targeting a particular group within the workforce. Their 
relevance also clearly declines over the period from 2008 
onwards.
Immediate post-crisis period (2008–2009)
In the early years of the crisis, many governments 
adopted national employment programmes as a reaction 
to the crisis. These were intended to strengthen labour 
demand, often by reducing employer SSCs and/or 
introducing wage subsidies with a general character. 
In some cases, these reductions were temporary, with 
a clearly predefined period of enforcement, while in 
others they were permanent.
General employer-side tax reductions: 2008–2009
Bulgaria: Employer SSCs were effectively cut by 2.4 percentage points in 2008 (and by a further 2 percentage points in 
2009) as a result of the entry of the state as a third insurer together with the employers and the employees.
Czech Republic: Within the national anti-crisis plan of 2009, there were reductions in social security premiums paid 
by employers. The rate of health insurance paid by employers decreased from 3.3% to 2.3% in 2009. However, this 
legislation was repealed after several months due to a package of measures aimed at reducing the deficit in the public 
finances.
Finland: As part of the government’s stimulus package in 2009, the state pension insurance contribution was cut by 0.8 
percentage points for all employers from the start of April (remaining at an average level of 0.77% of the employees’ 
wage for employers in the private sector and 1.05% of the wage for other employers) and then fully removed in 2010. 
The policy was forecast to increase labour demand by 10,000 workers in the long term while savings of €495 million 
were expected due to its removal. However, it seems the reduction has been offset by the successive increases in the 
employers’ earnings-related pension contributions. According to data from the Confederation of Finnish Industries 
(EK), the total non-wage labour costs of employers have in fact increased from an average of 22.07% of wage in 2009 
(23.21% of wage in 2008) to 23.38% in 2015 due to the increases in the earnings-related pension contribution, the health 
insurance fee and unemployment insurance contribution.
Germany: Labour costs for employers were reduced through a cut in the employer contributions to statutory 
unemployment insurance funds: from 3.3% in 2008 to 2.8% in 2009.
Hungary: In April 2009, the reshuffled government, under a new Prime Minister and a mandate of crisis management, 
approved the Managing the Crisis and Building Confidence programme which reduced the contributions paid by 
employers by 5 percentage points (from 32% to 27% of gross salaries). This reform had the elements of a fiscal 
devaluation,6 since the measure was counterbalanced by increases in consumer spending taxes.
Employers’ labour taxes increased in just a few countries 
mainly as a result of concerns about domestic budgetary 
situations. This was a concern that tended to become more 
prevalent in subsequent years. In Romania, employer SSCs 
increased by 2.3 percentage points in 2009, from 18.5% 
to 20.8%, for this reason. In the UK, and as part of the 
emergency budget to counter the debt crisis, the rates of 
national insurance contributions (NICs) paid by employers 
rose permanently by 1 percentage point. Although the 
change effectively took place in 2011 under the new 
Coalition Government, it was announced in two stages by 
the previous Labour Government in its pre-budget reports in 
December 2008 and 2009.7 Employer SSCs also increased in 
Lithuania in 2009, and in Estonia where the rise was higher 
than originally planned in 2008 due to the severity of the 
crisis.
Fiscal consolidation (2010–2011)
A growing number of countries started to change their policy 
stance in 2011 and 2012 due to growing debt levels and the 
perceived need for fiscal tightening. Untargeted increases 
in employers’ labour costs were very characteristic of this 
period, together with the discontinuation of some of the 
reductions adopted in 2008–2009.
5 These two datasets can be consulted online for a comprehensive review of all the reforms adopted in the area of employers’ labour costs: LABREF (https://webgate.
ec.europa.eu/labref/public/) and the Taxation Reforms database (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/taxation_reforms_database/index_
en.htm).
6 Fiscal devaluation is a policy tool aimed at regaining competitiveness and which could be relevant against the background of the crisis for euro area countries 
given the impossibility of ‘traditional’ exchange rate devaluations within the single currency. A fiscal devaluation is defined by the OECD as ‘a shift from employers’ 
social security contributions to value added tax (VAT), as an alternative means to restore competitiveness’. The fiscal devaluation would have a neutral effect on the 
public budget and would improve external competitiveness by making exports relatively cheaper and imports relatively more expensive, therefore improving the 
balance of trade, although there are doubts about its medium- and long-term relevance as a policy strategy (Koske, 2013).
7 To mitigate the impact on individuals with lower incomes, and on the incentives for employers to take on new staff, both the primary and secondary thresholds 
were raised substantially above inflation.
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General employer-side tax increases: 2010–2011
France: The new government ended one of the last TEPA Act measures (la loi en faveur du travail, de l’emploi et du 
pouvoir d’achat, the law in favour of labour, employment and purchasing power, introduced in 2007) still in force, and 
after September 2012 extra hours worked were no longer free of social contributions for employers over and above the 
weekly 35 hours.
Greece: A ‘special solidarity contribution’ for annual incomes exceeding €12,000 was introduced in 2011, varying from 
1% to 4% on the actual or imputed taxable or tax-exempt reported income (for income earned in 2010–2014). Although 
this measure was targeted, it potentially covered a large share of the workforce.
Poland: There was an increase in employers’ pension contributions by 2 percentage points, up to 8% from 2012. 
According to government estimates, the additional revenues to the Social Insurance Fund amounted to about PLN 7 
billion (around €1.55 billion) per year.
Spain: The maximum contribution base for social security was increased by 1 percentage point from 2011.
Slovakia: From 2012, income from work performed outside contractual work was liable for full social insurance and 
health insurance contributions.
UK: From April 2011, employer rates of NICs increased by 1 percentage point.
There are also examples of general, untargeted reductions 
in employers’ labour costs in this period, although they were 
far less common than in the immediate post-crisis period.
The first Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2010 
between Greece and its international creditors made an 
overall reduction in employer contributions a prerequisite 
for financial assistance. This started in 2012 with the 
abolition of two organisations, the Workers Housing 
Organisation (OEK) and the Workers’ Health Organisation 
(OEE) which provided contributory benefits for private 
sector employees. This resulted in a reduction of 
employers’ SSCs by 1.1 percentage points and a reduction 
in social security funds of €240 million, according to the 
then Minister of Employment.
There are other cases of untargeted reductions in employers’ 
SSCs in this period. In the UK, the threshold at which 
employers start to pay NICs was raised by GBP 21 (€24 
as at 3 January 2017) per week above indexation in April 
2011. In Ireland, a temporary decrease in employer SSCs 
was adopted in 2011 to offset the reversal of the cut in the 
minimum wage. In the Czech Republic, employer allowances 
to employees’ social and health insurance were replaced in 
2011 by a tax on wages which effectively meant a reduction 
of taxes for employers. Also in 2012, when the employer 
SSCs stood at 1.4% of payroll, it was decided to reduce the 
rate back to its 2009 level of 1%.
Post-crisis (2012 to 2015)
From 2012 onwards, there was a renewed policy 
orientation towards strengthening labour demand 
through reductions in employer labour costs. Compared 
with the early stages of the crisis, these untargeted 
reductions represented a much lower proportion of the 
total interventions aimed at reducing labour costs for 
the employer. Rather than a short-term reaction to the 
crisis, these measures appear to be aimed at reducing 
employers’ labour taxes over the longer term.
General employer-side tax decreases: 2012–2015
Austria: In 2013, the newly formed Austrian governing coalition (Social Democratic Party and the Austrian People’s 
Party) announced reduced SSCs for employers in their programme to stimulate economic growth and employment. 
Employer contributions were lowered by 0.1 percentage points to 1.3% for occupational injury insurance from July 2014 
and for the Insolvency Remuneration Fund (Insolvenz-Entgelt-Fonds, IEF) from 0.55% to 0.45% as of January 2015.
Belgium: A stimulus plan was announced in 2013 that included measures to decrease employer SSCs and offer wage 
subsidies amounting to €1.3 billion. The subsidies were to be released in three stages in 2015, 2017 and 2019, each with 
funding of €450 million; the measure was mainly aimed at reducing the wage gap between Belgium and its neighbouring 
countries by 2018. Each of these three programmes will include a linear and general reduction of employer SSCs and 
a reduction targeted at low-wage workers and an increase in wage subsidies for night and shift work.
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France: The possibility of a fiscal devaluation was under discussion for several years. In 2012, the previous government 
adopted the so-called Social VAT, which would have lowered employer SSCs and increased VAT simultaneously, 
but this reform was abandoned a few months later by the newly elected centre-left government. Nevertheless, the 
political debate about increasing the cost competitiveness of French companies through a fiscal devaluation regained 
momentum with the publication of the Gallois report (Gallois, 2012). In 2013, the government presented a tax credit for 
competitiveness and employment (Crédit d’impôt pour la compétitivité et l’emploi, CICE), to be financed half through 
increases in the VAT rate and environmental taxes, and half through a reduction in public spending, therefore containing 
elements of a fiscal devaluation. As of 2014, the standard VAT rate was raised from 19.6% to 20%, while the reduced 
rate increased from 7% to 10%. In addition, a carbon tax was introduced and some additional measures in the area 
of environmental taxation were enacted. Although the CICE is supposed to target low-paid employees, in practice it 
covers around 82% of workers. According to some simulation studies, the CICE is expected to increase GDP by 0.1 to 
0.3 percentage points and to create around 130,000–150,000 new jobs over a two to four-year time frame (Plane, 2012; 
Espinoza and Ruiz, 2014).
Greece: In 2014, the government completed the second cut in employer SSCs agreed with creditors. Contributions 
were cut by 1.1 percentage points in 2012 and then by 2.9 percentage points in 2014, through the abolition of the 
contributions to various funds covering sickness and maternity benefits. According to the Minister of Employment and 
Social Security, this reduction, together with a 1 percentage point reduction in employees’ contributions, was to result in 
a €800 million reduction in social security funds.
Italy: Reduced employer SSCs for companies for accident and illness funds were adopted in 2013. Moreover, companies 
became entitled to a tax deduction of up to €15,000 for each new permanent hiring, provided the number of workers 
employed under an open-ended employment contract within the company increased.
Latvia: The mandatory employer SSCs rate was reduced from 24.09% in 2013 to 23.59% in 2014.
Romania: A reduction in employer SSCs by 5 percentage points (from 20.8% to 15.8%) was sanctioned from October 
2014.
Spain: In early 2014, the government discussed proposals for a fiscal devaluation, prepared by a committee of experts 
selected by the Minister of Finance (Comisión de Expertos para la Reforma del Sistema Tributario Español). However, 
recently announced taxation reforms do not include any further reduction in employer SSCs, apart from the targeted 
ones covered later in the report. On consumer spending taxation, Spain increased the standard VAT rate by 2 and 3 
percentage points in 2010 and 2013, respectively, and the reduced rate from 7% to 10%.
Targeted reforms in employers’ labour costs
The European policy debate has generally favoured 
targeted reforms to reduce the costs borne by employers 
and these have been more extensively used across 
Member States, especially in more recent years. Targeted 
interventions are aimed in almost all cases at reducing 
employers’ labour costs, with one exception: cases 
of differential employer labour tax rates intended to 
incentivise the creation of permanent employment in 
highly segmented labour markets. In some cases, these 
operate by penalising temporary contracts with higher 
rates of employer SSCs.
In the early stages of the crisis, some targeted measures 
responded to the negative shock in labour markets by 
trying to save jobs or specifically targeting redundant 
workers or companies at risk. In the second stage of 
the crisis (2010–2011), against a background of fiscal 
consolidation across many countries, there was a focus 
on incentives to support employment in small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and to encourage 
start-ups, entrepreneurship or self-employment. Most 
recently, in 2012 and especially from 2013 up to the 
present, there has been a large increase in the number 
of targeted measures. The groups targeted include the 
young, older, long-term unemployed, those on temporary 
contracts and those in disadvantaged regions. This reflects 
the concern of policymakers about the disproportionate 
effect of several years of depressed labour markets on 
people who fall into these categories. It may also reflect 
increasing evidence of the relative cost-effectiveness of 
targeted measures, particularly their comparatively limited 
deadweight losses and high labour demand elasticities 
among targeted groups.
The next section presents a selection of the relevant 
measures by target group.
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Start-ups, small companies and crisis-hit companies
Austria: The period during which start-ups can make use of the benefits is important, as illustrated by the Austrian case, 
where initially start-ups had 12 months to take advantage of partial exemption from various contributions.8 This window 
was extended in 2011 to up to three years (during which exemption from the employers’ contribution could be granted for 
12 months). The decision to extend the time frame was because start-ups often do not have any staff in the first year. During 
the first year, there is no limit on the number of employees for whom a start-up can ask for exemptions. In the second and 
third years after start-up, the exemption of employer contributions can only be claimed for the first three employees.
Belgium: A more generous reduction in SSCs was agreed in 2011 for SMEs for their first three recruitments. The measure 
took effect in 2013. The reduction had a sliding scale: for the first hiring, employer SSCs were reduced by €1,500 per 
quarter during the first five quarters, €1,000 per quarter during the next four quarters and €400 per quarter during the 
four following quarters; for the third hiring, the reduction was €1,000 per quarter during the five first quarters and €400 
for a further four quarters.
France: Employer SSCs were reduced for new jobs created in small companies during 2009, setting them to zero at 
minimum wage levels.
Ireland: A subsidy was introduced for eligible manufacturing and internationally trading enterprises that had identified 
a number of full-time jobs at risk as a result of the economic downturn. Successful applicants could get a subsidy of up 
to €200 per week for each person working full time (an average 35-hour week) for the first 26 weeks, then declining to 
a maximum of €9,100 over the 15-month period to November 2010, capped at a maximum €500,000 per enterprise.
Hungary. The first employee employed by micro-companies run by families or self-employed individuals was offered a wage 
supplement of between HUF 66,000 and HUF 106,000 (€212–€341 as at 31 December 2016) and a waiver of SSCs for 12 
months, provided the employment continued for at least three months afterwards. This measure was introduced in 2008.
Latvia. Microenterprises (up to five employees) pay a lower rate of employer contributions: the nominal rate of social 
contributions is 34.09% of payroll, while the microenterprise tax is 9% of payroll, 65% of which must be dedicated to 
social insurance.9
Lithuania: A subsidy available to small enterprises starting businesses in 2010 covered SSCs and business licence 
acquisition costs.
Portugal: From 2012, mandatory SSCs were reimbursed to start-up companies when they offered full-time employment 
contracts of at least 18 months’ duration to skilled workers.
Spain and Sweden: In both Member States, special exemptions were introduced for companies with crisis-related 
difficulties. In Spain, viable companies experiencing temporary economic problems were able during 2009 to postpone 
social security payments if they made a commitment to maintain employment. In Sweden, employers could apply to 
defer payments of preliminary taxes for their employees during a two-month period in 2009. The deferment was for 
a maximum of one year and applied to wages paid between February and December 2009.
UK: Businesses set up in the three tax years from 2010 (excluding those in London, the south-east and eastern England) 
were exempt for one year from NICs for the first 10 employees hired in the first year of trading. The exemption was 
capped at a maximum of GBP 5,000 (€5,800) per employee and was worth up to GBP 50,000 (€58,000) per business for up 
to 400,000 businesses, with a total Exchequer cost of GBP 0.9 billion (€1.04 billion) spread over three years.
The unemployment rates of young people have reached 
record highs in Europe since the onset of the crisis. As 
opposed to previous episodes, when older cohorts exited 
the labour market in greater numbers due to industrial 
restructuring, young people have disproportionately carried 
the burden of labour market adjustment since 2008. The 
policy response to this at EU level culminated in the 2013 
Youth Guarantee. As a consequence, this is the group that 
has been most commonly targeted. The age thresholds 
used when defining young people varies across countries 
and policies; for some apprenticeship measures, for 
instance, the qualifying age ranges from the early twenties 
up to the age of 35 in some countries. In some cases, such 
as Belgium and France, additional requirements related to 
the low education levels or poor skill levels of the young 
people. In countries with very high graduate unemployment 
such as Italy and Spain, some schemes have been targeted 
at graduates. In others, measures are linked to the labour 
market entry of young people; these include exemptions or 
reductions in employer taxes that apply only to employers 
taking on employees in their first job as in, for instance, 
Austria and Croatia. Typically, the measures require that the 
person remains employed for a relatively long time or for 
a certain time after the programme is over.
8 Employers do not have to pay employer contributions to the Family Burdens Equalisation Fund (Familienlastenausgleichsfonds, FLAF), to housing subsidies 
(Wohnbauförderung), occupational injury insurance and surcharges for the Federal Economic Chamber (Kammerumlage).
9 In 2015, the microenterprise tax rate increased to 11% for microenterprises whose turnover was €7,000.01–€100,000 (9% for microenterprises whose turnover does 
not exceed € 7,000), while the share of the microenterprise tax paid into the social insurance budget increased to 69.4% of the total.
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Young people
Austria: In 2010, the Aktion +6.000 programme targeted young people under the age of 25 who could not find a job after 
completing their education. The public employment service paid over 50% of all total payroll costs for an employee 
during their first six months of work.
Companies set up in the previous five years that had decided to train apprentices for the first time, or established 
businesses that had stopped training apprentices and wanted to start again were eligible for the Youth Employment 
Package (Jugendbeschäftigungspaket), which from 2009 gave them a ‘basic subsidy’ (Basisförderung) for each apprentice 
hired; this was the equivalent of three months of an apprentice’s gross salary paid after the first year, two months’ salary 
after the second, and one month’s salary after the third and fourth year. They could also apply for a one-time subsidy of 
€2,000 for each apprentice (Blum-Bonus II).
Belgium: Reductions in employer SSCs were offered in Belgium from July 2013 for companies employing low-skilled 
job-seekers aged under 27 years; the workers were additionally entitled to a working allowance paid by the National 
Employment Office (ONEM/NEO).
Croatia: Employers have been exempted from contributions since 2012 when recruiting people below 30 years of age 
who either did not have work experience in the skill or profession for which they had educational qualifications, or who 
were long-term unemployed (registered for more than two years with the Croatian Employment Service).
In 2009, employers who gave someone their first job were exempt from pension insurance contributions for a year.
Finland: In 2010, the government had created a hiring subsidy for people below 25 years of age. With the launching 
of the Youth Guarantee in 2013, the subsidy was extended to cover all unemployed people younger than 30 (€700 
per month for up to 10 months, covering 30%, 40% or 50% of the hiring costs depending on the duration of previous 
unemployment).
France: The Jobs for the Future (Emplois d’avenir) programme, targeted at youngsters having serious problems entering 
the job market, was set up in France in 2012. Under the scheme, 75% of the gross wage is paid by the State for three 
years and priority is given to those aged between 16 and 25 who have no qualifications and especially those living in 
urban or rural areas with high unemployment.
Greece: In 2012, a programme targeted at highly skilled young people (including degree holders up to the age of 35, 
graduates from Greek higher education institutes and holders of undergraduate or postgraduate degrees) gave private 
employers a grant (€25 per day for unemployed people over 25 years and €20 per day for those under 25 years) for 
a maximum of 24 months if they agreed to keep the newly recruited employees for at least an extra three months.
Hungary: The First Job Guarantee Programme started in Hungary in 2013, providing employment opportunities for 
young job-seekers under the age of 25 (primarily the unskilled and first-time job seekers). It offers potential employers 
a maximum of six months’ wage subsidy on condition that the employment continues for at least half as long again as 
the period during which the employer received the subsidy.
Italy: A 35% tax credit (capped at a maximum of €200,000 per year and per company) was made available to encourage 
the recruitment of high-skilled young people, in particular those with a technical/scientific specialisation.
In 2011, employers with up to nine workers were granted 100% relief on SSCs for up to three years when contracting 
apprentices aged between 15 and 29 years, while employers with 10 or more workers paid reduced SSCs for apprentices 
over the whole period.
Latvia: The Latvian Work Places for Young People (Darba vieta jaunietim) programme, co-funded by the European Social 
Fund (ESF), was set up in 2011 and subsidises jobs for young people between 18 and 24 years of age who have been 
unemployed for at least six months (or have recently been on childcare leave, or have a disability). The subsidy covers 
50% of the monthly wage for nine months (with an upper limit of €142 for the first six months and €71 for the next three 
months).10
10 It replaced the Work Practice for Young People (Jauniešu darba prakse) programme, which was discontinued following an evaluation suggesting that it was being 
used by employers as a source of cheap labour rather than as a genuine training initiative.
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Lithuania: The ESF-funded project, Increasing Youth Employment (Jaunimo užimtumo didinimas),11 was launched in 
August 2012 to support those aged under 29 years with no previous job experience (including long-term unemployed 
young people), subsidising them for six months while they acquired working skills on-the-job or for four months 
of employment. The subsidy reimbursed the employer for up to 50% of salary costs (and up to 75% for disabled 
employees).12
Netherlands: From 2014, a programme (Premiekorting jongere werknemer) subsidised the labour costs of new 
employees aged between 18 and 26 years who had previously been unemployed or on welfare benefits for at least six 
months. Employer SSCs were reduced if these new recruits were employed for at least 36 hours per week (reduced to 24 
hours in 2015). The reduction applies throughout the duration of the contract up to a maximum of two years and up to 
a ceiling of €3,500 per employee per year.
Slovenia: A new measure was introduced in 2013 that partially reimburses employer SSCs if a person under 26 years, or 
a mother with a child under the age of three is hired and the job is their first. However, the employment must last for at 
least two years and the employer can ask for the reimbursement only at the end of the first year. The reimbursement is 
50% during the first year of employment and 30% in the second year of employment.
Employers who, between November 2013 and December 2014, hired on a permanent contract someone who had 
been unemployed for at least three months and was under 30 years of age were exempt from all of the main employer 
contribution categories (including health, pension and disability) for the first 24 months of employment.
Spain: Launched in 2013, the work experience contract (Contrato en prácticas) consisted of a 50% reduction in employer 
SSCs (with a 50% additional deduction for employing youngsters benefiting from the National Youth Guarantee System) 
when recruiting people under the age of 30 (or 35 if disabled).
Sweden: It was announced in the 2014 budget that SSCs for people under 23 years at the start of the year would be 
reduced to 10.21% (while the previous reduction would no longer apply to those who had reached the age of 25).
UK: Existing exemptions were extended from April 2015; NICs previously levied at 13.8% on wages between GBP 153 
(€171) per week and just over GBP 800 (€899) per week were removed for approximately 1.5 million young people 
currently in employment who were aged 21 and under.
The labour market situation of older workers has been 
improving and their employment levels have continued 
to grow over the crisis period. Nonetheless, in cases 
of involuntary job loss, older workers are generally 
considered more vulnerable. The likelihood of them 
finding new employment is much lower than their younger 
counterparts. For this reason, they account for a relatively 
high share of the long-term unemployed (European 
Commission, 2014b).
Although fewer reforms aimed at reducing employers’ 
labour costs target this group than target younger 
workers, an increase in such reforms can be observed 
in recent years. The age limits set in such reforms vary 
across countries and policies. Some are as low as 45 (in 
Portugal), but generally they apply to those over the age 
of 50. In many countries, the magnitude of the exemptions 
increases with age, as in Belgium, although in others 
restrictions are imposed on eligible jobs in terms of upper 
limits for wages. Measures may target an older worker who 
may be considered a ‘returner’ to the labour market after 
being unemployed for a certain time or, in some cases, 
older long-term unemployed people (as in Malta). Training 
may be necessary for older workers who have been out of 
the labour market for some time and this can be taken into 
account, as in the Slovenian 50plus scheme.
11 This programme replaced a previous one that ran from August 2010 to July 2012 exempting employers from pension social insurance contributions (representing 
23.3% of gross) for a maximum of one year when employing someone in their first job and whose remuneration did not exceed three times the minimum monthly 
wage of LTL 2,400 (€696) before tax.
12 The employer pays the employee’s wage and all related social insurance contributions in full, but a portion of these costs is then reimbursed. Up to LTL 1,700 
(€493) can be reimbursed per month, but there is a cap of LTL 391 (€113) per month for one employed person, which means employers are compensated for 
approximately 23% of each individual’s salary costs. The relatively low nominal value of the subsidy means that beneficiaries will mostly be in the low-skilled/low-
income segment.
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Older people
Belgium: Reduction of social contributions (€1,600 per year and per employee) for companies that hire workers over 
57 years was offered in Belgium from 2012. Graduated reductions were also offered to workers from the age of 50, the 
reduction in contributions starting at €200 per year for employees aged 50 and increasing with age. For workers aged 
50–57, one condition was that the overall wage should not exceed €4,000 per month. Previously, from 2008, Belgian 
employers could reduce contributions by a rate that increased in line with the age of the employee from 54 to 65 years 
(€400 per quarter for employees aged 54–57 years, €1,000 for those aged 58–61, €1,500 for those aged 62–64) when 
hiring people aged at least 54 years and where the gross wage did not exceed €13,401 per quarter.
Malta: An annual tax deduction of €5,800 was introduced in 2014 for employers hiring older people who had been 
unemployed for the previous three years, with an additional tax deduction on their income or corporate tax of 50% for 
training costs (up to a maximum of €400) if training was offered through a provider officially accredited by the Malta 
Qualifications Council.
Netherlands: From 2009 up to 2012, employers could claim an annual subsidy of €6,500 per employee for a maximum of 
three years to finance their SSCs when recruiting an older worker for at least 36 hours a week. The age threshold was 50 
years of age and recipients had to previously have been in receipt of social benefits. In 2012, the subsidy was increased 
to €7,000 per year and employee. The age threshold was set to rise to over 55 years of age from 2015.
Poland: From 2013, employers benefited from a wage subsidy for 12 months when hiring an unemployed person over 50 
years and for 24 months when the unemployed person was over 60. One condition was that the wage could not exceed 
50% of the minimum wage and the employment had to continue after the expiry of the subsidy for at least half as long as 
the subsidy had been paid.
Portugal: From 2013, when hiring unemployed people aged over 45, Portuguese employers could have a full refund of 
the Single Social Tax (TSU) for up to 18 months when offering permanent employment and a partial refund (75%) for 
fixed-term employment.
Romania: From 2013, employers hiring registered unemployed individuals aged 45 and over received a monthly 
payment equal to the Reference Social Indicator – set at RON 500 (€110) for 12 months – although the employment 
relationship with those employed had to last at least 18 months. This measure was available also when hiring people 
within five years of early or statutory retirement age.
Slovenia: The ‘50plus’ measure in Slovenia offers on-the-job training to those aged 50 or above who have been 
registered as unemployed for more than six months. The training lasts for a month and must be followed by full 
employment for at least 18 months with the same employer. The employer gets an €8,000 subsidy for each person 
recruited to work full time, or proportionally less for part-time employment.
People who have been unemployed for some time may 
progressively lose their labour market attachment and 
find it more difficult to reintegrate into the workforce. 
This is why some policies have targeted this group, 
particularly in recent years, although they are much less 
common than those targeting young and older people. 
The period of unemployment considered to be long-term 
unemployment varies and the magnitude of benefits may 
also depend on the duration of previous unemployment. 
Many measures targeted at the long-term unemployed 
involve elements of training which may be important for 
people who have been out of employment for a long time 
and whose skills may have deteriorated.
Employment effects of reduced non-wage labour costs
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Long-term unemployed
Bulgaria: A programme for the training and employment of the long-term unemployed was introduced in 2015. The 
training leads to professional qualifications followed by employment in the private sector. The employer receives 
reductions in SSCs and a wage subsidy (based on the minimum statutory wage); the subsidised salary under the 
programme for 2015 was BGN 360 (around €185) per month. Priority recipients include the long-term unemployed 
registered at the Labour Office for at least 12 months who are aged 29 or under and receiving monthly social assistance, 
or those over 50 years of age.
Estonia: From 2009, Estonian employers hiring a person registered as unemployed for at least 12 consecutive months 
(or 6 months for those aged 16–24) could apply for a subsidy of 50% of their wage, up to a maximum of half the national 
minimum monthly wage and for up to six months. Coverage was extended in 2010 to all those registered as unemployed 
for at least six months (or three months for those aged 16–24) before being hired, which had the effect of considerably 
increasing the uptake of the measure.
Finland: A new hiring subsidy implemented in 2015 covers a varying amount of the hiring costs depending on the 
duration of the unemployment (ranging from 30%, 40% or 50% of the hiring costs and lasting for 6 or 12 months, or even 
more, depending on the length of the previous unemployment period). The subsidy also depends on the type of person 
targeted. Apart from being aimed at the long-term unemployed, criteria include an upper wage limit and also make it 
possible for the benefit to be made available for people who belong to another specified disadvantaged category, even if 
they may not fit the formal definition of long-term unemployed.
Ireland: The Irish JobPlus initiative, set up in July 2013, subsidises the gross wage for up to two years when someone 
has been registered as unemployed for at least 12 months (on the Live Register) and is hired full-time. The subsidy is 
worth €7,500 over the course of two years for someone previously unemployed for between 12 and 24 months, and 
€10,000 for someone previously unemployed for over 24 months. This initiative replaced two previous programmes, 
the Employer Job Incentive scheme and the Revenue Job Assist scheme, moving the focus away from employer SSCs to 
direct wage subsidies.
Slovakia: Since late 2013, employers may be exempt from most social and health contributions for a year for a worker 
previously registered as unemployed for more than 12 months. The employee’s monthly income must not have been 
higher than 67% of the average monthly salary in the year before the employment relationship started. Another 
requirement is that the employer does not fire staff in order to recruit someone eligible for the scheme.
The unemployment effects of the crisis have not been 
spread evenly across countries or across regions. Due to 
the concentrated effects of the crisis in certain areas, over 
the past few years some regions have been targeted by 
specific policies.
Disadvantaged regions
France: An evaluation of an earlier programme for ‘tax-free zones’ (economically depressed areas) concluded that the 
jobs created did not sufficiently benefit local people and future programmes should therefore be more focused on 
employment and less on companies. As a result, the Emplois francs programme (‘tax-free zone’ employment provision) 
was set up in 2013 as a way to support better access or return to work for young people (up to 30 years old) living in 
disadvantaged urban areas (zones urbaines sensibles, ZUS). Participating companies were offered financial support of 
€5,000 per recruited employee. Take-up of the scheme was, however, much lower than expected and the scheme was 
ended in 2015.
Hungary: The government declared more than 1,000 disadvantaged areas as ‘Free enterprise zones’. The enterprises 
operating in these areas could apply for an exemption from employer contributions on wages up to a gross salary of HUF 
100,000 (about €320) for any new employee. From 2013, the only condition was that staff numbers increased.
Lithuania: From 2013, employers have been offered subsidies for new jobs in regions with above-average 
unemployment rates. Employers undertake to pay at least 35% of the labour cost of the new employees and to maintain 
their employment for at least three years. Employers were also obliged to provide a letter of guarantee from a bank or 
insurance company covering 50% of the subsidy amount (initially it was 100%, but this was judged to be a disincentive 
and modified).
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Incentives for employers to create permanent employment 
or to convert existing temporary jobs to permanent 
status have been implemented in countries having 
a highly segmented labour market and characterised 
by high levels of temporary employment. The two main 
countries to use such incentives have been Italy and 
Spain. The measures typically involve differential levels of 
employer contributions for different employment statuses. 
Employers pay higher rates for fixed-term contracts than 
for open-ended contracts. In some cases, such as Italy, 
recent policy changes serve in part to correct past reforms 
that had precisely the opposite effect – incentivising non-
standard employment – and implemented in previous 
periods in an attempt to stimulate flexible forms of 
employment and hence raise employment levels.
Promoting standard employment
France. The rates of employers’ unemployment insurance contributions for short-term and fixed-term contracts were 
raised in 2013 from 4% to 7% for fixed-term employment contracts of less than 1 month, 5.5% for contracts of between 1 
month and 3 months, and 4.5 % for customary fixed-term employment contracts of less than 3 months (contrat à durée 
déterminé d’usage). Exemptions were granted for hiring young people on permanent contracts.
Italy: Several reforms were adopted in recent years to discourage atypical employment and incentivise permanent 
hiring. In 2011, pension contribution rates were raised by 1 percentage point for pseudo-subcontracting workers (some 
self-employed workers and so-called ‘co-co-co contracts’ – coordinated and continuous collaboration contracts). 
In 2012, the contribution rates for the new Social Insurance (ASPI) were revised and the contribution for permanent 
contracts was set at 1.31%, while that of other contracts was raised by an additional 1.4%. At the same time, the 
placement contract (contratto di inserimento), created in 2003 to increase the employment of disadvantaged workers by 
providing employers with wage and social security breaks, was abolished.
In 2013, two new measures were adopted. First, for each new recruitment in open-ended contracts, the employer 
can deduct a maximum of €8,060 per year from SSCs over 36 months following the hiring. This is equivalent to 
a full exemption for wage levels below €36,000. Second, a related measure exists for people aged 18–29 who are in 
‘disadvantaged conditions’ (unemployed for at least six months or not holding a secondary education qualification). 
Employers are entitled to a bonus of up to €650 per month for 18 months for each new recruit with an open-ended 
contract (excluding job sharing and on-call employment relationships). This applied only to jobs starting between 7 
August 2013 and 30 June 2015. Where a fixed-term contract was turned into an open-ended one, the bonus lasted only 
12 months.
Portugal. In 2008, employer SSCs on permanent contracts were cut by 1 percentage point, financed by an increase in the 
rate for fixed-term contracts by 3 percentage points. The aim was to incentivise employers to hire workers on permanent 
contracts.
Slovenia. Employer SSCs and taxes were significantly increased in 2013 for contract types typically used by employers to 
acquire low-cost labour, in an attempt to discourage their use.
Spain: From 2013, employers could receive a bonus of €500 for men and €700 for women per year, to be deducted 
from the social security quotas paid by the company, when converting the First Young Job contract of young people 
under the age of 30 into a permanent contract.13 This is a type of fixed-term contract for young people registered 
with the public employment service who do not have any previous work experience. A significant reduction in social 
security contributions was introduced in 2014 for employers recruiting on open-ended contracts signed between 25 
February 2014 and 31 December 2014, since they would only have to pay the so-called flat rate contributions for 24 
months, amounting to €100 per month for full-time employment (reduced pro-rata for part-time working). At the end 
of 2014, employers were granted a social security bonus for giving permanent contracts to people benefiting from the 
National Youth Guarantee System and other categories of unemployed workers, including victims of gender violence, 
terrorism and people with disabilities. Employers can benefit for between six months and four years, depending on the 
employee hired. In 2015, a new law granted employers a bonus of €500 per month to be discounted from their common 
contingencies SSCs for recruiting new employees on permanent contracts. The benefits last for 24 months and apply 
only to contracts signed between 28 February 2015 and 31 August 2016.
The problem of low pay is typically intertwined with that 
of low skills, since people with low levels of educational 
attainment are much more likely to receive lower levels of 
pay. Measures targeted at low-paid employees typically 
overlap with those aimed at other groups already 
discussed, but there are some policies where low pay is 
itself the most important target.
13 While these measures to encourage permanent employment were implemented, Spain also adopted in 2013 a measure that offered incentives to employers who 
hired workers through temporary employment agencies.
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Low-paid workers
Belgium: Reductions in employer SSCs when hiring low-paid employees were cut in 2008 from 15.99% to 12.57% of 
contributions paid on the minimum wage from 21 years of age.
Czech Republic: Reductions in employer SSCs were available from 2009 to the end of 2010, applying to employees 
whose assessment basis14 was lower than 1.15 times the average wage. The monthly reduction of contributions for each 
employee was 3.3% of the difference between 1.15 of the average wage (CZK 27,100, about €1,042) and the assessment 
basis of the employee, but its maximum value could not exceed 25% of the assessment basis of the employee.
France: Since the early 1990s, the focus of French policy has been to reduce non-wage labour costs for low wages (Bunel 
and L'Horty, 2012). Two recent major reforms have been initiated to reduce these costs for low-waged workers to boost 
employment, investment and the international competitiveness of the French economy. First, the so-called tax credit for 
competitiveness and employment (Crédit d’impôt pour la compétitivité et l’emploi, CICE) reduces by 6 percentage points the 
total staff costs for individual wages that do not exceed 2.5 times the national minimum wage.15 CICE was complemented in 
early 2014 by the Responsibility and Solidarity Pact (Pacte de Responsabilité et Solidarité, PRS) which stipulates further cuts 
in employer SSCs. As of January 2015, a reduction of 28.35% applies to wages up to the national minimum wage (27.95% 
for companies with fewer than 20 employees). The rate progressively declines up to the upper limit of 1.6 times the national 
minimum wage (currently €2,332 per month for full-time employment of 151.67 hours). At the same time, employers’ 
contributions for family allowances were reduced by 1.8 percentage points, from 5.25% to 3.45%. The combined effect of 
CICE and the targeted PRS, if unfinanced by spending cuts, is estimated to boost output by 0.5 percentage points and to 
create around 290,000 jobs in the short term. In the long term, around 600,000 jobs could be created if cuts in employer SSCs 
are not targeted and the reform remains unfinanced by spending cuts (Espinoza and Ruiz, 2014).
Finally, a more limited set of interventions has been 
identified where the targeting is based on incentivising 
employment across gender, family situation, disability, 
specific activities/sectors or multiple groups.
Measures with multiple targets
Portugal: A series of employment initiatives was launched from 2008 onwards including reductions in employer SSCs and 
employment subsidies for many groups. They include:
¢ a 3 percentage point reduction in employer SSCs for hiring workers aged 45 years or more in SMEs;
¢ a 50% reduction in the conversion of temporary contracts into full-time, open-ended contracts;
¢ a 36-month exemption of employer SSCs for new permanent contracts given to people below 36 years of age seeking 
their first job, or unemployed people above 54 years of age. An alternative was the direct transfer of €2,000 from 
public funds followed by exemption from employer SSCs for only 24 months.
The above measures implemented in the 2008 Initiative for Investment and Employment (Iniciativa para o Investimento 
e Emprego) have been extended in subsequent years to include:
¢ a 1 percentage point reduction for workers earning the minimum wage;
¢ a 50% and 65% reduction (in the first and the following two years, respectively) for new fixed-term contracts given to 
people over 40 years of age who have been registered with the public employment service for over nine months;
¢ a 65% and 80% reduction (in the first and the following two years, respectively) for new workers who have been 
unemployed for two or more years – this could be combined with a direct transfer from public funds of €2,500, in 
which case the reduction in employer SSCs would last for 24 months;16
¢ a 36-month exemption from employer SSCs when a company hires an intern on a permanent contract.
Many of these measures excluded companies in which the number of workers with a permanent contract had decreased 
in the previous year; many were conditional on employment levels being at least maintained during the period of receipt 
of benefits.
14 The sum of taxable income items according to income tax rules for individuals who are not exempted from that tax, and which were credited to an employee by an 
employer in relation to his employment, which is subject to obligatory health insurance or pension insurance only.
15 In practice, this covers more than 80% of workers. For this reason, this measure was also included in the section on untargeted reductions in employers’ labour 
costs.
16 Beneficiaries of Social Insertion Income, beneficiaries of a disability pension, former drug addicts or former prison detainees could benefit as well.
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Spain: A new law (11/2013) introduced a number of measures involving exemption from employer SSCs for specific 
groups:
¢ 12 months’ exemption in enterprises with fewer than 250 workers (75% reduction if more than 250 workers) when 
hiring unemployed people under the age of 30 in part-time jobs with a training component;
¢ 12 months’ exemption for people under 30 years of age when recruited on permanent contracts by microenterprises 
(<10 employees);
¢ 12 months’ for employees over 45 when the employer is self-employed, younger than 30, without employees and 
recruiting an employee for the first time.
An interesting policy design feature of these measures is that they are intended to remain in place until the 
unemployment rate in Spain falls below 15%.
Women in areas with a large gender employment gap
Italy: Insertion contracts (contratto di inserimento) aimed at integrating difficult-to-employ individuals were extended 
in 2011 to women who had not had a job for at least six months in areas where there is a significant gender gap (a 
gap in the employment rate of at least 20 percentage points and in the unemployment rate of 10 percentage points). 
Employment on such contracts is for between 9 and 18 months, and employers pay reduced SSCs.
Parents returning to work
Hungary: As of 1 January 2011, Hungarian employers could pay SSCs at a rate of 20% instead of 27% for up to three 
years when hiring employees returning from childcare leave. One condition was that the job should be shared for at least 
one year between the returning employee and the worker who had been hired as a temporary replacement, with the 
working time shared equally between them. Another condition was that the wage should be no more than 200% of the 
statutory minimum wage.
Poland: Employers were exempted in 2009 from paying contributions for 36 months (to the Labour Fund and the Fund of 
Guaranteed Employee Benefits, accounting for around 2.5% of the gross wage) for employees coming back to work after 
maternity or parental leave.
Spain: In a plan introduced in 2008 to stimulate the economy, incentives were introduced for companies hiring (on 
permanent and full-time contracts) unemployed people with children. Rebates on employer SSCs of €1,500 per year 
for each hired worker were offered for two years (for contracts running until December 2010). In practice, the main 
beneficiaries were women. This benefit also applied to women who had suffered from gender violence, regardless of 
whether they had children or not.
People with disabilities
Malta: An employer hiring a new employee with a disability (individuals who have an intellectual and/or physical 
impairment, and individuals suffering from mental health problems) from 2015 is exempt from paying SSCs and may 
also claim a tax deduction on profits equivalent to the wage of the employee up to an annual maximum of €4,500 for 
each employee.
Netherlands: Reductions in employer SSCs for hiring a worker receiving disability benefits have increased over 
time. From 2013, employers can receive up to €7,000 per employee per year (compared with €1,021 in 2006). Another 
programme covers all labour costs from 2013 for employers recruiting people in receipt of disability (or unemployment) 
benefits for a trial period: during the first two months, the employer is exempt from labour costs (both wage and non-
wage costs) and the worker retains their benefits.
Employment effects of reduced non-wage labour costs
22
Part-time workers and multiple job holders
Estonia: Two targeted measures were introduced in 2010 for part-time jobs. The social tax contribution for the employer 
was reduced for up to a year when hiring a long-term unemployed person (defined as being unemployed for at least 
six months for 12 months before the start of work) in a part-time job. The employer social tax contributions were also 
reduced if an employee worked in more than one job. Previously, one employer of a worker with two or more jobs had to 
pay the minimum social tax contribution calculated on the basis of the national monthly minimum wage, while the other 
employer/s paid the tax on the basis of the actual monthly gross wage. As of 1 July 2010, each employer can pay the 
social tax on the basis of the actual monthly payment.
Spain: Employer SSCs were reduced in 2011 for the recruitment of certain groups of unemployed people on a part-
time contract (working hours between 50% and 75% of a full-time job) for at least six months. The eligible groups were 
unemployed people below 31 years of age or the long-term unemployed. Companies hiring within 12 months of the date 
that the measure was introduced benefited from a 100% reduction for 12 months if they had fewer than 250 employees, 
and a 75% reduction if they had more. One condition was that benefiting companies must demonstrate a net increase in 
employment.
Promoting research activities
Spain: A 40% reduction in employer SSCs is granted for the whole duration of the employment contract when hiring 
workers involved exclusively in research and development (R&D) tasks from 2014.
Sweden: To stimulate investment in R&D, especially in smaller companies, in 2014 employer SSCs for individuals 
working within the R&D sector were cut by 10% for those aged between 26 and 64 years. The upper limit of the reduction 
was SEK 230,000 (€24,885 as at 22 May 2015) per employer and month.
Summary
Since 2008 and the onset of the global financial crisis, 
there has been a growing policy consensus on the 
desirability of reducing labour taxation, and in particular 
employer-side taxes, as one way of fuelling demand 
for labour. However, as the examples presented in this 
chapter indicate, the reforms implemented across many 
European countries have not always been in line with 
this consensus. In the initial years of the crisis, against 
a background of fiscal stimulus programmes, the tax-
cutting orientation was generally followed. There was 
an increase in the number of reforms aimed at lowering 
SSCs or implementing employment subsidies. However, 
the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis from 2010 
onwards coincided with a clear decline in the number of 
policies to reduce employer contributions. A number of 
labour tax-raising reforms were implemented in many 
countries because of concerns over budgetary stability. 
In more recent years, since 2013, policy orientations and 
practice appear once again to be more in alignment. 
Data on employer SSC levels clearly reflect these trends, 
decreasing up to 2010, increasing in 2011 and 2012 and 
then once more declining.
Another change over time has been in the level of targeting 
in the tax breaks. Targeted measures have assumed more 
prominence over time. In the immediate aftermath of 
the global financial crisis, broad, untargeted measures 
were relatively more prominent. In the post-2012 period, 
most new measures have been largely targeted at 
disadvantaged groups that are underrepresented in the 
workforce; young people, older workers or the long-term 
unemployed. Measures have been intended, at least 
in part, to address the disproportionate labour market 
impact of the crisis and post-crisis period on these groups. 
Targeted measures are also more likely to minimise one 
of the common weaknesses of such measures: substantial 
deadweight losses. Moreover, they are relatively more 
cost-effective – an important consideration in a period of 
severely constrained public finances.
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2 Impact on employment of reduced 
non-wage labour costs – literature 
review
Impact of the tax wedge on labour 
supply and demand
During the years preceding the Great Recession, most EU 
countries displayed a downward trend in labour taxation. 17 
However, the tax wedge remains high on average in Europe 
compared with other industrial, developed countries 
such as the USA, Canada or Japan. Different authors have 
analysed the impact of the tax wedge on the labour market 
and on the overall economy. In the model presented by 
Alesina and Perotti (1997), a rise in transfers, for example 
to retirees, financed by payroll or corporate taxes can lead 
to higher relative unit labour costs for tradeable products, 
an appreciation in the relative price of non-tradeables 
and a subsequent decrease in the employment level in all 
sectors of the economy. According to Nickell (2003), a 10 
percentage point increase in the tax wedge should reduce 
labour input by 1%–3%. By comparing France, Germany 
and Italy with the USA, Nickell (2003) found that the 
difference in the tax wedge accounts for around a quarter 
of the difference observed in the employment rates 
between the USA and the large continental countries.
On empirical grounds, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) found 
that the response of unemployment to labour taxation is 
particularly strong in Europe. They argued that levels of 
collective representation were higher in Europe and, as 
a result, higher tax rates on labour were indeed shifted 
into higher gross wages in Europe – but not in the other 
OECD countries. If labour costs increase as a response to 
an increase in the tax wedge, labour inputs become more 
expensive relative to capital. Companies are encouraged 
to substitute capital for labour, implying that the marginal 
product for capital will tend to fall in equilibrium. Due to 
decreasing returns, the incentives to accumulate capital 
may decline over time, implying lower long-term growth. 
A 10 percentage point increase in labour taxes reduces 
output growth rate by 0.4 percentage points per year and 
raises unemployment by 4 percentage points.
Knabe et al (2006) found that an increase in the net tax 
wedge (measured as the tax wedge less cash benefits) 
of 1 percentage point would raise the low-skilled 
unemployment rate by 0.2 percentage points in high 
wedge countries, even after controlling for the public 
employment share. In contrast, Dolenc and Laporšek 
(2010) concluded that an increase of the tax wedge of 1 
percentage point is expected to decrease EU employment 
growth by a more modest 0.04 percentage points. 18
Policies aimed at lowering the tax wedge are often directed 
at specific segments of the labour market, such as the 
low-skilled, women, young people, older workers and 
migrants, as they are subject to higher unemployment risk. 
Since their labour market elasticities are rather high in 
absolute value, employment probabilities in these groups 
are particularly affected by a change in non-wage costs 
(Hamermesh, 1993; Katz, 1996).
Besides the low-skilled, other groups are subject 
to specific labour market risks. High and persistent 
youth unemployment is a major challenge in many 
countries. Young people often face higher barriers to 
entry into the labour market due to their lack of working 
experience compared with adults. Labour market 
difficulties encountered in early working life can have 
long-lasting consequences on the earnings profile. Bell 
and Blanchflower (2010) estimated that a six-month 
unemployment spell for young workers aged below 22 
leads to an 8% wage decrease. At the age of 30, the wages 
of this group are expected to be lower by two to three 
percentage points than they would have been otherwise.
In addition, women are often faced with limited working 
opportunities as in many cases they are the ones who 
have to shoulder the double burden of work and family 
obligations. Due to policies favouring flexible working 
hours, the prevalence of poor childcare provision and 
the lack of part-time employment opportunities, the 
unemployed female workforce has a high concentration 
of single parents and long-term unemployed. There is 
a higher risk of dropping out of the labour force altogether, 
shifting from unemployment to inactivity.
Payroll taxes and social contributions are paid by 
employers and employees. However, irrespective of the 
legal incidence of taxation, the actual burden may differ 
as it is determined largely by the elasticities of labour 
demand and supply. For this reason, the economic 
incidence is not necessarily the same as the legal incidence 
of taxes (Borjas, 2013). For instance, while a reduction in 
the SSC rates paid by employers does not affect the gap 
between the gross and net wage for private households, 
it lowers the labour costs to companies. Labour demand 
17 The Great Recession is a term that refers to the sharp decline in economic activity in developed economies during the late 2000s which followed the global financial 
crisis in 2007–2008. 
18 These rather minor effects are restricted to the shorter experience after the turn of the century, where movements in the tax wedge have been less pronounced 
than in earlier periods. For this reason, the effects may have been more difficult to identify.
Employment effects of reduced non-wage labour costs
24
will increase but labour supply may remain unchanged, 
resulting in upward wage pressure if the labour market 
is in equilibrium before the reform. The less elastic the 
labour supply, the larger the share of lower contribution 
rates that end up being shifted to workers in form of higher 
wages. This can reverse the benefits of the initial reduction 
of labour costs to the employer and limit positive 
employment effects. While the legal incidence may not 
coincide with the economic incidence of taxation, it may 
nonetheless be important in the short term, as it normally 
takes some time for wages to adjust to new conditions. 
Econpubblica (2011) and the European Commission 
(2015c) provide recent reviews on the empirical findings of 
tax incidence on wages. In general, the estimates suggest 
that labour demand is more responsive to a change in the 
tax wedge than labour supply – at least at the aggregate 
level.
This chapter looks at the academic literature on the 
response of labour demand and then the labour supply 
to non-wage labour cost reductions. It concludes with 
some final remarks on the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the different policies.
Labour demand response
The slope of the labour demand curve is determined by its 
own-wage elasticity – that is, the responsiveness of labour 
demand with respect to the producer wage (including 
non-wage costs). This parameter is of key importance, as 
the effectiveness of tax wedge reforms crucially depend 
on the reaction of companies to cost changes. The larger 
the elasticity in absolute value, the more pronounced 
the employment reaction for a given change in the tax 
wedge. A high elasticity of labour demand also ensures 
that the decline in costs will not result in higher wages 
for workers. According to the meta-analysis presented by 
Lichter et al (2015), there is no consensus on the genuine 
value of the elasticity. Heterogeneity can be traced to 
different sources, such as the dataset used, the type 
of worker, the industry considered and the country in 
the evaluation exercise. The responsiveness of labour 
demand to costs is higher in absolute value if labour can 
be more easily substituted by other input factors. Thus, 
the demand for low-skilled workers is more affected 
by lower costs than skilled work. Moreover, the short-
term elasticity is smaller than the long-term elasticity in 
absolute value. The fact that labour demand is less elastic 
over short-term periods reflects the lag in adjustment to 
new conditions. For example, if the production technology 
could be characterised by a Cobb-Douglas function with 
constant returns to scale, a 1% increase in labour costs 
implies a 1% reduction in employment in the long-
term equilibrium.19 If wages increase, companies have 
the incentive to substitute labour with capital. But the 
installation of new machinery takes time, leading to a less 
pronounced short-term reaction. Elasticities vary across 
different segments of the labour markets. In general, the 
more easily labour inputs can be replaced, the higher 
their responsiveness to a change in relative input prices. 
For this reason, employment in low-skilled work can be 
particularly responsive to a decrease in labour costs. In 
the current context of weak wage and productivity growth, 
the availability of relatively inexpensive labour may be 
a more attractive option for employers than the more 
risky commitment to invest in productivity-enhancing 
technology, even at very low interest rates.
According to standard models, the equilibrium quantities 
of employment and the real wage are determined by the 
intersection of labour demand and supply. Compared with 
the pre-crisis conditions, labour demand is not sufficient 
to absorb the initial plans of private households to supply 
work. The rise in unemployment may generate downward 
pressure on wages, either in the form of wage decreases 
or more moderate wage growth in the future. In principle, 
a new equilibrium could be reached if real wages can 
sufficiently adjust, but wages tend to be ‘sticky’ – empirical 
estimates suggest that the quantitative reactions are 
not very strong. For example, the wage curve postulates 
a negative relationship between the wage level and 
unemployment – see Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 
1995) and Card (1995). According to these studies, the 
elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment is -0.1 or 
lower in absolute value. In a meta-study, Nijkamp and Poot 
(2005) demonstrated considerable heterogeneity of the 
parameter across countries, but the parameter is very low 
in absolute value. As the response of wages to disequilibria 
between labour demand and supply is quite modest, 
unemployment will probably be persistent.
Figure 5 illustrates the effect of a subsidy equal to q%, for 
example, due to lower social contributions or functional 
equivalents. Such a subsidy can decrease the labour costs 
from w0 to w1. Since companies require a lower marginal 
product of labour in the new equilibrium, labour demand 
will expand (Bell et al, 1999). While the labour supply curve 
(S) is unchanged, the demand curve will shift to the right 
(from D0 to D1), as the labour demanded by companies 
will be higher at each wage level. The larger the labour 
demand elasticity is, the flatter the respective curve, and 
the higher the number of new jobs which are offered by 
companies.
After the reduction of the social contribution rate, labour 
demand exceeds labour supply at the labour costs before 
the reform (w0). As a consequence, an upward pressure 
on wages is generated that will stimulate labour supply. 
Otherwise, private households are not willing to increase 
their supply. Hence, the initial wage reduction will not be 
maintained, as part of the lower tax wedge will be passed 
to employees in form of higher wages. The upward wage 
adjustment is stronger the less elastic labour supply is and 
reduces the potential employment response. However, 
companies can still benefit, as long as the new market 
wage (w1) remains below the initial level. Households are 
willing to increase supply, as their payoff w1'=w1(1+q) is 
higher than the previous level. Employment increases 
from L0 to L1.
19 In economics, a Cobb-Douglas production function represents the relationship between the output and the combination of factors, or inputs, used to obtain it.
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In reducing the cost of hiring workers, subsidies for 
companies can stimulate the demand for certain groups 
in the labour market, such as workers with low skills. The 
skills offered by workers may not match the requirements 
of the job. The mismatch could gradually diminish with 
training on-the-job. Subsidisation reduces the degree of 
uncertainty on the side of employers regarding worker 
productivity and may serve as a screening instrument. 
Subsidies can in this way overcome impediments linked 
to information asymmetries between companies and 
workers.
In any case, the actual response of employment and wages 
depends on the extent to which the lower costs are passed 
onto the employees in higher wages, as a shift will reduce 
the employment gains. At least, some shifting should be 
expected; otherwise, households may not be willing to 
increase their labour supply.
In a seminal study on a large payroll tax reduction in Chile 
in the early 1980s, Gruber (1997) found that the reduced 
costs to companies were entirely passed on to workers in 
the form of higher wages with little effect on employment. 
Azémar and Desbordes (2010) emphasised that the level 
of collective bargaining coordination is important for the 
size of the shift. In countries where wage bargaining is not 
highly coordinated, half of the lower cost will be shifted 
to workers in the long term in the form of higher wages, 
whereas in countries operating under highly coordinated 
bargaining regimes or under systems including parameters 
capturing productivity gains when allowing for wage 
increases, full shifting can be expected. Under the latter 
conditions, employment gains could be minimal. Based 
on a recent meta-analysis, Melguizo and González-Páramo 
(2013) concluded that on average about two-thirds of the 
incidence of labour taxation finally shifts onto workers’ 
wages.
Labour supply response
Although the scope of this study is on policies to influence 
labour demand, policies may also aim to reduce the 
tax wedge in favour of employees. Here, outcomes are 
affected by influencing the supply side. Measures include 
reduced personal income taxes or employee SSCs, 
wage subsidies or (earned income) tax credits. As they 
supplement the ordinary labour market earnings, they 
provide higher incentives for low-income households to 
work. Because the subsidies raise the effective wage, more 
people are willing to work at any given market wage than 
they were in the absence of the subsidy. The tax reduction 
usually focuses on low productivity workers, where the 
market wage is below the reservation level and generally 
dependent on the level of unemployment benefits.
The mechanism is illustrated in Figure 6, where the 
introduction of a wage subsidy of p% leads to a shift 
Figure 5: Effect on employment of wage subsidy provided to companies
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Notes: Wage subsidy is equal to q%. w1' = wage paid to worker; w1 = wage cost to employer; D = labour demand; L = employment;  
S = labour supply; w = wage costs.
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in the labour supply curve from S0 to S1. In contrast to 
the discussion presented above, the labour demand 
curve (D0) is not affected by the policy move. At the new 
equilibrium, the employment level is higher. The market 
clearing wage declines (from w0 to w1) owing to the higher 
number of people in work. The fall in the market wage rate 
encourages companies to hire more workers. However, the 
take-home pay received by workers – that is, the market 
wage plus the tax credit or w1’ = w1(1 + p) – exceeds the 
initial wage.
The policy will lead to increases in the real consumption 
wage. In terms of its opportunity costs, leisure will become 
more expensive. Private households will therefore raise 
labour supply – the substitution effect from labour to 
leisure is expected to be positive. The income effect 
works in the other direction, as the higher consumption 
wage allows the household to work less for any given 
income level. For a household already at work, the higher 
consumption wage can raise the incentive to work less. 
In families with multiple workers, a credit can lead one 
spouse to leave the labour force in response to the higher 
income earned by the other spouse (Neumark, 2013). 
Benefits also go to people who are employed regardless of 
the availability of the tax credit. For a household initially 
not working, there is no ambiguity. The higher consumer 
spending wage generates a positive substitution effect, 
but there will not be a negative income effect. At the 
aggregate level, however, the income effect is ambiguous, 
implying that the response of labour supply to reduced 
employee taxes is not determined in advance. In Figure 6, 
a positive net impact is assumed for illustrative purposes 
and employment increases from L0 to L1. The larger the 
response of labour supply to real wages, the flatter the 
supply curve and the higher the impact.
Choosing between the alternatives
Both demand- and supply-oriented tax reforms act on 
different sides of the labour market. Demand side reforms 
aim to stimulate the labour demand of companies through 
a lower cost burden. The decrease in the producer wage is 
achieved through a lower tax wedge. Supply side reforms 
aim to improve the incentives of private households to 
participate in the labour market.
In general, a lower tax burden on the wage earnings of 
private households can be sufficient to stimulate labour 
supply in the presence of negative productivity shocks. 
These shocks are often caused by structural change and 
are limited to certain industries. The former wage level 
turns out to be too high, leading to sectoral employment 
losses. If unemployment benefits raise the reservation 
wage above the market equilibrium, tax subsidies or a cut 
of functional equivalents can be a suitable instrument to 
circumvent the unemployment trap. Because the subsidy 
raises the effective wage, more people are willing to work 
Figure 6: Effect on employment of wage subsidy provided to employees
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Notes: Wage subsidy is equal to q%. w1' = wage paid to worker; w1 = wage cost to employer; D = labour demand; L = employment; S = labour supply; 
w = wage costs.
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at any given market wage than they would have been in 
the absence of the subsidy.
Instead of paying wage-replacing benefits that will be 
reduced if a person starts working, the government may 
pay benefits that will increase the wage of people if they 
accept work in a low-paid job. These benefits reduce the 
tax burden on low wages and can activate employment 
in the low-skilled segment. At the same time, they 
constitute a redistributive channel that raises low wages 
up to socially acceptable levels. Therefore, the policies 
are also more in line with the goal of socially inclusive 
growth. It should be noted, however, that the response of 
labour supply is not determined on a priori grounds. While 
unemployed people may be encouraged to work, people 
already in employment can work less in response to higher 
consumption wages. In families with multiple workers, 
a tax credit scheme can lead one spouse to leave the 
labour force due to the higher income earned by the other 
spouse (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Neumark, 2013). Benefits 
are also paid to people who are employed regardless of 
the availability of the tax credit. Large deadweight losses 
can therefore be expected.
The employment effects of such measures depend on 
the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the wage. 
The higher the elasticity, the stronger the response. In 
this case, private households are willing to increase their 
labour supply even after modest wage increases, and 
the initial reduction of labour costs through lower social 
contribution rates may be largely maintained. Evidence at 
the aggregate level suggests that the elasticity is rather low 
(Bargain et al, 2014), but that tax cuts may have different 
effects for particular groups of the labour force. While the 
supply decision of men is largely unaffected, employment 
decisions of married women, single mothers and low-
skilled men tend to be more influenced by a decrease of 
the tax wedge (Meghir and Phillips, 2010; Devillanova and 
Profeta, 2011).
In a recession, policies stimulating the supply side of the 
labour market may not be very successful. As employment 
is restricted by a widespread lack of demand, employers 
may not be willing to create more jobs, irrespective of the 
incentives for households to supply work. For that reason, 
subsidies provided to companies can provide a more 
promising approach.
Review of empirical evidence
This section summarises the empirical evidence regarding 
the impact of non-wage labour costs reductions on 
employment. Following a brief introduction, it looks at 
studies evaluating the impact of reductions in employer 
SSCs and empirical studies on functional equivalents such 
as hiring subsidies, before finally turning to the available 
evidence on the potential negative side effects of wage 
subsidies (such as deadweight and substitution effects).
Many empirical studies have investigated the employment 
effects arising from the reforms in the tax wedge 
implemented since the 1990s to improve the labour 
market performance. Marx (2001) offers a review of the 
older literature. Among some of the main general patterns 
highlighted in this review, it seems that positive results 
are found in simulations of the impact of a reduction in 
employer SSCs, but only if it is assumed that demand 
for low-skilled labour is very sensitive to its cost. But 
this may not be the case, as most evaluations before 
the 2000s indicate that the net employment impact of 
selective employment subsidies for the most vulnerable 
groups is only minor, probably due to skills mismatch 
or other barriers to employment. In addition, although 
very few studies estimate the deadweight loss, it is often 
found when they do, that between 50% and 90% of those 
subsidised would have found employment anyway. 
Also, around 20%–35% of the subsidising jobs act to 
the detriment of those in unsubsidised jobs. All in all, 
discounting the deadweight loss and substitution cost, 
the net employment creation due to cuts in employer 
SSCs is very small. In the review of US evaluations made 
by Neumark (2013), however, the author signals that the 
negative appraisal of hiring credits is mainly based on 
evaluations of policies directed at the disadvantaged. 
Instead, based on the evidence regarding the impact of 
broad-based reductions in employer SSCs, they could 
prove more effective at creating jobs than measures 
targeting the disadvantaged. For the fiscal burden, 
however, these measures are more costly and can worsen 
labour market adjustment to disequilibria.
A common conclusion in both reviews is the potential 
negative effect of targeting: workers who are eligible for 
employment subsidies may suffer stigma effects. Potential 
employers may perceive that subsidised workers have 
been unsuccessful in the labour market and consequently 
consider them as risky or less productive. This stigma 
attaching to eligible workers, together with the lack of 
information about existing subsidies and the considerable 
administrative costs involved in claiming subsidies, can 
account for the low take-up of available incentives by 
companies signalled in both reviews. In periods when 
there is a general lack of demand, when unemployment is 
a widespread phenomenon, stigmatisation effects may be 
less important.
The impact of wage subsidies has also been considered in 
the context of the evaluation of ALMPs. For instance, Kluve 
(2010) carries out a meta-analysis on a comprehensive 
dataset of 137 programme evaluations from 19 European 
countries including private sector incentive programmes. 
Studies evaluating private sector wage subsidy 
programmes find beneficial impacts in terms of individual 
employment probability, although most evaluations 
do not take into account potential displacement or 
substitution effects or deadweight. Card et al (2010) 
extended the previous analysis by carrying out a meta-
analysis of around 200 microeconometric evaluations of 
ALMPs between 1995 and 2007, and covering nearly 50 
countries, and found similar results.
The bulk of the evidence in the above reviews refers 
to the period before the Great Recession. This section 
aims to extend the review of the more recent analyses 
on the effectiveness of non-wage labour cost reductions 
with a specific focus on European countries. In order to 
identify the studies providing an evaluation of the policy 
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intervention of interest, three bibliographic sources have 
been used:
¢ a web search using a set of keywords;
¢ a compilation of studies collected by Eurofound staff;
¢ reports from recognised institutions such as the 
European Commission and the OECD.
Studies from the last two sources were directly added 
to the dataset for the review if they included relevant 
evaluations. This review also searched for evaluations 
in the references in these studies, adding them to the 
dataset if they fulfilled the requirements. As for the web 
search, the standard procedure in systematic reviews of 
the literature, including meta-analysis, was followed. The 
economic literature databases – Google Scholar, RePEc 
(Research Papers in Economics), Scopus and Thomson 
Reuters Web of Science – were used and a set of keywords 
defined based on those most commonly used in the 
related literature. More precisely, the search used the 
following three groups of keywords:
¢ non-wage labour cost, payroll tax, payroll taxes, 
SSC, labour tax, tax incidence, company taxation, 
business taxation, wage subsidy, targeted wage 
subsidies, hiring subsidies, hiring credit, subsidised 
employment, subsidised work, low-wage subsidies;
¢ employment, labour demand, job creation schemes;
¢ evaluation, programme evaluation, matching, 
propensity score matching, difference-in-difference, 
regression discontinuity, treatment effects.
As a result of the search process combining the different 
groups of keywords in different ways and limiting the 
publication year to those after 2000, a preliminary list of 
378 studies was produced. This list was used to identify 
those studies whose focus was the precise type of policy 
intervention of interest for the review. In a subsequent 
step, the resulting list was screened to identify those 
studies that included an estimate of the effect of the 
intervention on employment. Only empirical studies 
containing such an estimate were considered. The list of 96 
selected studies is reproduced in Annex 1.20
To guarantee a degree of homogeneity in the quality of 
the results, a criterion for inclusion based on the levels of 
the so-called Maryland scale (Sherman et al, 1997) was 
defined.21 In principle, evaluations from analyses that 
fit into Level 1 of the scale have not been considered, 
whereas studies that apply techniques that make it 
possible to identify a causal effect (from Levels 3 to 5 
of the scale) were preferred. Those classified as Level 2 
have been analysed in detail to decide on their inclusion 
or exclusion. A review of these studies follows. For 
readers who are interested in the whole set of papers, the 
most relevant information in the tables is offered in the 
supplementary material which is available from Eurofound 
on request.
It is also worth mentioning that a range of techniques are 
used in the empirical papers to evaluate the efficiency of 
decreases in employer SSCs and equivalent measures. 
There is no clear superiority of one over the rest, and the 
choice depends on the characteristics of the data and the 
scope of analysis. The techniques are briefly presented in 
the box below.
20 All the annexes mentioned are available on the web page of this report at http://bit.ly/nonwagelabour
21 Level 1: Either (a) a cross-sectional comparison of treated groups with untreated groups, or (b) a before and after comparison of treated group, without an 
untreated comparison group. No use of control variables in statistical analysis to adjust for differences between treated and untreated groups or periods.
 Level 2: Use of adequate control variables and either (a) a cross-sectional comparison of treated groups with untreated groups, or (b) a before and after comparison 
of treated group, without an untreated comparison group. In (a), control variables or matching techniques are used to account for cross-sectional differences 
between treated and controls groups. In (b), control variables are used to account for before and after changes in macro level factors.
 Level 3: Comparison of outcomes in treated group after an intervention, with outcomes in the treated group before the intervention, and a comparison group 
used to provide a counterfactual (for example, difference-in-difference). Justification is given to the choice of comparator group that is argued to be similar to the 
treatment group. Evidence is presented on the comparability of treatment and control groups. Techniques such as regression and (propensity score) matching may 
be used to adjust for difference between treated and untreated groups, but there are likely to be important unobserved differences remaining.
 Level 4: Quasi-randomness in treatment is exploited, so that it can be credibly held that treatment and control groups differ only in their exposure to the random 
allocation of treatment. This often entails the use of an instrument or discontinuity in treatment, the suitability of which should be adequately demonstrated and 
defended.
 Level 5: Reserved for research designs that involve explicit randomisation into treatment and control groups, with randomised controlled trials providing the 
definitive example. Extensive evidence is provided on the comparability of treatment and control groups, showing no significant differences in levels or trends. 
Control variables may be used to adjust for treatment and control group differences, but this adjustment should not have a large impact on the main results. 
Attention is paid to problems of selective attrition from randomly assigned groups, which is shown to be of negligible importance. There should be limited or, 
ideally, no occurrence of ‘contamination’ of the control group with the treatment.
29
Impact on employment of reduced non-wage labour costs – literature review
Techniques to evaluate the impact of 
non-wage labour cost reductions
Different approaches have been proposed to examine the impact of non-wage labour cost reductions on employment. 
One dimension is related to the level of the analysis, where macro- and microeconometric evaluations can be 
distinguished.
Macroeconometric evaluations of reforms in non-wage labour costs usually exploit the time and regional variation of 
the implementation of the policy in order to apply a panel data difference-in-differences estimator (D-i-D) that allows 
the impact on employment to be measured.22 The analysis is implicitly based on the assumption that the elasticities of 
the outcome with respect to the explanatory variables are identical across the panel members (for instance, countries 
in international comparative analysis). An important limitation of this approach is that even if the results hold for the 
average of the panel, they may not be valid at the individual economy level. Moreover, most evaluations only provide 
a partial assessment of the policy impacts. In particular, indirect effects may be substantial, but they are often neglected 
in the analysis. For instance, companies benefit from lower production costs if they receive wage subsidies when 
jobs for the targeted are created. They hire additional workers and increase production levels, with further (second 
order) positive effects on employment. The subsidies may crowd out unsubsidised work, as the latter will lose price 
competitiveness. The result could reflect a substitution from unsubsidised to subsidised work, with no output change. In 
exchange for hiring the new workers, old workers can be dismissed.
In general, indirect effects are difficult to estimate. Although the direct impact can be positive, the total impact could 
be negative if indirect effects have huge undesirable consequences. An additional critique to this approach is that most 
studies following this approach provide ex post evaluations of the policy change – that is, what the impact of reductions 
in non-wage labour costs implemented in the past had been. However, even though the experience with past policies 
can be helpful to ensure the smooth implementation of future reforms, this interpretation of the results requires that the 
behaviour of agents does not change once new policies are implemented (Lucas, 1976).
Macroeconometric models and computable general equilibrium models can allow one to overcome both criticisms. 
First, as these models consider complex interactions between policy settings and outcomes, they are able to deal with 
both the direct impact of any policy changes and the indirect effects of such changes on the whole economy. Second, 
and due to their micro foundations, they are less subjected to the Lucas critique and they can be used to carry out ex 
ante evaluations – that is, the future impact of a policy change. However, and due to their strong data requirements, 
usually there is a lack of empirical underpinning, and results can be largely driven by the model assumptions and by the 
calibration process of the model parameters.
At the microeconomic level, studies are usually based on longitudinal data coming from surveys. Estimating the policy 
impact is usually also based on a D-i-D strategy. In this setting, the appropriate construction of counterfactuals is of 
critical importance and can have a significant impact on the results. The dominant approach distinguishes between 
two groups: people who are treated by the specific measure and people who are not. Ideally, the treatment should 
be the only variable that accounts for potential differences between the two groups. A person who is eligible for 
a specific measure is paired with an otherwise comparable person or set of people who are not. The D-i-D estimator is 
an instrument to quantify the average treatment effects by comparing the pre- and post-treatment differences in the 
outcome in a treatment and control group (Ashenfelter and Card, 1985). One difference relates to the starting differences 
between the two groups which by assumption should persist over time in the absence of the policy effect (parallel 
trend assumption); the second difference relates to variations over time between the two groups that are induced by or 
attributable to the policy effect. To determine the significance of the treatment, the appropriate calculation of standard 
errors is important. If they understate the true variation due to the presence of serial correlation or heteroscedasticity in 
the error term, treatment effects can appear as significant, when they are actually not (Bertrand et al, 2004). As before, 
the most relevant limitation of this approach is that indirect effects of the policies are often not considered. Indirect 
effects occur when a programme affects people other than its participants. In some evaluations (see, for instance, 
Damioli et al, 2015), as all subsidy recipients are necessarily employed, the standard approach of using actual receipt 
of the subsidy as treatment creates the problem of separating the effect of gaining a job from the effect of gaining the 
subsidy. Ideally, one would like to compare subsidy recipients with other unemployed workers who have the same 
probability of getting a job without the subsidy. Thus, credible identification requires solving the so-called double-
selection problem (Lechner and Melly, 2010) of selection into employment and selection into the treatment.
22 Difference-in-differences is a statistical technique used in quantitative research in the social sciences that attempts to mimic an experimental research design 
using observational study data by studying the differential effect of a treatment/policy/measure on a ‘treatment group’ versus a ‘control group’. It calculates the 
effect of a treatment (that is, an explanatory variable) on an outcome (that is, a response variable) by comparing the average change over time in the outcome for 
the treatment group with the average change over time for the control group. A further elaboration – differences-in-differences-in-differences, D-i-D-i-D – allows 
a further differentiation in impact across subcategories of the ‘treatment group’ and the ‘control group’, for instance based on age or gender.
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Using a control group of unemployed workers who do not receive a subsidy is likely to result in largely overestimated 
employment effects of the subsidy if selection into employment is not appropriately accounted for. The reason is that 
employed subsidy recipients are being compared with unemployed workers for whom the probability of getting a job 
is generally much lower. The second challenge arises even if selection into employment could be solved. As in most 
non-experimental programme evaluation studies, receipt of the subsidy is not random. However, in contrast to other 
measures such as training programmes or job search assistance, the assignment process for wage subsidies involves 
not only the caseworker and the job-seeker but also the employer. To eliminate selection bias, one would ideally like 
to control for all factors that drive the decisions made by all three parties that affect the employment outcomes of the 
subsidy recipients. However, data limitations usually do not make it possible to follow this approach.
Impact of reductions in employer SSCs
This section examines some selected studies that 
evaluate the impact of reductions in employer SSCs on 
employment.
The effect of the large increase of payroll tax subsidies 
for low-wage workers that occurred in France in 1995 
and 1996 is studied by Crépon and Desplatz (2002). The 
initial scheme from 1993 consisted of an exemption of 
5.4 percentage points in employers’ payroll taxes for 
monthly wages less than 1.1 times the minimum wage 
and a halving of payroll taxes for those earning between 
1.1 and 1.2 times the minimum wage. Between 1995 and 
1996, these two thresholds were raised to 1.2 and 1.3 
times the minimum wage, respectively, and in September 
1995 a new degressive reduction of between 1 and 1.2 
times the minimum wage was introduced. In October 
1996, these two programmes were merged into a single 
degressive reduction on payroll taxes for those earning 
up to 1.33 times the minimum wage. Wages matching 
the minimum wage were allocated the highest reduction 
of 18.2 points in payroll taxes. Using propensity score 
methods23 the authors found that, between 1994 and 
1997, payroll tax reductions were associated with strong 
employment effects in the economy: the average growth 
rate of employment attributable to the policy was 2.24% 
in manufacturing and 3.15% in non-manufacturing. 
The authors also found that these developments in 
employment are related to two broad types of mechanism. 
The first is related to substitutions between factors of 
production where there has been a composition effect 
of the workforce favouring lower paid workers (an 
increase of the unskilled labour content of production) 
and a substitution between labour and capital, with 
the capital–labour ratio falling. The second mechanism 
corresponds to a profitability effect, that is, an increase 
in all factors of production due to an increase in demand 
where reduced production costs are passed on in prices.24
Plane (2012) simulates the economic impact of a tax 
credit in France, the Tax Credit for Competitiveness and 
Employment (Crédit d’impôt pour la compétitivité et 
l’emploi, CICE), aimed at the creation of employment 
and the growth of GDP. Eligibility includes all companies 
taxed on their actual income and subject to corporation 
tax. The tax credit translates into a decrease of 6% of the 
gross payroll tax, excluding contributions by employers, 
for salaries between 1 and 2.5 times the minimum wage 
(salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance, SMIC). 
According to the simulation made by the author using 
the macroeconometric ‘model e-mod.fr’, a 6% decrease 
in gross payroll taxes implied by the CICE would lead 
to a decrease of 2.6% of the average labour costs in the 
market sector. The strongest sectoral impact on the cost 
of labour would be in industry (-2.8%) and market services 
(-2.4%). Overall, the CICE accounts for 1.4% of the value 
added of the market sector. According to the simulation, 
in five years the CICE would create about 150,000 jobs, 
lowering the unemployment rate by 0.6 percentage points 
and generating a gain of 0.1 percentage points of GDP 
five years later. By lowering labour costs, the CICE directly 
promotes employment by encouraging the substitution of 
capital by labour.
Also in France, Cahuc et al (2014) evaluated the impact of 
an unexpected (announced and implemented on the same 
day) temporary one-year subsidy targeted at workers paid 
less than 1.6 times the minimum wage in companies with 
fewer than 10 employees. ‘Zero charges’ reduced labour 
costs by up to 12% (for workers hired at the minimum 
wage). Using a D-i-D strategy and administrative data, the 
authors compared the development of small companies 
(between six and 10 employees, the treatment group) and 
medium-sized companies (between 10 and 14 employees, 
the control group) from November 2008 – just before the 
introduction of the hiring credit – to November 2009. The 
measure was introduced by the French government at 
the outset of the global financial crisis. The authors found 
that the programme had a strong and rapid impact on 
employment. The estimated elasticity of employment 
with respect to the drop in labour cost induced by the 
hiring credit was about -4, a very high (absolute) value. 
This can be explained by the fact that the measure was 
targeted at low-wage workers in the context of a high 
minimum wage and high unemployment, but also by the 
fact that the hiring credit was only for the newly employed. 
If the measure had instead been applied to all jobs, the 
corresponding elasticity would have been about -1.1. It is 
worth highlighting that hiring and employment began to 
rise three months after the introduction of the credit. The 
pattern of hours worked is similar to that of employment, 
meaning that companies did not substitute the working 
23 Propensity score matching is a statistical matching technique whose objective is to estimate the effect of a policy by accounting for the covariates that predict 
receiving the policy.
24 Because of the econometric specification involved, the authors advised that their study was valid only for the specific measure in force over the period 1994–1997 
and could not be generalised to other measures.
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hours of workers newly employed and eligible for the 
hiring subsidy for those of incumbent employees.
However, it has also been found that the employment 
effects of hiring subsidies decrease when recruitment 
difficulties increase. This suggests that they are more 
effective at boosting employment in downturns than in 
upturns, when labour markets are tight.
The authors identified two additional and interesting 
results. First, about 84% of the hirings subsidised by the 
policy would have been created without the hiring credit. 
Second, although the gross cost of the hiring credit per 
job created borne by the government amounts to about 
a quarter of the labour cost, once it is computed net of 
savings on social benefits, the cost of the hiring credit per 
job created is about zero, allowing the authors to conclude 
that the hiring credit was nonetheless cost-effective.
Huttunen et al (2013) investigated the effects of a Finnish 
payroll tax reduction aimed at improving the employment 
chances of older (over 54 years) low-wage full-time 
workers (earning between €900 and €2,000 per month). 
The reduction was temporary (from 2006 to 2010), but 
sizeable – up to 14 percentage points, depending on 
the respective wage level: the size of the subsidy was 
determined as 44% of the part of the monthly earnings 
that exceeded €900 and was capped at €220 per month, 
which was reached when earnings were €1,400. The 
subsidy was reduced by 55% of the monthly earnings over 
€1,600. The authors used a differences-in-differences-in-
differences (D-i-D-i-D) strategy where the treated group are 
workers in the targeted group and the control groups refer 
to slightly younger workers (45–53 years) and workers not 
on low wages. The results show that the subsidy had no 
effect on the employment of the eligible groups. However, 
working hours increased slightly for those already in work, 
as former part-time workers took on full-time jobs.
Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2009) and Korkeamäki (2011) 
looked at the effects of a payroll tax experiment. The 
first study focused on northern Finland and the second 
extended the focus to eastern regions of Finland. The 
Finnish government had cut payroll taxes by between 
three and six percentage points for a three-year period. 
Specifically, the experiment abolished employer 
contributions to the national pension scheme and 
health insurance for companies located in targeted high 
unemployment regions. The policy offered a reduction 
in payroll taxes for eligible companies of 4.1 percentage 
points on average from 2003 to 2005. Although using 
individual company data and a D-i-D method, evidence 
refers to the regional level where each company in 
a target region was matched with a similar company 
in a comparison region. The findings indicate that the 
reduction in payroll taxes leads to higher wage growth in 
the targeted regions and this offset half the impact of the 
initial tax reduction. Although the cut in payroll taxes was 
not entirely passed on in the form of higher wages, the 
employment effects from the remaining cost reduction 
were not significant.
Egebark and Kaunitz (2014) investigated whether a payroll 
tax reduction for employers of young workers in Sweden 
was effective in raising youth employment. The policy 
involved a reduction of 11 percentage points in the payroll 
tax rate in 2007 for employers of young workers and an 
additional decrease of six percentage points in 2009. They 
found that the payroll tax cuts were largely unsuccessful 
in Sweden, the impact on youth employment being 
small (2.7%) and the cost per created job rather high. No 
significant effect of the extension, implemented in 2009, 
was found. Because the tax reduction also applied to 
existing employment relationships, the burden for the 
public budget was sizeable. Estimated costs per created 
job were more than four times higher than the costs of 
directly hiring workers at the average wage.
Analysing the same policy and with the same 
methodology, Skedinger (2014) reported similar results 
for the Swedish retail industry. This sector absorbs many 
young workers, and the share of labour costs to total 
costs is relatively high. Hence, the demand for labour 
should be more sensitive to cuts in wage costs than in 
other industries. While the effects of the tax reductions on 
worker recruitment were quite small, they tended to be 
somewhat greater at lower wage levels. For workers bound 
by minimum wages, the evidence points to larger effects 
on the probability of entry. This finding is consistent with 
the view that high minimum wages represent a serious 
obstacle to labour market entry among the young. One 
reason for the overall modest effects could be that, for 
the group of uneducated, inexperienced young workers, 
labour costs are still too high compared with their 
expected productivity gains. Even sizeable deductions in 
the tax wedge cannot be sufficient to close this gap. Hence, 
cuts in payroll taxes alone may not be efficient to improve 
employment opportunities for young people. The policies 
could be extended by training measures to increase the 
employability of the participants. Both papers outline the 
possibility of certain overlaps with other labour market 
reforms introduced in Sweden in that period (New Start 
Jobs, income tax reductions, changes in employment 
protection legislation) and that, after 2009, the effect of the 
policy may be confounded with the impact of the financial 
crisis.
Other authors have analysed the impact of policies 
reducing non-labour costs for specific groups of workers 
and companies. For instance, Pirttilä and Selin (2011) 
analysed the impact of a reduction in payroll tax rate 
for older workers in Sweden. In 2007, payroll taxes were 
reduced by about 16 percentage points for workers 
over 65 years. In 2008, the measure was extended with 
the abolition of payroll tax for workers born in 1937 or 
earlier. The policy was combined with a generous income 
tax credit for those aged 65 and over, thus introducing 
additional work incentives from the supply side. The 
evaluation was carried out using aggregate data from 
the Labour Force Survey between 2001 and 2010, and 
applying a D-i-D methodology using workers between 
55 and 65 years as the control group. The results showed 
a large and significant increase in the employment rate of 
the older workers after the intervention. The size of the 
effect is around 2 percentage points, taking into account 
that the mean pre-reform value of overall employment in 
the period 2001–2006 was 10.3% of the population aged 
65–74 (increased to 12.3%), which implies an increase 
in percentage terms of 19.4%. However, the authors 
Employment effects of reduced non-wage labour costs
32
recognise that the exercise should not be interpreted 
as a proper evaluation of the impact of the reform on 
the labour supply of the older workers, as it necessarily 
reflects the simultaneous effect of the income tax credit 
and the reduction in payroll tax.
Bennmarker et al (2009) and Månsson and Shahiduzzaman 
Quoreshi (2015) estimated the impact of a 2002 reduction 
of 10 percentage points in the payroll tax rate (from 
about 33% to about 23%) for companies in Regional 
Support Area (RSA) A in Sweden (the northern part of 
the country), with annual gross wage bills up to SEK 
852,000 (around €85,500). Companies in the agriculture, 
fishing and transport sectors were excluded. Although the 
reduction was not limited in time, there was an ongoing 
debate about discontinuing the support, which may 
have influenced company behaviour. Using micro-level 
data for the 2001–2009 period, both papers estimate 
a D-i-D in which the treated group were companies in 
the RSA A region and the control group consisted of 
companies located geographically close to the ones 
in the treated group in RSA B. The authors found an 
impact on employment of about 2% during the first 
year of implementation, although it was not statistically 
significant at the usual levels. However, in the medium 
term (four years after implementation), a 4% increase in 
employment was observed to be statistically significant 
at the 10% level, whereas in the long term (eight years 
afterwards) the impact was again non-significant.
For the Hungarian case, Cseres-Gergely et al (2015) 
measured the impact of a temporary reduction on 
employer SSCs when hiring long-term unemployed 
people, a reduction which is largest for job-seekers aged 
over 50 and those with only primary education (START 
plus and extra). The reductions last for a maximum of 
two years. The general subsidy available to all long-
term unemployed is 14% of the total wage cost in the 
first year and 7% in the second year, which for the 
selected subgroup with multiple disadvantages almost 
doubles – 25% of the total wage cost in the first year 
and 14% in the second year, with a cap set at twice the 
minimum wage. Eligibility is determined solely by the 
observable characteristics of job-seekers. Eligibility for 
START extra can be earned in two ways: by accumulating 
unemployment spells (for those with low levels of 
education); or by reaching 50 years of age (for those with 
qualifications). Using a large administrative dataset, the 
results of the analysis show a significant impact on the 
re-employment probabilities for men aged over 50, which 
is driven by the subgroup of those with lower secondary 
education. For the higher educated, there is no significant 
effect, and this may be due to the ceiling on the subsidy 
(which reduces the value of the subsidy at high wages) 
or possibly to stigma effects, which may be stronger in 
white-collar occupations. The authors found positive but 
insignificant effects for women. A possible explanation is 
that older women are less likely to actively look for a job, 
which lowers the potential impact of any wage subsidy 
that is by design dependent on job search. The subsidy for 
job-seekers with at least secondary education and aged 
over 50 is cost-effective for men. The authors presented 
some evidence to show that this was not merely caused by 
substitution across various subgroups of job-seekers. They 
also estimated exit probabilities for close substitutes of the 
treatment group and found no indication of a substitution 
effect. Lastly, under conservative assumptions, the subsidy 
is cost-effective for men with at least secondary education 
aged over 50.
Damioli et al (2015) presented the results of the 
counterfactual impact evaluations of three different 
ESF-funded measures implemented between 2009 
and 2012 in the Italian regions of Marche, Umbria and 
Calabria. Two policies are analysed: the promotion 
of permanent contracts by subsidised conversion of 
fixed-term contracts in Marche and Umbria; and the 
creation of new employment by hiring disadvantaged 
and severely disadvantaged workers (according to 
EU Regulation 800/2008) and disabled workers (Law 
68/1999) in Calabria.25 Focusing on the intervention in 
Calabria targeting the creation of new employment for 
disadvantaged people, monetary incentives covered 
between 50% and 75% of total labour costs (gross wages 
and social contributions) for between 12 and 36 months. 
The exact amount and duration of the incentive varied 
according to the type of hired worker. Specifically, the 
maximum incentive was equal to 50% of total labour costs 
for 12 months after the hiring, extended to 24 months 
for severely disadvantaged workers, and to 75% of total 
labour costs for a maximum period of three years for 
disabled workers. The evaluation was carried out through 
a combination of propensity score matching and D-i-D 
methods, analysing a period covering the year before 
the policy introduction in Calabria and all quarters after 
the introduction of the measure since 2014. The results 
indicated no or limited impact on the recruitment of new 
workers, possibly because the incentive structure was not 
strong enough to counterbalance the risk of employing an 
unknown worker.
Impact of other measures to reduce employer 
labour costs
The empirical evidence on the impact of functional 
equivalents to reductions in employer SSCs on 
employment is considered here. Most evidence refers to 
hiring subsidies, which can be implemented in various 
forms and with different objectives depending on the 
country and the characteristics of the labour market.
25 ‘Disadvantaged worker’ means any person who (i) has not been in regular paid employment for the previous six months; or (ii) has not attained an upper secondary 
educational or vocational qualification (ISCED 3); or (iii) is over the age of 50 years; or (iv) lives as a single adult with one or more dependents; or (v) works in 
a sector or profession in a Member State where the gender imbalance is at least 25% higher than the average gender imbalance across all economic sectors 
in that Member State, and belongs to that underrepresented gender group; or (vi) is a member of an ethnic minority within a Member State and who requires 
development of his or her linguistic, vocational training or work experience profile to enhance prospects of gaining access to stable employment. ‘Severely 
disadvantaged worker’ means any person who has been unemployed for 24 months or more. ‘Disabled worker’ means any person who: (i) is recognised as disabled 
under national law; or (ii) has a recognised limitation which results from physical, mental or psychological impairment.
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For instance, several studies have focused on the impact 
of integration allowances, a hiring subsidy paid to 
the employer over a fixed period of time in Germany 
(Eingliederungszuschuss, EGZ). This programme, active 
between 1998 and 2003, consisted of three variants of the 
subsidy, which were collapsed into a single one in 2004.
Jaenichen and Stephan (2011) analysed the effectiveness 
of one of the three variants that were in place during 
the period 1998 to 2003: the variant for hard-to-place 
workers (Beierschwerter Vermittlung), whose target 
group was unemployed people having severe difficulty 
in reintegrating, such as the long-term unemployed 
or disabled people. The subsidy compensated the 
company for a gap between a worker’s productivity 
and their minimum wage. It accounted for as much 
as 50% of the monthly wage or salary and lasted for 
a maximum of 12 months. The study used a propensity 
score matching approach and displayed the effect of 
taking up a subsidised job during the second quarter of 
2002 compared with no or later participation in a labour 
market programme. The results show that wage subsidies 
may considerably increase the employment prospects 
of supported workers compared with never being in any 
programme or participating only later. The share in regular 
employment three years after the programme was 25%–
42% higher in the treatment group than in the matched 
comparison group.
Boockmann et al (2012) analysed another variant of the 
EGZ subsidy, which was targeted at workers of age 50 and 
older, studying their transition from unemployment into 
employment. A D-i-D estimator compared the change in 
the survival in unemployment during the first 180 days 
of unemployment of the treatment group compared with 
a control group of unemployed people just below the 
age of eligibility. The authors found that the broadening 
of eligibility in 2002 increased the likelihood of exiting 
unemployment only for one category of worker, women in 
eastern Germany. Consistent with this finding, the end of 
specific treatment for older workers in 2004 reduced the 
causal employment effect in this group. According to the 
authors, the reasons why women from eastern Germany 
were the only group to exhibit positive employment 
effects was ‘not the result of a single reason but a mixture 
of labour supply, good qualifications, previous work 
experience, high unemployment rates, labour market 
attachment and longer subsidy durations’. A comparison 
of the number of estimated additional employment 
relationships with the estimated number of additional 
subsidies disbursed indicated significant deadweight 
effects.
Deadweight and substitution effects were directly 
estimated by Moczall (2013), who looked at German 
establishments receiving the JobPerspektive, a long-
term wage subsidy targeted at very hard-to-place job-
seekers launched in 2007. The subsidy was granted 
initially for a maximum of 24 months, after which the 
subsidy could be extended permanently, although no 
permanent subsidisation has been available since 2012. 
One assumption underpinning the intervention was that 
there are some people who will never find unsubsidised 
employment and achieve high enough earnings to exit 
welfare. Therefore, this subsidy was available to employers 
willing to employ hard-to-place workers at local wage rates 
(or the union wage, if applicable), eliminating the need 
for regular welfare payments and generating payments 
to social security. It was designed to compensate the 
employer for the lack of productivity of such workers, 
depending on how productive these workers were 
assumed to be. Up to 75% of total wage costs were 
reimbursed. In the evaluation, subsidised establishments 
were matched to one or more non-subsidised 
establishments using propensity score matching and 
a population-size establishment panel from administrative 
sources. The empirical evidence supported a positive and 
significant result on employment for companies in western 
Germany. The increase occurred about evenly in the 
low- and mid-skilled regular worker groups, and mostly 
for workers aged below 50 years. In eastern Germany, 
however, no robust effect on regular employment was 
found. The policy conclusion is that wage subsidies 
combining restrictive targeting and generous subsidies 
can indeed lead to positive employment outcomes 
in subsidised establishments. Limiting the number 
of subsidised workers relative to the total workforce 
size should also provide a safeguard against distorting 
competition on the product market leading to potential 
displacement effects.
Kangasharju (2007) examined a Finnish wage subsidy 
distributed through local Labour Offices. The target group 
were the unemployed, long-term unemployed, those 
facing the threat of unemployment and unemployed 
persons aged 25 or under. The wage subsidy was between 
€430 and €770 per month, with a maximum length of a 
subsidised job of 10 months (average 6 months), which 
implied a reduction in the wage costs of a subsidised 
worker of about one-third. The company was required 
to demonstrate that the job was new, the worker had 
a permanent contract, and it had not laid off workers 
from similar jobs just before or during the subsidy period. 
Using micro data and a D-i-D approach, the treated group 
corresponded to companies with subsidised workers in 
any year of the period under analysis (1995–2002) and 
the control group consisted of matched companies that 
did not receive subsidies. The effect was measured as the 
difference between the treated and control groups in the 
change in company’s payroll before and after employing 
subsidised workers. The wage subsidy stimulated 
employment in subsidised companies, with a magnitude 
of the effect that was about a 9% increase in payroll. The 
effect was robust to alternative controls and methods of 
matching, whereas evidence also indicated that subsidies 
did not have sizeable effects on non-subsidised companies 
of the industry or region (that is, there was no significant 
displacement effect).
According to Eppel et al (2011) and Eppel and Mahringer 
(2013) based on Austrian policy examples, subsidies to 
encourage work appear to be successful especially for 
certain unemployed categories. These authors reported 
positive effects of the so-called comeback employment 
subsidy (Integration Subsidy or Eingliederungsbeihilfe) in 
helping disadvantaged unemployed individuals back into 
employment. Potential participants from disadvantaged 
groups included: long-term unemployed people aged 
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over 25 and unemployed for more than one year; those 
aged under 25 and unemployed for six months); people at 
risk of becoming long-term unemployed such as female 
returners, people with psychological, physical or mental 
disabilities; and job-seekers with poor or outdated labour 
market skills and a long unemployment record. The 
subsidy was up to 66.7% of wage costs (monthly gross 
pay not including special bonus payments) and a lump 
sum of 50% for non-wage labour costs. It could be granted 
for the duration of the employment relationship, but 
for no more than two years. The programme duration 
could be extended to three years only for individuals 
with disabilities. During a probationary period of no 
more than three months (six months for people with 
disabilities), the subsidy could cover 100% of the wage 
costs. Eppel and Mahringer (2013) identified programme 
effects for episodes starting in the period between 
2003 and 2006, with unemployed individuals who took 
up subsidised employment during a specific analysed 
quarter considered to be the treated group, and those 
who did not considered to be the non-treated. The 
study used matching techniques and nearest neighbour 
propensity score matching. In a follow-up period of 
four years, the promotion through integration subsidy 
implied an increase in unsubsidised paid employment 
of 102 days (+13.9%) and a reduction in the time spent 
in unemployment of 58 days (-13.8%). Although all 
subgroups benefited from subsidised employment, 
this was particularly the case for older workers and the 
long-term unemployed. It was concluded that wage 
subsidies are a particularly encouraging instrument in 
helping disadvantaged unemployed individuals back 
into employment. However, substitution or displacement 
effects were likely to be substantial (more than 50%), 
as the companies tended to fill vacant positions with 
subsidised rather than unsubsidised job-seekers.
For the UK, Marlow et al (2012) evaluated the impact of 
the Future Jobs Fund (FJF) introduced in 2009 to support 
the creation of subsidised jobs for unemployed young 
people. The subsidy consisted of an employer subsidy 
whose maximum amount was GBP 6,500 (€7,300) for each 
job. Eligible workers were young people who had claimed 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for at least six months. The 
scheme was active from 2009 to 2011, with an extension 
of an additional year until 2012. Whereas the treated 
group consisted of 20–24 year-olds who started an FJF job 
between October 2009 and March 2010 and were receiving 
JSA one week before the job started, the control group 
was composed of the non-participants aged 25–29 who 
claimed JSA. Using D-i-D combined with propensity score 
matching and administrative data, the authors computed 
the difference between participants and similar non-
participants in the likelihood of receiving welfare support 
and of being in unsubsidised employment. A negative 
effect of the policy on the probability of a participant being 
in unsubsidised employment (jobs not subsidised by the 
FJF) during the lock-in period was, as expected, indicated. 
After the lock-in, the programme increased the probability 
of being in unsubsidised employment by approximately 
10 percentage points. This gap was observed over the 
period from 27 to 104 weeks after starting an FJF job. No 
significant differences between groups of individuals (by 
gender, ethnicity or disability) were found.
Pons-Rotger and Arendt (2010) examined the magnitude 
of the employment effects of the Act on an Active 
Employment Effort, a Danish hiring subsidy for small 
private companies introduced in 2006, which covered 
approximately 50% of the minimum wage throughout 
the subsidised period. The programme imposed certain 
restrictions: the ‘employment contribution’ condition 
required that the hiring of a subsidised employee resulted 
in a net increase of the company’s number of normal 
employees. Thus, a new subsidised employee cannot 
replace an existing ordinary job and ordinary employment 
(calculated as the average level of employment in the 
three months before subsidised hiring and the same 
three months of the previous year) cannot be reduced in 
advance. There is also a maximum number of subsidised 
employees linked to company size: companies with 1–5 
employees (full- or part-time employed) can employ at 
most one subsidised employee; companies with 6–50 
employees can employ one subsidised employee for 
each five ordinary employees; and companies with more 
than 50 employees can employ one subsidised employee 
per 10 ordinary employees. The maximum duration of 
a subsidised job is one year, but six months was the most 
frequent duration. The sample used in this study was 
restricted to private sector one-workplace companies 
at least a year old, and which were eligible for a new 
wage subsidy because they did not – at the start of the 
treatment month – have any subsidised employees and 
had at most 10 employees. This threshold of 10 employees 
was chosen so that only employers who in the treatment 
month might recruit at most one subsidised employee 
would be considered. The study used a D-i-D matching 
estimator approach and found that, after completion of 
the subsidised period, the subsidy contributed in 71% of 
cases to an increase in ordinary recruitment, while in 45% 
this happened at the cost of an existing ordinary employee 
who was separated from the company. In summary, 
the net employment effect was moderate: in 26% of 
companies the subsidy led to a new ordinary recruit. 
However, the overall employment effect of the subsidy was 
higher than the proportion of subsidised employees who 
ended up being employed at the subsidised company on 
ordinary terms. Some additional jobs were created which 
would not have been created in the absence of a wage 
subsidy. In addition, the study found no evidence of 
deadweight loss or substitution effects during most of the 
subsidised period.
Finally, Sjögren and Vikström (2015) studied the impact 
of the New Start Jobs (NSJ) scheme, a Swedish subsidy 
for employers hiring from among the long-term jobless – 
those who had been unemployed or for other reasons 
absent from the labour market for at least one year. The 
subsidy covered the payroll tax (31.4%) for the same 
amount of time they had been unemployed or out of the 
labour force (up to a maximum of five years). In a context 
of increasing unemployment after the global financial 
crisis of 2008, the subsidy became more generous in 
2009 (doubled to 62.8% of gross salary). By 2011, the NSJ 
scheme had benefited some 45,000 individuals out of 
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a total of around 250,000 who had been jobless for at least 
a year.
The authors used micro-level data to apply D-i-D and 
regression discontinuity approaches – the latter based 
on modifications to the policy over time already noted 
and to the provision of double duration subsidies 
for older workers hired (>55 years). In practice, their 
analysis is based on data on individuals who had 
previously been unemployed – not the broader group of 
jobless or non-employed provided for in the measure. 
A sizeable employment effect of being eligible for the 
NSJ subsidy was found. Eligibility was associated with 
a 16%–20% increase in job-finding rates initially. Using 
as a comparator group those unemployed who found 
a job just before they became eligible for the subsidies 
(who had been unemployed for just less than 12 months 
when they found an unsubsidised job), the study found 
a positive employment impact for scheme beneficiaries 
(+2 percentage points in employment rate 30 months after 
leaving unemployment). Subsidised workers were more 
likely to keep their jobs at the expiry of subsidies than 
other workers and to remain in employment over a longer 
time horizon.
The employment effects were stronger for men, older 
workers and the less educated. For highly educated 
beneficiaries, however, there were strong crowding out 
effects. This, the authors suggest, points to a need to 
target the measure more at those near the minimum 
wage level. The authors also found that both the rate and 
length of subsidies matter: positive employment effects 
increased when the subsidy became more generous and 
where benefit duration was longer. But for older workers, 
doubling the duration rather than the subsidy rate 
was a more cost-effective and employment-generating 
strategy. One possible reason was that the human capital 
accumulation necessary to strengthen more long-term 
employment prospects takes time to materialise.
Incentives to convert fixed-term employment 
contracts into permanent positions
Employment subsidies can serve policy objectives other 
than employment creation. The share of fixed-term 
contracts is particularly high in Italy and Spain, and recent 
measures have offered incentives to recruit on permanent 
contracts or convert existing fixed-term contracts to 
permanent contracts.
In the pre-crisis period, fixed-term contracts were widely 
used to circumvent the regulatory burden on permanent 
contracts in a number of countries, most notably in Italy 
and Spain (Adam and Canziani, 1998; Barbieri and Sestito, 
2006). While they provide an instrument to introduce more 
flexibility in the labour market, fixed-term contracts can 
also increase the instability of employment relationships. 
Employment protection is typically less pronounced, 
and the incentives for workers and companies to invest 
in human capital can be lower. The Great Recession led 
to massive layoffs of fixed-term employees. Workers 
on temporary contracts are more likely to lose their 
jobs and are also more likely to suffer from wage cuts. 
Conversion incentives are one measure to counter labour 
market segmentation where it is considered especially 
problematic.
For Italy, Cipollone and Guelfi (2003, 2006) evaluated the 
effects of a tax credit to support hiring with open-ended 
rather than with fixed-term contracts. In particular, the 
policy (Credito d’imposta) consisted of an automatic tax 
credit given to companies hiring workers with open-ended 
contracts. The incentive amounted to about €413 (€620 for 
workers in the south of Italy) per month and per worker 
from the moment of hiring (starting in October 2000) until 
the end of December 2003. Thus, according to the authors’ 
calculation, for a worker in the south hired in October 2000 
and retained until December 2003, each company would 
have received about €24,200. The eligibility criteria were 
very undemanding for both companies and workers. In 
particular, a worker was eligible if they were aged 25 years 
or over and not working with an open-ended contract 
in the 24 months before being hired. A company was 
eligible if the newly hired worker raised the overall level 
of permanent employment at the company above the 
average recorded in the period between October 1999 
and September 2000. In particular, two questions were 
addressed. The authors examined whether the credit 
actually increased the average worker’s likelihood of being 
hired on an open-ended contract. They also investigated 
whether the increase in probability was uniform across 
workers (that is, whether it provided everybody with an 
additional opportunity to enter permanent employment 
or instead favoured only specific workforce groups).
Using longitudinal data from the Italian Labour Force 
Survey, the authors estimate simple linear probability 
models in which the probability of being hired on an 
open-ended contract is the dependent variable. This is 
estimated using a D-i-D technique that identified the 
effect of the subsidy as the change occurred after the year 
2000 (when the tax credit was introduced) with respect to 
previous years. The results indicated that companies used 
this subsidy primarily to hire under open-ended contracts 
workers who would have been hired under such contracts 
regardless of the subsidy, albeit after a short transition into 
temporary employment. The estimates suggested that, 
compared with 2000, in 2001 the subsidy did not increase 
the overall probability of being hired, but increased the 
chances of finding an open-ended contract. The change 
was rather uneven across workers. Conditional on being 
hired, the probability rose by about 10% for workers 
holding a college degree and by about 4% for people with 
a secondary school diploma, while it did not change or 
may even have declined slightly for less educated workers.
The authors also found that although all workers older 
than 25 were eligible, the policy was more effective 
for those aged between 25 and 35: for this group, the 
probability of getting a permanent job went up by 4.2 
percentage points between 2000 and 2001 when compared 
with a worker of 36 or older. One potential explanation 
is that transitions between permanent positions, which 
were not eligible for the subsidy, are more frequent among 
older workers. In addition, the research found a strong and 
positive impact for those unemployed workers who had 
some previous working experience. Finally, the tax credit 
seems to have improved the chances of finding a job in the 
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southern regions for both less and more educated workers. 
The effect seems to be stronger in these areas because of 
the larger saving on labour costs due to a higher tax credit 
per head and lower wages.
Anastasia et al (2013) analyses the impact of another 
scheme of incentives for the conversion of fixed-term 
contracts into permanent jobs adopted in Italy in 2012. 
The measure affected all workers except men over 30 and 
the conversion incentive amounted to €12,000. Although 
expected to last nearly six months, uptake of the scheme 
was such that the funding was exhausted after less than 
one month. The analysis used micro data from Sistema 
informativo lavoro Veneto, an online system managed by 
the region of Veneto. The evaluation used a regression 
discontinuity design based on the age threshold for 
eligibility. The authors concluded that the measure had 
been successful: in particular, it had curbed the downward 
trend in permanent contracts, encouraging the hiring of 
women and young people without displacing adult males. 
There were some deadweight costs: around half of the new 
jobs would have been created without the policy.
Ciani and Blasio (2015) provided additional evidence 
about this policy measure using a similar methodology. 
Their results also showed that the programme was 
effective in stimulating conversions. Compared with the 
counterfactual scenario, conversions increased by 83% 
and the impact persisted for 7.5 months after the scheme 
had ended. The authors’ estimates on deadweight costs 
are more precise than those in Anastasia et al (2013). 
In particular, Ciani and Blasio (2015) found that the 
additional permanent positions came with a cost: to get 
one extra permanent job, the government had to finance 
an additional 1.2 conversions that would have taken place 
without financial support.
For Spain, García-Pérez and Rebollo-Sanz (2009) evaluated 
the effectiveness of regional wage subsidies to foster 
permanent employment. The evaluated policy was 
a one-time subsidy for new permanent contracts in 1997 
and 2001. The average regional subsidy paid to workers 
from different age and gender groups ranged from 9% of 
labour costs in the Balearic Islands to more than 60% in 
Extremadura. On average, the subsidy represented about 
24% of labour costs. The target groups for new permanent 
contracts depended on criteria defined at the regional 
level, ranging from all ages to specific age groups varying 
by gender. For instance, while in Andalusia, Cantabria 
or Castille-Leon the target group covered the whole 
population, in Aragon men over 40 were excluded, in the 
Balearic Islands all men were excluded and in Catalonia 
and Navarra there was no incentive. Using longitudinal 
administrative individual data (Muestra Continua de Vidas 
Laborales), a microeconometric evaluation was carried out 
for the 1995–2004 period. In particular, duration models 
are estimated using a D-i-D-i-D strategy making use of the 
regional and temporal variation of wage subsidies together 
with differences in individual eligibility criteria. The results 
allowed the authors to conclude that subsidising new 
permanent contracts had a positive but small effect on 
the flow to permanent jobs, but only for certain eligible 
worker groups (middle-aged women and young workers). 
An important caveat of this analysis is that the authors just 
evaluated the potential impact of the policy, as they were 
only in a position to know whether individuals employed 
were eligible for the subsidy but not whether a specific 
company claimed the subsidy or not.
Conde-Ruiz et al (2010) also provided evidence of the 
impact of this policy, but focused on a different aspect. In 
particular, the authors analysed whether companies fired 
workers once the subsidy finished. Their results supported 
this hypothesis. They suggested that a potential solution 
would be to take into account a company’s history of firing 
and hiring decisions. Those companies with a higher job 
turnover are the ones benefiting more from the subsidy, 
a situation that is clearly inefficient.
Deadweight, displacement and 
substitution effects
While most papers point to moderately positive 
employment effects for the targets and beneficiaries of 
reductions in non-wage labour costs paid by the employer, 
the total impact is not determined in advance. A reduction 
of these costs can increase the chances for the people 
eligible, but can be also accompanied by negative side-
effects for others (Heckman et al, 1999; Card et al, 2010). 
These side-effects are hard to quantify and are ignored in 
many empirical studies.
Evaluating the employment effects of policy interventions 
is problematical. It is often unclear whether new jobs can 
be attributed to the policies or not: they might have been 
created even without the existence of the wage subsidy 
(deadweight losses). Some of the workers might be 
recruited in any case at the given wage level. Such effects 
are more pronounced when a larger group is eligible to 
benefit from the policy. Secondly, subsidised work can 
crowd out or displace unsubsidised work (Layard et al, 
1991). The availability of subsidies affects the relative 
price of workers and can cause unintended displacement 
effects. Companies may tend to fill vacant positions 
with subsidised rather than unsubsidised job-seekers, 
or may replace non-subsidised workers with subsidised 
workers (substitution effects). If the policy is directed 
at new recruits, employers could fire old and hire new 
workers to receive the subsidies (Katz, 1996). To limit these 
unintended effects, reforms of the tax wedge may require 
special reporting and control mechanisms. These impose 
additional costs, often relatively onerous for SMEs,and can 
dissuade companies from making use of subsidies because 
of the substantial administrative burden.
Only some of the analysed studies conducted an analysis 
of the deadweight, displacement and substitution 
effects of employment-enhancing policies. In particular, 
estimates of the percentage of people subsidised who 
would have found work anyway, had the employment 
subsidy not been in place, varies substantially across 
these studies and even within the same study for different 
measures and targets. Csoba and Nagy (2012), for instance, 
concluded that in over half of cases, the participants of 
active labour programmes in Hungary would have been 
hired in the absence of the subsidy. Eppel et al (2011) 
estimated a deadweight effect of the so-called comeback 
employment subsidy (Eingliederungsbeihilfe) in Austria 
of 52%. However, deadweight losses were estimated to 
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be significantly lower for women, older and the long-
term unemployed. High variability was also present in 
the study by Betcherman et al (2010), where estimates of 
deadweight losses were in a range of between 47% and 
78%, and 27% and 46%, for two targeted employment 
subsidies offered by the Turkish government – Law 5084 
(2004) and Law 5350 (2005), respectively. It is worth 
mentioning that many evaluations estimating deadweight 
loss are based on interviews with employers: in these 
cases, deadweight effects could be underestimated 
due to selection bias or opportunistic responses by the 
participating employers.
For substitution effects, it was estimated by Csoba and 
Nagy (2012) that a wage subsidy programme that sought 
to provide long-term employment to those excluded from 
the labour market in Hungary was responsible for only 
up to two-thirds of newly created jobs. However, several 
studies found no indication of a substitution effect, for 
example Pons-Rotger and Nielsen (2010) on a Danish wage 
subsidy for small private companies and Cseres-Gergely 
et al (2015) on a wage subsidy for long-term unemployed 
workers introduced in Hungary in 2007. In many analyses, 
the existence of a substitution effect is acknowledged, 
but not estimated. One way to limit the substitution 
effect could be to ban the dismissal of workers and their 
replacement with subsidised employees. A number 
of schemes include provisions that make subsidies 
dependent on the recipient company at least maintaining 
employment levels.
Financing labour tax reforms
Wage subsidies provide moderate positive employment 
effects for the beneficiaries, according to most empirical 
studies. Nonetheless, there is the possibility that the 
costs of deadweight and displacement effects could 
outweigh the positive results. Furthermore, most empirical 
studies are partial, as they do not consider the second-
order effects of tax reforms. Once the financing side is 
considered, positive employment effects may be harder 
to identify. The potential effect of policies accompanying 
employer labour cost reductions and possible knock-on 
effects on aggregate labour demand are considered in this 
section.
Reductions in employer SSCs and functional equivalents 
will, all other things being equal, trigger a decline in public 
revenues. These deficits will in many cases be financed by 
additional taxes. In principle, a reduction of contribution 
rates can be self-financing if a substantial increase in 
employment can be expected and if the labour demand 
elasticity is large in absolute value. The reduction of the 
tax wedge may, for example, lead to a huge employment 
response that is also supported by an expansion of labour 
supply. Due to the rising number of contributors, further 
revenues in the social security system will be generated. 
In principle, they can be sufficiently large to compensate 
for the initial loss of revenue. However according to the 
evidence in the above studies, positive employment 
effects are more likely to be modest and the self-financing 
scenario is highly unlikely. Budget-neutral reforms will 
require increases in other taxes.
Indirect taxes such as VAT may finance the loss in 
revenues caused by a lower labour tax wedge. If VAT 
increases are passed onto consumer prices, they will 
reduce the purchasing power of households. A decline 
in private consumption expenditure can be expected. If 
the tax increase is redistributed between employees and 
companies, wage–price spirals can result, with further 
negative effects on economic performance. VAT rises may 
reduce the profits of companies and potentially undermine 
private investment, implying a lower speed of capital 
accumulation. In any case, output falls can be expected 
due to the decrease in aggregate demand with, ultimately, 
adverse effects on employment. Additionally, distribution 
effects need to be taken into account. A higher VAT rate 
can imply a particular burden for low-income households, 
as they spend a higher share of disposable income on 
consumption (Warren, 2008). Such taxes are additionally 
regressive since recipients of transfers (such as pensions 
and unemployment insurance) do not benefit from the 
parallel cut in labour taxes.
Macroeconometric models are appropriate tools to 
examine the overall effects of a shift in the tax structure 
because they are able to capture the direct and indirect 
effects within the system of national accounts. Simulations 
by the European Commission indicate positive effects of 
a tax shift in the long run, if lower social contribution rates 
provided to companies are targeted at the employment 
of young and low-skilled people (European Commission, 
2014d).
Based on a model for the German economy, Dreger (1996) 
found that lower contributions to the pension system can 
stimulate employment: a reduction in the contribution 
rates of 1 percentage point could lead to 80,000 additional 
jobs on average (equivalent to about 0.2% of the total 
labour force). However, the effects become much more 
modest if a budget-neutral increase in the VAT rate is 
included: employment gains fall to 20,000 jobs (about 
0.05% of the total labour force). As the output reaction 
is even weaker than the employment response, a minor 
decline in productivity is involved. However, this does 
not point to a loss in competitiveness. Instead, it reflects 
the fact that production becomes more labour-intensive. 
These results have largely been confirmed in later 
studies. Using the QUEST III macroeconometric model, 
the European Commission (2008) simulated a shift from 
labour to consumer spending taxes for the entire euro 
area. Relative to the baseline scenario of no change, 
employment is found to increase by 0.14% after the first 
year and by 0.25% after the second.
Summary
Several lessons can be drawn from this literature review. 
A core result established by the standard theory on the 
incidence of labour taxation emphasises that the effects on 
employment depend on the extent to which any tax relief 
for employers is passed onto employees in form of higher 
wages. For full shifting, no impact on new employment 
is expected, as the producer costs relevant to companies 
will not change. Hence, the policies are more successful 
the weaker the shift to wages is. In an environment of high 
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unemployment in many EU countries, the actual incidence 
of lower social contribution rates may not deviate very 
much from the legal incidence. High unemployment and 
a more elastic labour supply will limit any potential wage 
increases. Therefore, the risk that wages rise in response to 
lower social contribution rates should be rather low.
The empirical evidence summarised here has indicated 
that the employment effects from lower social 
contribution rates or functional equivalents such as hiring 
subsidies are positive, but likely to be modest. This result 
is in line with those indicated in previous reviews such as 
that by Marx (2001). Although there is great heterogeneity 
in the estimated impacts, they are consistently lower than 
the predictions of theoretical models and non-statistically 
significant in several cases. This heterogeneity may be due 
to the design of each of the measures studied, such as the 
definition of the target group or the variations in research 
methodologies, aspects that are analysed in the meta-
analysis that follows.
Empirical studies have also found evidence of deadweight 
losses, displacement losses and substitution effects. 
Deadweight losses in particular are often seen to account 
for 50% or more of the net new jobs created. To reduce 
crowding out and deadweight losses, net hiring subsidies 
can be favoured over gross hiring subsidies. According 
to Knabe et al (2006), to this end the principle of double 
marginal subsidisation may be helpful. In particular, 
a company hiring a new worker and raising employment 
above the reference level will receive wage subsidies 
only for the new worker and one incumbent worker. On 
the positive side, this could strengthen the incentives for 
net job creation. However, such measures imply higher 
monitoring costs and can raise their administrative 
burden, disincentivising their use in particular for SMEs. 
To rule out habituation effects, subsidies should be 
temporary and targeted at companies or sectors facing 
temporary shortfalls in demand (van der Ende et al, 
2012) and should be terminated as soon as the economy 
improves to shift the focus to re-employment in regular, 
unsubsidised jobs.
Even in periods of deep economic crisis with large 
employment losses, it may be prudent to target non-wage 
labour cost reductions at specific subgroups of workers. 
Labour demand elasticities are low in absolute value for 
better qualified workers, suggesting that non-wage costs 
reductions should be targeted to the needs of the most 
vulnerable group of the labour force. Closer targeting 
should also increase efficiency and reduce deadweight 
losses. For the most disadvantaged groups, such as the 
long-term unemployed or people with disabilities, more 
generous employment incentives and hiring subsidies 
may be necessary to compensate for impediments such as 
deficits in skill levels.
More research is needed to analyse the cost-effectiveness 
of policy reforms. The few new jobs generated could imply 
a substantial drop in revenue for the treasury or the social 
security system if funded by compensatory tax increases, 
for example, on consumption. For this reason, reforms to 
reduce the tax wedge should be designed with care. The 
employment increase in response to hiring subsidies is not 
huge, according to most empirical studies. Furthermore, 
unintended side effects such as distributional distortions, 
deadweight losses and habituation effects may offset 
some of the employment benefits.
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3 Results of the meta-analysis
This chapter presents the results of a meta-analysis of 
recent evaluations of the employment impact of the 
employer SSCs and functional equivalents in Europe. It 
complements the earlier literature review by means of 
a quantitative analysis of the existing estimates. First, the 
process followed to build the dataset of impact estimates 
and carry out a descriptive analysis of the studies used to 
perform the meta-analysis is discussed. Next, the main 
characteristics of the variability of the estimated impacts 
are described, depending on the precise type of policy 
reform (that is, change in SSCs or in any of the elements 
included under the umbrella of functional equivalents). 
Differences across estimates based on other key 
characteristics of the reform, such as its duration, scope and 
existence of a target group of workers, are also explored in 
this step. Similarly, the distribution of the estimated impact 
is compared with differences across studies in their design 
and characteristics (for instance, type of data, econometric 
methodology, type of publication, country under study) and 
to the macroeconomic context, including the institutional 
setting of the labour market. This preliminary descriptive 
evidence provides information on the likely sources of 
variability of the estimated impact of SSCs or functional 
equivalent reforms on employment. However, it does 
not account for the confounding effect that other factors 
may exert. There may be differences in the estimated 
impact across types of reforms, or due to differences in 
the characteristics of the intervention, that can stem from 
variations in the design and context of the studies.
A meta-regression analysis aims to assess the variability 
in the estimated impact of the policy studied while 
accounting for the sources of variation between 
evaluations. First, the econometric methodology is briefly 
discussed, taking account of the fact that the outcome of 
interest in this study is not the estimate of an effect size. 
The lack of a minimum degree of homogeneity in the 
economic magnitudes that have been used in the literature 
to measure the employment impact of a change in the 
employer SSCs or in a functional equivalent prevents the 
standard meta-analysis of effect sizes. Instead, the focus 
of the meta-analysis in this section is a categorisation of 
the estimated impact of the reforms on a magnitude that is 
related to employment in some way. In fact, the existence 
of such a type of estimate is a crucial element for the 
inclusion of a study in the dataset for the meta-analysis. 
Due to this constraint, the approach follows Card et al 
(2010) and Kluve (2010) in fitting non-linear probabilistic 
models for binary and ordinal outcomes. Probit models 
are used to carry out a meta-analysis on positive and 
significant versus non-positive and significant (significantly 
negative and non-significant) estimated effects of the 
policy reform on employment. To add more information, 
estimates in the group of studies are classified in three 
categories depending on the strength of the effect:
¢ significantly negative and non-significant;
¢ significantly positive but weak;
¢ significantly positive and strong.
Ordered probit models are fitted in this case to account for 
the ordinal nature of the outcome to be meta-analysed. 
The section contains a synthesis of the results of the meta-
analysis.
The chapter concludes with a summary of the main 
findings of the meta-analysis.
Description of the database
In order to carry out a systematic and structured meta-
analysis of the evidence, the standard steps in this kind of 
analysis (for instance, Garg et al, 2008; Stanley et al, 2013) 
were followed.
Identification of the question of interest: This must be 
as specific as possible and associated with a quantitative 
measure linking the outcome of interest to the magnitude 
used to proxy for the policy intervention. In most cases, 
this task involves some homogenisation or grouping of the 
inputs and outcomes, necessitated by the large variation 
among studies in the measures used.
Identification of all studies providing evaluation(s) 
of the policy intervention: The process for compiling 
studies needs to be explicit so as to avoid sources of bias 
and to allow for the external judgement of the quality 
of the meta-analysis. Databases and other sources, the 
keywords used to perform the search and the period must 
be disclosed. Similar principles should apply to the rules 
for the selection (inclusion/exclusion) and classification of 
studies based on the dimensions of interest for the meta-
analysis.
Coding of information: This is the information selected 
from each study that will be used to produce the 
quantitative review. It is important to collect information 
on:
¢ the impact of the measure;
¢ details of the evaluation;
¢ the empirical method and econometric technique;
¢ the context of the economy for which the estimate was 
obtained;
¢ the group of the population targeted by the policy 
intervention;
¢ the type of data;
¢ the period covered;
¢ details about the publication.
This information needs to be complemented using 
the interpretation of the results and/or the subjective 
assessment of the policy intervention. The type of 
subjective information to be compiled and treated needs 
to be determined on a priori grounds based on the focus 
of the review. It may, for instance, include the side-
effects of intervention or the cost of implementation. To 
minimise the risk of misinterpretation, and even mistakes 
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in the coding, it is preferable that two or more reviewers 
code the relevant studies. However, in an extensive 
survey of evaluations, the potential number of studies 
to be considered can be rather large, meaning that the 
task associated with this step is likely to be very time-
consuming. In such a case, the risks can be minimised 
by strong coordination among reviewers and by defining 
a common grid to be used by them all, with clear criteria. 
The grid including the information collected for all the 
studies can be made available on request.
Analysis of the collected information: This step includes 
the appraisal of the methods in each study, or group of 
similar studies, the summary of results and the isolation 
of key findings, and the identification of the origin of the 
variability of results across studies. The analysis should 
also take into account the main characteristics of the 
policy intervention (for instance, type of reform, duration, 
target groups).
Drawing conclusions on the magnitude, significance, 
and sources of variability of the effect under analysis: 
In this final step, the team of reviewers must reach 
conclusions on the existence and relevance of the effect 
of the policy intervention, based on the previous analysis 
of the reported evidence. The team is also expected to 
establish whether the findings in the available studies are 
consistent and can be extrapolated to other contexts (for 
instance, other countries/regions, population groups, time 
periods, sectors). In this regard, it is reasonable to believe 
that a proper search of primary studies (including issues 
such as positive and negative estimated effects, published 
and unpublished, in English and in other languages) and 
a systematic, transparent and ‘as objective as possible’ 
treatment of the evidence reported in these studies, will 
provide more consistent and comprehensive conclusions 
than those derived from the mere comparison of one study 
to another.
With respect to the question of interest in this study, the 
aim was to analyse whether and to what extent reducing 
SSCs supported by employers have an effect on the net 
generation of employment. Although the primary focus 
is on this particular policy, the analysis is also extended 
to measures that can be considered to be functional 
equivalents (policies to stimulate labour demand by 
reducing labour costs for the employer), as already 
indicated.
The procedure implemented for selecting the evaluations 
considered in the study is described in Chapter 2. Studies 
considered in the meta-analysis have been identified 
from the list of studies resulting from the search of the 
literature applying the filters described in that section 
(that is, only those that analysed European countries and 
whose empirical methodology fit into Levels 2 to 5 of 
the Maryland scale). In particular, for the meta-analysis, 
only those studies that included at least one estimate 
of the effect of an SSC or functional equivalent reform 
on a broadly defined measure of employment were 
selected. This resulted in 207 estimated effects from 68 
studies covering 19 countries. Different estimates for the 
same study were included when they corresponded to 
the impact on, for instance, different population groups, 
periods of time and types of policy interventions.
It has become common practice to use meta-analysis only 
when there are a high number of available estimates of the 
effect of interest. This means that the number of elements 
in the list of empirical studies providing estimates of the 
employment effects of changes in the employer SSCs or 
functional equivalents determined whether the meta-
analysis could be carried out or not. The main reason 
is that, with a small number of studies, the statistical 
analysis would be unstable and unreliable. Every study in 
the list of potential candidates was reviewed to determine 
if it fulfilled the conditions to be included in the meta-
analysis. The result of this process is summarised in the 
final column of the table in Annex 2. The number of studies 
with feasible evaluations was large enough to guarantee 
reliable evidence from the meta-analysis. Compared with 
previous meta-analyses of the effect of similar policies, 
the dataset from this study included more estimates than 
that in Kluve (2010) and a similar number to that used by 
Card et al (2010) (137 and 199, respectively). However, the 
exclusive focus on the effects in European countries and 
the more focused scope of the policy under analysis in this 
report makes the number of studies in this sample lower 
than that in Kluve (2010) and Card et al (2010) (96 and 97, 
respectively).
Extraction of the relevant information in each of the 
selected studies was performed by the team members. 
Extraction and coding of the information about the 
policy reform, its effect, and the main characteristics of 
the design of the evaluation and the context in which it 
was performed, is a crucial task for a systematic review 
of evaluations when the number of studies to review 
is large and several reviewers are involved. All relevant 
information from the evaluations must be collected and 
this makes it important to design a mechanism that 
guarantees that the collection of information is both 
as objective and as systematic as possible, and that 
subsequent consolidation and summarisation is possible. 
At the same time, differences in the criteria used by 
reviewers should be minimised.
To guarantee the quality of results in this step, two 
decisions were made – on the design of an evaluation grid 
and on a strategy to assure the quality of the reviews.
Evaluation grid
An evaluation grid (reproduced in Annex 3) was designed 
in which most of the items corresponded to variables 
whose information was directly used in the meta-analysis. 
The grid had four sections.
In the first section, the reviewer was asked to provide basic 
information about the study, such as the author/s, year 
and type of publication. This section also documented the 
language of the publication.
The main elements and characteristics of the policy 
intervention were introduced in the second section. The 
items included the type of policy intervention (employer 
SSCs) and the different types of functional equivalents, the 
population targeted by the policy, the duration, and the 
country and year of the reform.
The third section was dedicated to the design of the 
evaluation, determining the characteristics of the 
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methodology and data used to assess the impact of the 
policy. The reviewer was first asked to supply the precise 
type of data and, if relevant, its frequency. The source of 
the data distinguishing between administrative registers 
and survey datasets was also included. This was followed 
by information about the methodological approach of the 
evaluation: if the focus was on individuals or companies 
(microeconomic approach), or territories, sectors or any 
other type of aggregation (macroeconomic approach); the 
type of econometric method that was applied; and the 
rating of the paper according to the Maryland Scientific 
Method Scale. Finally, in this section of the grid, the 
reviewers also provided information about the period 
under analysis and the precise definition of the outcome 
variable in the study. This was crucial information given 
the focus of the review on the effects on employment.
Finally, the fourth section was designed to collect 
information about the evidence in each study. The 
reviewer was firstly asked to reveal if the evaluation 
focused on a precise group of the population (for instance, 
long-term unemployed, young, female) or if there was 
not a particular target group. Then the reviewer was 
asked to provide information about the time horizon of 
the impact, distinguishing between short-, medium- and 
long-term impacts, and whether the evaluation was about 
the effect on the extensive margin (people employed) or 
the intensive margin (number of hours). This section of 
the evaluation grid ends with items for the quantitative 
impacts of the reform. As detailed below, rather than the 
estimate of a coefficient and the corresponding standard 
error, or p-value, the reviewer was asked to indicate if the 
estimated effect was significantly positive or not, and in 
the former case, if the impact was considered as strong or 
weak.
The evaluation grid was implemented in Google Forms. 
Once a reviewer had completed the grid for an evaluation, 
it was submitted and automatically uploaded into 
a dataset in the form of a spreadsheet, which also included 
the name of the reviewer of each study and the date 
on which the review was produced. This made initial 
treatment of the collected information easier, particularly 
with a view to homogenisation and standardisation of 
responses, and the subsequent export of the data to the 
statistical software used to obtain the results of the meta-
analysis.
Quality assurance strategy
The second decision taken concerned the strategy to 
guarantee the quality of the information gathered by the 
reviewers. The information of each study was extracted 
and collated by a member of the research team using 
the evaluation grid. The project coordinator monitored 
a number of entries selected randomly for each reviewer, 
with the object of checking the consistency with the 
criteria established for the collection of information 
and with that required in the evaluation grid. At the end 
of this process, the coding of information was revised 
and homogenised before its analysis. A preliminary test 
of the entire procedure was performed using a limited 
number of studies. The members of the team reviewed 
this set of studies, selecting, coding and entering the 
information into the evaluation grid. Afterwards, all the 
entries were compared and differences were discussed. 
As a result, some practical clarifications were made 
such as the information to select and the way of coding 
it. The procedure also led to the introduction of some 
improvements and the correction of minor bugs in the 
evaluation grid. In principle, this systematic procedure 
should minimise the risk of heterogeneous and 
inconsistent responses in the collection of the relevant 
information for the meta-analysis.
Methodology
The information collected from each of the studies 
included in the meta-analysis was codified and clustered 
into groups of variables. The first group corresponds to 
the outcomes. In this regard, the ideal magnitude to be 
meta-analysed would have been the standardised effect 
size (the standardised magnitude of the estimated effect) 
corresponding to the impact that the policy reform had on 
employment. However, the selected studies strongly differ 
over the definition of the outcome and policy variables, 
which makes it impossible to combine sufficiently 
comparable effect sizes to be meta-analysed. Regarding 
the measure of employment, while most macroeconomic 
evaluations focus on the employment rate or the number 
of jobs, microeconomic evaluations usually consider the 
probability of finding a job, as some evaluations focus on 
the effect on the exit from unemployment (it is assumed 
that a decrease in unemployment is strongly linked to 
employment generation due to the less elastic response 
of participation). In addition, other evaluations address 
other types of related effects, such as the duration of 
unemployment spells or the transition from temporary to 
permanent employment.
In this sense, it is worth mentioning that several studies 
have focused on the evaluation of policies targeted on 
some specific population groups and that studies varied in 
the time span in which the response of employment to the 
intervention was measured. Broadly speaking, there are 
three options: short, medium and long term. In summary, 
to proxy the theoretical magnitude, employment 
evaluation studies use a number of different empirical 
counterparts that range from employment rates, levels 
or changes to the probability of finding a new job, the 
time to find a job and the probability of getting a better/
more stable job. This variety makes it difficult to obtain 
a sufficiently homogeneous quantitative measure that can 
be used across the different evaluations.
There is also a wide heterogeneity between studies in the 
variable used to capture the policy intervention. It may be 
simply a time dummy to distinguish the period in which 
the intervention was in force (as in aggregate time series 
analyses for a single economy) or the interaction between 
this type of binary variable with other dichotomous and/
or continuous variables that proxy, for instance, the group 
of workers targeted by the policy and the size of the 
intervention (as in studies aiming at identifying causal 
effects). Variability in the method of creating a proxy for 
policy intervention is even observed within the latter 
type of measure as studies vary, for example, in the 
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target groups of workers and in the way the size of the 
intervention is defined.
Therefore, the large variability in the set of studies 
made a meta-analysis based on effect sizes impossible. 
Instead, estimates were classified based on the sign and 
significance of the effect. Two outcome variables were 
defined based on such information. The first distinguishes 
two groups of estimated effects: those indicating that the 
impact of the reform on employment was positive and 
significant; and those for which there was not a significant 
effect or it was even negative.26 The second adds further 
information as it differentiates the first group of estimates 
by the strength of the impact. More precisely, three groups 
were defined for the second outcome: the first included 
the non-significant or negative estimates; the second 
was formed by significantly positive weak estimates; 
and the third was formed by significantly positive but 
strong estimated effects. The distinction between a weak 
and a strong effect rested on the reviewer’s subjective 
judgement, based on information from each study 
referring to the magnitude of the estimated effect and the 
corresponding degree of significance. Where available, the 
indicated assessment of the reviewer/s of the evaluation 
on the strength of the estimated effect was also taken into 
account. It is worthwhile mentioning that Kluve (2010) 
and Card et al (2010) faced similar issues regarding the 
availability of comparable effect sizes in their datasets, 
which led them to suggest the categorisation of the 
estimated effects, though in a way slightly different to 
that used in this study. Their three categories correspond 
to significantly negative, non-significant and significantly 
positive effects.
The rest of the information corresponded to variables 
that account for variations across estimates in the 
policy intervention, the design of the study and the 
characteristics of the publication. Several variables were 
defined within each of these groups. Table 1 shows the 
details of the variables included in each group and the 
corresponding categories for each of the categorical 
variables. The inclusion of the level of each evaluation 
in the Maryland scale was considered as an additional 
control for the design of the study. However, this variable 
is closely associated with other components of the design 
of the study, particularly the econometric method used to 
obtain the estimate of the effect of the policy intervention 
and, as a result, their inclusion in the meta-regression 
does not improve the estimates (further details are 
provided in Annexes 5 and 6). It can be observed from 
the information at the bottom of Table 1 that a group 
of variables was added to the dataset with the aim of 
controlling for the macroeconomic background and the 
labour market institutions of the country-period for each 
evaluation. Specifically, the annual GDP growth rate and 
the unemployment rate for the country and period of the 
evaluation were the two variables included to control 
for differences across evaluations in the macroeconomic 
context. The source for these data is the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators dataset. Measures of 
the degree of wage-setting coordination, level of wage 
bargaining, union density and adjusted bargaining 
coverage were the ones selected to account for differences 
in labour market institutions. They were extracted from 
the ICTWSS database (Visser, 2016).
Next, the main trends of the database, describing several 
characteristics to be used later in the meta-regressions, 
were summarised. The descriptive analysis of the 
information collected from the evaluations is a crucial 
element. In the first place, it is important to check that 
there is enough variability across studies in the effect of 
the policy. If so, obtaining preliminary evidence on the 
sources of variability is necessary: for instance, whether 
the estimates of the effect varies over time and/or across 
countries, or whether there are clear manifestations of 
the influence of the econometric method or the type of 
data used to obtain the estimate of the effect. Differences 
were formally tested using the statistical toolkit. This 
preliminary descriptive evidence was used to guide 
the specification of the meta-regression, in which the 
particular impact of each of the characteristics of the 
study, the policy intervention, the context and so on 
can be estimated, conditional on other characteristics. 
A detailed description of studies included in the meta-
analysis according to different dimensions is provided in 
the tables in Annex 4.
Analysis of the studies
The 68 studies finally considered covered 19 countries. 
They were mostly written in English (81%) and mostly 
published as academic articles (44%), working papers 
(28%) or reports (19%), the rest (9%) being unpublished 
works or other types of publication. Half of all studies, 
and also half of those published as journal articles, were 
published from 2012 onwards. This more recent period 
accounts for 69% of all reports, but just 40% of working 
papers and other types of publication. Central and eastern 
European (CEE) countries provided many of the more 
recent publications, while a higher number of ‘older’ 
works was found for continental countries. Significantly, 
the database did not include journal articles for CEE 
countries, which were mostly represented by reports (80% 
of all works). In the southern countries, however, 60% of 
all considered studies were published as journal articles. 
Studies for the Nordic countries were mainly published as 
working papers, while continental countries were mainly 
responsible for those in the ‘Other’ category.
26 The researchers opted to group evaluations reporting non-significant and significantly negative estimated effects since the main interest of the study is the 
identification of policy interventions in the EU Member States that stimulated employment in an effective way. Additionally, the joint consideration of these two 
types of effects in a single category allowed them to compute the variable of interest in a way that guaranteed a good balance between its two categories, 59% of 
observations corresponding to a positive and significant effect and 41% to non-significant or significantly negative effect. A further distinction between the last two 
effects would have led to the definition of categories with a low number of observations, which could negatively affect estimates in the meta-regressions.
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Table 1: Variables for policy intervention, study design and controls
Group Variable Categories Notes
Policy intervention
Type of reform
SSCs Employer SSCs and functional equivalents. The 
‘Other’ category includes active labour market 
programmes and other non-wage labour cost 
measures.
Employment incentive
Payroll cost
Other
Direction
Increase Any policy intervention focused on the employer 
social security contributions or a functional 
equivalent that caused an increase in the cost of 
labour was coded as ‘Increase’.
Reduction
Duration
Permanent Defined as permanent when a period of application 
was not announced when the reform was enforced.Temporary
Scope
Single reform
Included in a package
Targeted (companies 
or workers) – general
Specific group of companies The policy is targeted at a specific group of 
companies, at a specific group of workers or not 
targeted at all.
Specific group of workers
No specific group
Target – detailed
Unemployed
Long-term
Fixed-term The target group for fixed-term is individuals already 
employed, and the type of intervention is of the form 
of conversion incentives.Young
Old
Women
Disabled
Low-skilled
Design (data, method 
and so on)
Data frequency
High frequency High frequency: periodicity less than annual
Low frequency Low frequency: annual or more than annual
Undated
Data source
Administrative
Survey
Econometric 
method
Difference in differences
Matching
Regression discontinuity
Other
Outcomes of the 
study
Employment only
Employment and wages
Number years 
analysed
Continuous variable
Time horizon 
assessed
Long-run Long-run: effect measured after three or more years
Medium-run Medium-run: effect measured between 1 and 3 years
Short-run
Short-run: effect measured within the first year after 
the intervention
Other
Language
English
Other than English
Characteristics of the 
study
Group of countries
CEE
CEE: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, 
Romania
Continental Continental: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany
Nordic Nordic: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, UK
Southern Southern: Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
Type of publication
Journal article
Report
Working paper This category includes mostly unpublished works.
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Group Variable Categories Notes
Context
GDP growth
Continuous variables 
Sources: ICTWSS and World Development Indicators 
databases
Unemployment rate
Wage setting 
coordination
Level of wage 
bargaining
Union density
Adjusted bargaining 
coverage
Note: ICTWSS is the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage-setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 51 countries 
between 1960 and 2014 (Visser, 2016)
[see Excel file for table]Even though the main focus of 
this report is on changes in employer SSCs, the list of 
studies strictly devoted to this type of policy intervention 
accounted for only 15% of all of those covered. Functional 
equivalents, particularly employment incentives, were 
more numerous. Most papers (50%) evaluating SSCs 
corresponded to southern European countries, followed 
by continental countries. In only one CEE country 
(Hungary) was an evaluation of this type of policy found. 
Nordic countries were responsible for two-thirds of all 
works on the effects of payroll cost measures. In all groups 
of countries, the category ‘employment incentives’ was 
the type of policy measure with most evaluations (Sweden 
being the only exception). The ‘Other’ category accounted 
for 12% of works and included mostly ALMPs.
Only six out of the 68 studies considered policies that 
imply an increase in costs, four being associated with 
employment incentives and two with payroll costs. Most of 
these works are found in continental countries.
Most works (65%) related to policies that are permanent 
rather than temporary. This was not so in the works for 
southern countries, where two-thirds of works related to 
temporary policies. Interestingly, eight out of 10 policies 
considering employer SSCs were temporary, while two out 
of 10 were mainly permanent. All policies that would mean 
an increase of costs for the company are temporary.
Half of the studies considered reforms that were part of 
a comprehensive package. This ratio was higher (65%) for 
studies in continental countries, while in Nordic countries, 
35% of the analysed studies considered single reforms. 
Again, studies analysing SSCs displayed a differentiated 
pattern, as most of them (73%) were linked with reforms 
labelled as ‘Single’.
Most (80%) of the analysed policy interventions were 
targeted at workers. Five out of six studies analysing 
interventions targeted at companies related to Nordic 
countries. When employment incentives were analysed, 
most of the policies focused on workers rather than on 
companies. Companies were more represented in studies 
analysing changes in payroll costs.
The main characteristics of the design of the studies are 
as follows. Only six studies performed a macro analysis, 
three being based on developments in southern countries. 
Clearly, the types of data influence the analysis. A quarter 
of all studies used cross-sectional data, while half of the 
works used high frequency (quarterly, monthly) data and 
the remaining used annual data. This proportion was 
about the same for all types of policy interventions, with 
the exception of studies about reforms in payroll costs, 
which tended to use lower frequency data. For collecting 
such data, 90% of studies used administrative records and 
just 10% used surveys. Most analyses using surveys related 
to southern countries.
As for the statistical techniques used in the evaluations, 
half used a D-i-D approach; matching techniques were 
used by 29% of studies and regression discontinuity by 
10% (mostly in works carried out in southern countries). 
Half of the works applying D-i-D used low frequency data, 
while regression discontinuity approaches were mostly 
applied to high frequency information. Policies labelled as 
‘Other’ were those that more frequently used, in relative 
terms, matching and regression discontinuity techniques.
When deciding the score for each study on the Maryland 
scale, the technique and type of data were, as might be 
expected, key. The two studies considered to be Level 
4 used undated data with a regression discontinuity 
design for analysing the impact of reforms in employment 
incentives. At the opposite end of the spectrum, those 
studies signalled as Level 2 mainly used ‘Other’ types of 
techniques. Significantly, most studies in CEE countries 
were marked as Level 2. In the same vein, 57% of Level 
2 studies were reports or ‘Other’ type of publications; 
this contrasts with the 80% of Level 3 and Level 4 which 
were published as journal articles or working papers. 
Finally, Level 2 studies that, for the purposes of this study, 
have lower standards displayed the highest proportion 
of works written in a language other than English. This 
clear dependence between the level of the Maryland 
scale in which each evaluation was classified and the 
characteristics of the design of study is the reason why 
the Maryland scale was not included as a separate 
determinant of the employment outcome in the meta-
regressions.
The focus of the studies was also checked and only those 
studies where there was an evaluation of the policy and 
its impact on employment were considered. Nevertheless, 
some studies also considered the impact on wages. This 
was the case in 37% of all studies, but this incidence was 
higher (70%) in studies carried out in Nordic countries. 
It was also the case for payroll costs and ‘Other’ types of 
functional equivalent policies.
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Of 68 studies, seven analysed across a time frame of only 
one year, and 42 up to 5 years. Only 4 studies analysed 
more than 10 years in total. Studies analysing SSCs 
were those with the highest proportion (73%) using 
short periods of time (up to five years). Looking at the 
reference year of every study, 31% of all the studies 
were before 2000, 46% were between 2001 and 2007, 
and 24% were from 2008 onwards. 27 Studies referring 
to CEE and southern countries were the ones with more 
recent analysed periods. Studies analysing years before 
2000 used mostly regression discontinuity and ‘Other’ 
types of techniques. The most recent work focused only 
on companies was referenced in 2006. Consequently, 
the more recent studies were devoted to the analysis of 
policies targeted at workers. Interestingly, there was no 
study involving analysis of payroll costs whose reference 
year was after 2008.
The 68 considered studies reported 207 estimates, or 
evaluations, in total. As shown in Figure 7, for 19 analyses 
(28% of the total), only one evaluation was considered. 
The largest number of papers (39 or 57%) had between 
two and four estimates, while 10 studies had more than 
five estimates. These studies accounted for 82 estimates in 
total. On average, every study had about three estimates. 
Studies analysing ‘Other’ types of functional equivalent 
interventions were the ones with more estimates per 
paper (5.3 on average), followed by SSCs (4), payroll costs 
(3.5) and employment incentives (2.1), a category that 
had 17 out the 19 papers with just one estimate. These 
averages are larger than the ones in the works of Kluve 
(2010) and Card et al (2010) (1.4 and 2.1, respectively).
The main outcome of every evaluation reports whether the 
analysed policy had a significant impact on employment. 
Table 2 (p. 47) and Figure 8 (overleaf) display the 
proportion of estimates that resulted in no significant 
or negative results, plus the proportion of positive and 
significant estimates, with a distinction between weak and 
strong effect: 59% of all evaluations reported a significant 
and positive effect of policy interventions on employment 
creation, most of them (73%) being categorised as having 
a strong rather than a weak impact on employment. Table 
2 also distinguishes the results by the characteristics of 
the policy. The policy with the strongest proportion of 
positive results is employment incentives, followed by 
SSCs and other policies, with payroll costs the one with the 
lowest positive impact (in fact, it displays more negative 
or non-significant impacts than positive ones). As shown 
in the last column of Table 2, this study found a significant 
bilateral association between the type of policy and the 
outcome of the estimate.28
When the policy implies an increase in labour costs, the 
impact on employment is particularly strong, although not 
statistically significant. This variable has to be interpreted 
with caution: an increase in labour costs may lead to 
a reduction in employment and this is interpreted as the 
expected outcome of the policy.
The duration of the policy is not significantly associated 
with the result of the estimate, while being part of 
a comprehensive package of policies increases the 
frequency of strong positive results of the analysis.
The aspect strongly associated with the outcome is the 
policy target. When policies are focused on companies 
rather than on workers, the impact is either not significant 
or negative in almost all estimates (92%).
The distribution of the results of the estimates were also 
analysed with respect to the differences in the design of 
the study and the other characteristics. Detailed results 
Figure 7: Histogram of the distribution of estimates per study
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27 The reference year was considered to be the one in which the policy under analysis was enforced, or when a change in such policy took place. Where the policy had 
been in place previously and no change was experienced, the middle year of the analysed period was used as the reference.
28 In order to decide if there is a significant association, a battery of tests was used: Pearson’s chi-squared, likelihood-ratio chi-squared, Cramer’s V, Goodman and 
Kruskal’s gamma, and Kendall’s tau-b. Details of these results are given in Table A4.7 of Annex 4.
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are provided in Table A4.6 of Annex 4. In brief, the design 
of the evaluation is in general significantly associated 
with the final outcome. This study finds, for instance, that 
studies using matching techniques display a strong trend 
towards a positive and strong impact on employment. 
Something similar happens when the studies are only 
analysing employment rather than when the focus is on 
both employment and wages.
The length of the time period under analysis is significantly 
associated with the final outcome. Hence, analyses using 
shorter periods of time show higher proportions of strong 
positive impacts on employment. This result, however, 
is not found when looking at the time horizon of the 
assessment, as evaluations with long- and short-term 
perspectives display similar outputs.
The evidence from the description of the information in 
the dataset of evaluations is informative about the type 
of reforms analysed and the characteristics of the design 
of the studies, the publication, and the economic and 
labour market context. It also provides an initial insight 
into the sources of variability in the impact of the policy 
reforms. However, as already indicated, it would be 
speculative to derive strong conclusions from the simple 
measures of association between the reported outcome 
of the evaluation and each characteristic of the policy 
intervention. This is because differences in certain factors – 
the design, in other characteristics of the study, and the 
context, which have also been shown to correlate with the 
estimated impact of the reforms – might be behind the 
association between the outcome and the characteristics 
of the policy. The meta-regressions in the following section 
provide evidence on the variability in the impact of the 
reforms due to the precise type of policy intervention 
and other characteristics of the reform, conditional 
on differences across evaluations in the design, the 
publication and the context.
Econometric methodology and 
results of the meta-regressions
The design of the meta-regression is highly conditioned 
by the type of outcome used to summarise the effect 
of the policy intervention. As discussed above, an in-
depth analysis of the evaluations led the authors of this 
study to the idea of using both a nominal and an ordinal 
variable that summarised the impact of the reform in each 
evaluation rather than a proper effect size. More precisely, 
based on the estimates of the corresponding effect 
provided in each evaluation (ai) a binary outcome variable, 
impact1, was constructed as:
 impact1i = 1 if i is significantly positive
 impact1i = 0 otherwise
 
 impact2i = 3 if i is significantly positive with a large value
 impact2i = 2 if i is significantly positive with a moderate value 
 impact2i = 1 otherwise 
 
 impact3i = 1 if i is significantly positive with a large value
 impact3i = 0 if i is significantly positive with a moderate value
 
Therefore, impact1 just distinguishes between evaluations 
yielding a significant positive effect and those that do 
not. In other words, it differentiates between policy 
interventions that effectively stimulated employment and 
those that did not.
A probit model is used to analyse the relationship between 
the effectiveness of the policy intervention, as proxied 
by impact1, and its main characteristics, controlling 
also for differences in the design of the evaluation, the 
characteristics of the publication, and the economic 
background.
In addition to the binary outcome variable, and motivated 
by the interest in having additional information on 
the interventions that exerted a positive effect on 
employment, an ordinal variable with three categories, 
impact2, was defined as:
 impact1i = 1 if i is significantly positive
 impact1i = 0 otherwise
 
 impact2i = 3 if i is significantly positive with a large value
 impact2i = 2 if i is significantly positive with a moderate value 
 impact2i = 1 otherwise 
 
 impact3i = 1 if i is significantly positive with a large value
 impact3i = 0 if i is significantly positive with a moderate value
 In this case, an ordinal probit model is fitted to analyse 
variations in the estimated impact of the policy 
intervention to its characteristics and the design, 
Figure 8: Distribution of the employment impact by type of policy
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publication and context controls. The reasoning behind this 
alternative treatment of the estimated impact is that it may 
be the case that the size of the effect varies across alternative 
types of reforms (for instance, for a change in employer 
SSCs and for some of the functional equivalents) and/or 
depending on, for instance, the duration and the specific 
group of workers targeted by the intervention. In this regard, 
as a final step in the analysis, a third indicator of the impact 
estimated in each evaluation, impact3, is defined only for the 
significantly positive effects as:
 impact1i = 1 if i is significantly positive
 impact1i = 0 otherwise
 
 impact2i = 3 if i is significantly positive with a large value
 impact2i = 2 if i is significantly positive with a moderate value 
 impact2i = 1 otherwise 
 
 impact3i = 1 if i is significantly positive with a large value
 impact3i = 0 if i is significantly positive with a moderate value
 
Accordingly, a probit model was fitted to analyse the effect 
of the characteristics of the reform on the magnitude of 
the effect, using only the sample corresponding to the 
evaluations that provide a significantly positive effect (123 
out of 207).
Considering the strategy followed in the meta-regression for 
each of these three outcome variables, only the variables 
under the category ‘Policy intervention’ were included in the 
specification in a first step. This allowed the researchers to 
assess to what extent the employment effect of the reform 
depended on the type of instrument, the direction, duration 
and scope of the intervention, and the target group (if 
any). As for the target of the policy, a distinction was made 
between specifications that used a broad measure of the 
target (whether the target was a group of workers or a group 
of companies, or whether the reform was untargeted and 
applied to the whole population), and those that allow for 
differences in the impact across detailed groups of workers 
(for instance, the long-term unemployed, young, female, 
disabled). In further steps, controls for differences in the 
design, type of publication and economic context of each 
evaluation were subsequently included with the aim of 
checking whether variations in the impact of the reform were 
really due to differences in the policy rather than, broadly 
speaking, to the environment in which the evaluation 
was implemented. For the specifications including the 
controls for the economic context, a distinction was made 
between specifications that included only controls for the 
macroeconomic background and those that also added 
information about the labour market institutions, as they 
might exert a differential effect on the chances of the success 
of reforms such as those analysed in this report. In a final 
step, the effect of the interaction between the type of policy 
intervention and the target groups was explored. This was 
motivated by the fact that the effectiveness of the different 
Table 2: Distribution of model output by characteristics of analysed/estimate study
% of estimates that are: Number of 
observations
Association
No sign/ 
negative
Positive
Weak Strong
All estimates 41% 16% 43% 207
Policy intervention
Type of instrument Employment increase 24% 23% 54% 80 ✓✓
Other 49% 15% 37% 41
Payroll costs 55% 14% 31% 42
SSCs 50% 7% 43% 44
Direction Increase 25% 19% 56% 16
Reduction 42% 16% 42% 191
Duration Permanent 39% 18% 43% 131
Temporary 43% 12% 45% 76
Scope Package 34% 15% 51% 104 ✓
Single measure 48% 17% 36% 103
Target No specific 44% 17% 39% 18 ✓✓✓
Specific group of 
companies
92% 8% 13
Specific group of workers 36% 16% 47% 176
Specific target group of workers
Unemployed 36% 16% 48% 83
Long-term unemployed 22% 21% 57% 63 ✓✓✓
Fixed-term contract 20% 80% 5
Young 38% 15% 46% 52
Old 29% 29% 42% 31 ✓
Women 28% 20% 52% 25
Disabled 21% 14% 64% 14
Low-skilled 35% 6% 59% 17
Note: ✓✓✓, ✓✓, ✓ denotes that the null hypothesis of independence is rejected for the variables involved with a probability of 99%, 95% and 90%, 
respectively.
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types of interventions might well vary between the groups 
targeted by the reform.
In the following section, the results of the estimate of 
the probit and ordered probit specifications described 
above are summarised and discussed. The tables in this 
section synthesise the estimated effect of differences in the 
characteristics of the policy intervention on the employment 
impact reported in the evaluations. They also include 
information about the effect of the controls. A set of symbols 
is used in these tables, rather than the precise value of the 
estimated coefficients and the corresponding standard 
errors and levels of significance. The symbol ‘O’ is used when 
a coefficient is not statistically different from zero (the effect 
of the corresponding variable is negligible), a ‘+’ is used when 
it is significant and positive, and a ‘–’ when it is negative. The 
degree of significance (as a statistical proxy for the relevance 
of the effect) is denoted by the number of symbols in each 
cell. The interested reader can find the tables summarising 
all the technical information of the estimates in Annex 5.
It is also important to mention that in all estimates the 
omitted (reference) categories are, respectively: ‘a change 
in the employers’ SSCs’, ‘a decrease in the non-wage cost of 
labour’, ‘a temporary change’, ‘a comprehensive package’, 
‘the lack of a target group’, ‘high frequency data used’, 
‘source of data is administrative records’, ‘econometric 
method is D-i-D’, ‘only the effect on employment is analysed’, 
‘short-term impact’, ‘CEE group of countries’, ‘published as 
journal article’, and ‘language other than English’.
Significantly positive impacts compared to non-
positive impacts: Probit meta-regressions
As already mentioned, the analysis starts by distinguishing 
between evaluations that provide a (significantly) positive 
and a non-positive impact. Table 3 shows the summary 
of results when using the broad target measure. The first 
column in the table corresponds to results when only 
the policy characteristics are included. The probability of 
obtaining a positive impact (compared to a non-positive 
one) in an evaluation of a reform involving an employment 
incentive is significantly higher than that implemented 
through a decrease in the employers’ SSCs. In contrast, 
there seems to be no differences with respect to the other 
two types of reforms. As for the other characteristics of the 
policy intervention, neither the direction nor the duration 
and scope seem to affect the result of the evaluation. The 
only source of variability in the impact worth mentioning is 
that corresponding to policies that target a specific group 
of companies. With respect to non-targeted reforms, those 
targeted at specific companies seem to be less likely to 
provide a positive impact on employment. Interestingly, 
there are no difference between untargeted reforms and 
those directed at a particular group of workers.
The following columns show the results when 
subsequently adding the three groups of controls. The 
effect of the type of reform when controlling for differences 
in the design, publication and macroeconomic context 
remains largely unaltered. The only difference is in the 
effect associated with employment incentives, which in 
some specifications becomes insignificant while in others 
remains significantly positive. Its effect is only marginally 
significant when the dummies for the group of countries 
are excluded in the specification that controls for the 
macroeconomic context variables (last column in Table 3). 
The inclusion of controls does not lead to major changes in 
the results of the effect of the other policy characteristics, 
with the interesting exception of that for the group of 
workers. The specification that includes the three set 
of controls suggests that the probability of obtaining 
a positive impact of the reform is higher if the policy was 
targeted to a particular group of workers.
Overall, the results suggest that when a reform affects 
only a specific group of the working population, it is 
more effective in increasing employment than when 
there is no target. In turn, the evidence derived from 
the evaluations indicates that interventions designed 
for particular groups of companies may be less effective 
even than untargeted reforms.
As for the influence of differences across evaluations in the 
controls, the results confirm the strong influence of the 
design of the study itself. In summary, it is more likely to 
estimate a positive employment impact of the reform when 
using data drawn from periods of less than a year, and when 
using administrative registers rather than data from a survey. 
On the other hand, using matching techniques may increase 
the chance of estimating a positive impact compared 
to applying D-i-D in isolation. In any case, the latter 
econometric method may be linked to a higher propensity 
to obtain positive evaluations when compared to alternative 
techniques (such as regression discontinuity).
Regarding the time horizon of the assessment, the 
results indicate that a positive impact is less frequent in 
the medium and long term compared to the short term.
Less frequent positive impacts are also obtained in studies 
that combine the assessment on employment and wages 
versus those that only focus on the impact on employment. 
On the other hand, the results summarised in Table 3 reveal 
some differences across groups of countries in the propensity 
to obtain positive impacts. With respect to the CEE group, 
which is the reference category, evaluations for the other 
groups of countries tend to provide less frequent positive 
effects. The fact that part of the differences across countries 
vanish when the GDP growth and the unemployment rate are 
included as controls suggests that some of these differences 
are caused by disparities in the economic background of the 
economies in which the policy reform is evaluated.
It can be inferred that the likelihood of a positive 
impact increases in countries and periods of high 
pace of growth and decreases when the economy is 
relatively stagnant. As regards the influence of the 
unemployment rate, the evidence derived from the 
meta-regression of evaluations is not as robust that 
of GDP growth. If anything, the evidence points to 
a decline in the chances of observing a positive effect 
when unemployment is high.
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The results of the probit meta-regressions obtained when 
including the detailed target group of workers instead 
of the variable for the general target are synthesised in 
Table 4 (overleaf). The inclusion of the detailed groups 
of targeted workers indicates that there may be some 
differences in the effectiveness of the policy intervention, 
depending on the particular group of workers targeted 
by the reform. Based on the specification that includes 
all the controls (fourth column of results in Table 4), 
the probability of obtaining a positive impact on 
employment is higher when the policy is targeted 
at female workers and, to a lesser extent, the low-
skilled. The differential effect observed for the long-term 
unemployed in the specification with no controls and 
only with controls for differences in the design vanishes 
when the country group dummies and the macro-context 
controls are added. The opposite holds true as regards 
the effect of women. When the dummies for the groups of 
countries are excluded (fifth column of results in Table 4), 
a positive effect is again observed for the long-term 
unemployed and, particularly, for workers with a fixed-
term contract. This points to the concentration of the 
differentiated effect for these groups in specific countries 
or under specific macroeconomic circumstances.
The results of a final set of specifications that add several 
controls for differences in the labour market institutional 
setting in which the evaluations were obtained are 
summarised in Table A5.3 of Annex 5.
Table 3: Probit models for positive versus non-positive impact – general target*
Policy intervention
Type of reform Employment increase ++ O O ++ +
Other O O O O O
Payroll cost O O O O O
Direction Increase O O O O O
Duration Permanent O O O – O
Scope Single reform O O + O O
Target Group of companies – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Group of workers O O O + + + + + +
Design (data, method and so on)
Data frequency Low frequency O O – – – – –
Undated – – – – – – – – – –
Data source Survey O – – – – – – – –
Econometric method Matching + + O O + + +
Other – – – – –
Regression discontinued – – – – – – – – – – – –
Outcomes Employment and wages – – – – – – – –
Number of years analysed – O O O
Time horizon assessed Long term – – – – – – – –
Medium term – – – – – – – – – –
Characteristics of the study
Group of countries Continental – – – –
Nordic – – – – –
Southern – – – – –
Type of publication Other O – – –
Report O O O
Working paper O + + +
Language English O O O
Context – macroeconomic
GDP growth + + + + + +
Unemployment rate – – O
Number of observations 207 207 207 207 207
Joint significance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.11 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.33
Note: *Full statistical outputs for this table and other results of the meta-analysis are available in an online annex at http://bit.ly/nonwagelabour
Models are probits, fit to binary data with value 1 for significant positive estimates, and 0 for negative and non-significant estimates. + + + positive p < 
0.01; + + positive p < 0.05; + positive p < 0.1; – – – negative p < 0.01; – – negative p < 0.05; – negative p < 0.1; O p ≥ 0.1. Based on standard errors clustered 
by article. Joint significance denotes the result of the Wald test of the joint significance of all the coefficients. Omitted categories are: SSCs, Decrease, 
Temporary, Comprehensive package, No target group, High frequency, Administrative data, D-i-D, Only employment, Short-term, CEE, Journal article, 
Other than English.
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 The main conclusion that can be derived from the results 
is that none of the labour market controls seem to affect 
the probability of a positive impact in the evaluation.
Strong, moderate and non-significant impacts: 
Ordered probit meta-regressions
The results of the meta-regressions obtained so far do not 
allow evaluations reporting strong and weak, or moderate, 
positive impacts to be distinguished as they are all grouped 
into the category of significant positive evaluations. 
However, it may be that different types of reforms result in 
positive impacts with a similar probability, while differing 
in the frequency at which they lead to moderate or strong 
impacts. A similar argument can be applied to the other 
policy intervention characteristics. To investigate variations 
between non-positive, positive moderate and positive 
strong impacts, the meta-regression exercise was replicated 
by means of an ordered probit model. The assumption is 
that there is a logical ordering in the values taken by the 
impact2 variable. The synthesis of these results is shown in 
Tables 5 and 6.
Results from the ordered probit model for the specifications 
that include the general target groups of workers and 
companies are very similar to those observed above 
for the binary variable that only distinguishes between 
positive and non-positive impacts. As can be observed in 
the results columns of Table 5 corresponding to the most 
comprehensive specification, the only policy characteristic 
Table 4: Probit models for positive versus non-positive impact – detailed target
Policy intervention
Type of reform Employment increase O O O O O
Other O O O O O
Payroll cost O O O O O
Direction Increase O O O O O
Duration Permanent O O O O O
Scope Single reform O O O O O
Target Unemployed O O O O O
Long-term contract + + + O O +
Fixed-term contract O + O O + +
Young O O O O O
Old O + O O O
Women O O O + + +
Disabled O O O O O
Low-skilled + O O + +
Design (data, method and so on)
Data frequency Low frequency O – – – – – – – – –
Undated O – – – O
Data source Survey O – – – – – –
Econometric method Matching O O O +
Other – – – – – – – – – – –
Regression discontinued – – – – – – – – – – – –
Outcomes Employment and wages O – – O O
Number of years analysed – – – O –
Time horizon assessed Long term – – – – – – –
Medium term – – O – – – –
Characteristics of the study
Group of countries Continental – O
Nordic O –
Southern – – – –
Type of publication Other O O O
Report O O + +
Working paper O ++ +
Language English O O O
Context – macroeconomic
GDP growth + + + + + +
Unemployment rate – O
Number of observations 207 207 207 207 207
Joint significance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.31
Notes: See notes to Table 3.
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that induces variation in the probability of the three 
categories in which the impacts are classified is the type of 
general target.
Specifically, when controlling for differences in design, 
characteristics of the study and the macroeconomic 
context, reforms that are targeted at a group of workers 
are more effective: they increase the probability of 
a large impact more than those with no target group or 
those for a specific group of companies.
Table 5: Ordered probit models for degree of the impact – general target
Policy intervention
Type of reform Employment increase O O O O O
Other O O O O O
Payroll cost O O O O O
Direction Increase O O O O O
Duration Permanent O O O – – O
Scope Single reform O O O O O
Target Group of companies – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Group of workers O O O + + + + + +
Design (data, method and so on)
Data frequency Low frequency O O – – O
Undated O – – O O
Data source Survey – – – – – – – – –
Econometric method Matching + + O O + +
Other – O – – –
Regression discontinued – – – – – – – – – – –
Outcomes Employment and wages O O O O
Number of years analysed – – – O O
Time horizon assessed Long term O O – – – –
Medium term – – – – – – –
Characteristics of the study
Group of countries Continental O O
Nordic O – –
Southern O O
Type of publication Other – – – – –
Report O O O
Working paper O O O
Language English O O O
Context – macroeconomic
GDP growth + + + + + +
Unemployment rate – – –
Observations 207 207 207 207 207
Joint significance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.07 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.21
Notes: Non-significant estimates, 2 for significant weak positive estimates, and 3 for significant strong estimates. + + + positive p < 0.01; + + positive 
p < 0.05; + positive p < 0.1; – – – negative p < 0.01; – – negative p < 0.05; – negative p < 0.1; O p ≥ 0.1. Based on standard errors clustered by article. Joint 
significance denotes the result of the Wald test of the joint significance of all the coefficients. Omitted categories are: SSCs, Decrease, Temporary, 
Comprehensive package, No target group, High frequency, Administrative data, D-i-D, Only employment, Short-run, CEE, Journal article, Other than 
English.
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More differences between the analyses of the binary 
and the ordinal measures of the impact occur when the 
comparison is based on the specifications that include the 
detailed groups of workers.
Although no significant variability is observed in the 
type of reform, there is clear evidence to suggest 
that single reforms are less effective in promoting 
employment and that, even when they do so, the 
impact is weaker than reforms within a comprehensive 
package.
As for the differential effects of the target groups of 
workers, the results point to a higher impact for workers 
with a fixed-term contract (where the positive employment 
impact is conversion to permanent status).
The results also indicate that the impact is likely 
to be stronger when the target of the reform is the 
unemployed, including the long-term unemployed, the 
disabled and low-skilled workers.
As can be inferred from Table A.5.6 of Annex 5, this 
evidence is robust to the inclusion of proxies for 
differences across evaluations in the labour market 
institutional setting.
Strong impacts compared with moderate 
positive impacts: Probit meta-regressions 
excluding non-positive evaluations
As a final step in the meta-analysis, the focus was only on 
evaluations that provided a positive impact of the reform. 
Table 6: Ordered probit models for degree of the impact – detailed target
Policy intervention
Type of reform Employment increase O – O O –
Other O O O O O
Payroll cost O O O O O
Direction Increase O O O O O
Duration Permanent – O O O O
Scope Single reform – – – – O – – – – – –
Target Unemployed O + + O O + +
Long-term contract + + + + O O + +
Fixed-term contract + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Young O O O O O
Old O O O O O
Women O O O O O
Disabled O + + + + + + +
Low-skilled + + + + ++ + +
Design (data, method, etc.)
Data frequency Low frequency O – – – – – – –
Undated O O O O
Data source Survey O – – – –
Econometric method Matching O O O O
Other – – – – – – – – – – – –
Regression discontinued – – – – – – – – – – – –
Outcomes Employment and wages O O O O
Number of years analysed – – – – – O –
Time horizon assessed Long term O O – – – – – –
Medium term O O O O
Characteristics of the study
Group of countries Continental O O
Nordic O O
Southern O O
Type of publication Other O O O
Report O + + +
Working paper O O O
Language English O O O
Context – macroeconomic
GDP growth + + + + + +
Unemployment rate O –
Observations 207 207 207 207 207
Joint significance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.09 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.22
Notes: See notes to Table 5.
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As described above, a probit meta-regression is used in 
this case for the outcome that differentiates between 
positive moderate and positive strong impacts, neglecting 
those that correspond to non-positive effects. Before 
discussing the results, it should be mentioned that the size 
of the sample of evaluations decreases sharply as a result 
of neglecting those reporting a non-positive impact (119 
compared with 207 in the full sample). This may affect the 
precision of the estimates, so results should be interpreted 
with some caution.
It should also be mentioned that the number of 
evaluations reporting a positive impact when the reform 
was untargeted or the target was a group of companies 
is rather low (11 out of 123 evaluations, and only one 
for a group of companies as a target). Such a lack of 
variability in this dimension prevents the computation of 
meta-regressions using the specifications that include the 
variable for the general target of the reform. Consequently, 
only the results for the specifications including the 
detailed target groups of workers are summarised in Table 
7. From this table, it can be seen that there is substantial 
variability in the magnitude of the impact of alternative 
types of reforms. Specifically, evaluations of any of 
the functional equivalents have a lower probability of 
providing a strong positive effect when compared with 
a change in the employer SSCs. This is an important piece 
of evidence that was not revealed in the previous meta-
Table 7: Probit models for strong versus weak positive impact – detailed target
Policy intervention
Type of reform Employment increase – – – – – – – – – – – –
Other O – – – – – – – –
Payroll cost – – – – – – – – –
Direction Increase O – – O O
Duration Permanent O O ++ – – –
Scope Single reform – – – – – – – – – – – –
Target Unemployed + + + + + + + +
Long-term contract O O O + + +
Young O O O –
Old O O O – – –
Women O – – – – – –
Disabled + + + + + + + + + + + +
Low-skilled + + + + + + O + + +
Design (data, method and so on)
Data frequency Low frequency O + + – – –
Undated + + + + + + +
Data source Survey O + + – – –
Econometric method Matching O + + + O
Other O O –
Regression discontinued O O O
Outcomes Employment and wages O O O
Number of years analysed O O + + +
Time horizon assessed Long term O O O
Medium term O O –
Characteristics of the study
Group of countries Continental + + +
Nordic + + +
Southern + + +
Type of publication Other + + + + +
Report + + + + + +
Working paper O + + +
Language English + + + + + +
Context – macroeconomic
GDP growth + + +
Unemployment rate – – –
Observations 119 119 119 119
Joint significance Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.18 0.24 0.44 0.44
Notes: Models are probits, fit to binary data with value 1 for significant strong positive estimates, and 0 for significant weak positive estimates. 
Negative and non-significant estimates excluded. + + + positive p < 0.01; + + positive p < 0.05; + positive p < 0.1; – – – negative p < 0.01; – – negative 
p < 0.05; – negative p < 0.1; O p ≥ 0.1. Based on standard errors clustered by article. Joint significance denotes the result of the Wald test of the joint 
significance of all the coefficients.Omitted categories are: SSCs, Decrease, Temporary, Comprehensive package, No target group, High frequency, 
Administrative data, D-i-D, Only employment, Short-run, CEE, Journal article, Other than English.
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regressions which also accounted for evaluations reporting 
non-positive impacts. It suggests a sort of discontinuity in 
the effect of the type of reform.
There are no significant differences in the probability of 
a positive impact between changes in employer SSCs 
and functionally equivalent measures, but successful 
interventions provide a stronger effect on employment 
when they are implemented through a change in 
employer SSCs.
As for the other characteristics of the policy intervention, 
based on the last column of Table 7 which corresponds 
to the specification that controls for the macroeconomic 
context, it can be said that the chances of obtaining 
a strong rather than a moderate positive impact in an 
evaluation are lower when the reform is announced 
as permanent, or there is not a precise period of 
enforcement. This probability is also lower for single 
reforms than for comprehensive packages. However, the 
results point to substantial variability in the probability 
of observing a strong versus a moderate impact in the 
evaluation depending on the target group.
The evidence suggests that evaluations that focus on 
the unemployed, including the long-term unemployed, 
on the disabled and the low-skilled tend to report 
more frequently evidence of strong positive impacts 
on employment. In contrast, the evidence of a strong 
impact is less frequent when the evaluation focuses on 
young and, particularly, older individuals and female 
workers.
Based on the meta-regressions, it is not possible to come 
to a conclusion on the differential effect for evaluations 
that focus on fixed-term workers because they all report 
a strong positive effect. (These observations are excluded 
from the analysis).29 In any case, and conditional on this 
low number of cases, it can be assumed that there is 
a higher probability of a strong impact when the reform 
targets the group of workers with a fixed-term contract. 
Indeed, the ordered probit model, where the strength of 
the impact was considered, reported significant results 
for this target group, while a robust significant effect 
cannot be derived from the initial binary specification. 
At any rate, it should be kept in mind that policies that 
address workers with fixed-term contracts are a particular 
category and very different to the others considered in 
the study. Such policies target individuals who are already 
employed and the dependent variable in the analysis is the 
conversion to a permanent contract.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the specific analysis 
of the strength in the impact of positive evaluations 
points to the role of differences in the design and in other 
characteristics of the study in affecting outcomes.
Interaction between the type of reform and the 
group targeted by the policy
This subsection presents the main results of meta-
regressions including the interaction between the type 
of intervention and the target group. More detailed 
comments and tables with results are provided in Annex 7. 
It can be argued that a particular policy tool, for instance 
a change in the employer SSCs, may have a different 
effect on employment depending on the group of workers 
targeted by the reform.
Interactions between the four types of reforms analysed 
in the study were considered: the two groups defined for 
the general target (a specific group of companies, and 
a specific group of workers) were compared with the eight 
more specific groups (such as all the unemployed, long-
term unemployed, young people, women) for the detailed 
target. Due to the large amount of interactions and the 
limited size of the sample, only the interaction between 
the type of reform and one target group was considered. 
The probit results for the positive versus non-positive 
impacts and the ordered probit models specified for 
assessing the degree of the impact available were obtained 
just for the groups for which there was enough variability 
(they are displayed in Tables A7.1 and A7.2 in Annex 7).
The results indicate that employment incentives are 
more effective than changes in employer SSCs for 
young workers, whereas the opposite applies for the 
disabled and low-skilled groups.
Summary of main findings of the 
meta-analysis
The meta-analysis has enabled the identification of the 
circumstances and features that affect the employment 
response to the reduction in employer SSCs and 
functionally equivalent measures (employment incentives, 
hiring subsidies, payroll cost reductions). In particular, the 
findings from the meta-analysis put forward the following 
conclusions.
Policy intervention
¢ Across all of the evaluations covered, many including 
multiple estimates of employment effects, 59% of 
estimates indicated a significant positive employment 
effect and in most of these cases, the employment 
effect was assessed as being strongly positive.
¢ The evidence from the sample of evaluations strongly 
supports the case that a positive employment impact 
is more likely when the policy targets a specific group 
of workers rather than when it affects the entire 
working population. In contrast, the existing evidence 
suggests that targeting specific groups of companies 
(located in remote areas and/or with some particular 
29 This is why the effective number of observations in these estimates is 119 rather than 123 (115 in those for which there are some missing values in some of the 
labour market controls).
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characteristics such as small companies) is not 
effective.
¢ Among the groups of workers usually targeted by 
the types of reforms under analysis, the higher 
probabilities of positive employment impacts were 
observed for the long-term unemployed and workers 
with fixed-term contracts (though in this case the 
positive impact is on the transition to a permanent 
contract). Also, improved employment outcomes 
were more likely for female, disabled and low-skilled 
workers, although the evidence is less robust for these 
groups. Interestingly, reforms targeted at young and 
older workers do not report a stronger effectiveness 
than untargeted policies.
¢ The probability of obtaining a significant positive 
effect was roughly the same for interventions 
involving SSCs and in any of the functional 
equivalents. However, among the evaluations 
reporting positive effects, changes in employer SSCs 
are more likely to produce a strong impact than any 
form of functional equivalent.
¢ A positive impact is less frequent in the medium and 
long term compared with the short term.
¢ The effects of decreasing and increasing non-wage 
labour costs as a result of the reform are symmetrical 
in the sense that the effect on the probability of 
observing a positive impact on employment is likely 
to be similar in magnitude, although of opposite 
sign, when the policy reform reduces or increases the 
employer SSCs (or functional equivalent).
¢ The likelihood of a positive impact is similar for 
single, standalone reforms and for changes in 
SSCs or functional equivalents that are part of 
a comprehensive package of reforms. However, for 
positive evaluations, the probability of reporting 
a strong impact is higher for reforms within 
a comprehensive package.
¢ Different types of reforms may well have 
a differentiated effect depending on the group 
targeted by the intervention. A tentative conclusion 
was that employment incentives were more effective 
than changes in employer SSCs for the employment 
prospects of young workers, whereas targeted 
reductions of employer SSCs work better for the 
disabled and low-skilled groups.
Design of the evaluation
¢ The characteristics of the data, the econometric 
methodology and the period during which the 
impact is measured affect the likelihood of obtaining 
a positive employment impact of the reform. 
On average, evaluations exploiting data from 
administrative registers, measured at intra-annual 
intervals, applying D-i-D techniques and, to an even 
greater extent, matching estimators have a higher 
probability of reporting a significant positive impact.
Economic and labour market background
¢ Faster GDP growth enhances the probability that the 
reform achieves its goal of stimulating employment. 
This may be also interpreted as the policy intervention 
having a lower probability of success in low growth 
economies and in periods of recession and stagnation. 
The evidence is overall less conclusive about the 
effect of the incidence of unemployment, though it 
does weaken significantly the probability of obtaining 
a strong positive employment effect.
¢ The evidence does not support a connection between 
the effectiveness of the reforms in employment 
creation, and the labour market institutional setting as 
regards collective bargaining and union density.
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4 Conclusions
This report has reviewed recent studies that evaluate 
policies aimed at reducing the cost burden on employers 
when hiring employees in an effort to stimulate new 
employment. Hiring subsidies and employment-
generating reductions in employer social security 
contributions (SSCs) have become a prominent element 
in the set of labour market policies used in recent years. 
Their role in contributing to employment-friendly growth 
has been underlined by the European Commission in the 
European Semester policy coordination process and many 
Member States are currently implementing or considering 
relevant measures.
Existing research evidence points to the potential 
drawbacks that limit the effectiveness of such measures in 
promoting net employment generation. Concerns relate in 
particular to deadweight, displacement and substitution 
effects – the traditional qualifications of positive measure 
outcomes in labour market policy evaluation. Unintended 
effects include waste or inefficiency in implementation, 
opportunistic behaviour by benefiting companies and 
potential countervailing or distortionary impacts of 
the policies implemented on other non-participating 
companies or economic players. Each can potentially 
undermine the cost-effectiveness of the measures or 
compromise policy objectives.
Additional concerns relate to the requirements of 
budget neutrality, an especially important constraint 
at a time of severe public spending restrictions. Paying 
for employment subsidies or compensating for revenue 
foregone may require new taxes, for example, on 
consumption. Second-order employment effects from 
these may tend to offset some positive gains resulting from 
employer tax reductions. Similarly, reductions in employer 
contributions may result more directly in declines in public 
employment as a result of funding shortfalls. In relation to 
these effects, it is important to highlight that the current 
policy consensus is premised on such forms of tax shifts 
away from labour (or fiscal devaluation) being in aggregate 
employment and growth-friendly.
Finally, in relation to employer social security tax 
reductions, there is the possibility that decreases in 
employer taxes end up being diverted into higher 
employee wages rather than generating new employment, 
the main policy objective. This arises as a result of 
differences in labour supply and demand elasticities in 
particular across the business cycle and across different 
target categories.
Not all of these potential impacts are easy to estimate 
and even where evaluations do provide estimates – as is 
more often the case in relation to deadweight effects, for 
example – the range of estimates is very broad and covers 
a spectrum from no significant effect to up to 90% of new 
employment created. While a systematic assessment of 
these countervailing effects is beyond the scope of the 
current report, they need to be taken into account. Taken 
alone, deadweight losses in particular are likely to be 
considerable. Taken in combination, these countervailing 
effects can be expected to qualify considerably the 
findings of positive employment impacts.
There are policy design features intended to address some 
of these countervailing effects. The most obvious, and 
common, example is that of targeting where restricting 
the benefits to a specific category of beneficiaries should 
reduce deadweight losses. Many measures impose 
conditions that tie subsidy payment to maintenance of 
employment levels at benefiting companies to discourage 
the substitution of current employees with subsidised 
employees. In most cases, these obligations persist 
for a specified period after the expiry of the benefit 
and can involve repayment where the employment 
commitments are not maintained. Displacement effects 
relate to potential negative employment effects in non-
beneficiary companies: limiting the number of subsidised 
recruitments per company may help to minimise market 
distortions leading to displacement effects (see, for 
example, Pons-Rotger and Arendt, 2010).
From a cost-effectiveness point of view, time-limiting 
policy interventions reduce costs and may also mitigate 
against habituation effects. Most of the policies covered in 
the evaluations were described as permanent rather than 
temporary. This was true in the narrow sense that no end 
date was known at the time of implementation but, by 
their nature, all policy measures are temporary and their 
provisions can be superseded. An interesting approach 
was that of the Spanish authorities who had decided that 
the targeted employer SSCs introduced in 2013 would 
remain in place until the national unemployment rate fell 
below 15%.
The empirical evidence summarised in the report has 
shown that the employment effects from lower employer 
social security contribution rates or functional equivalents 
such as hiring subsidies tend to be mixed. In just over 40% 
of employment effect estimates covered in the meta-
analysis, no significant positive impact was identified. 
However, where positive employment effects were 
identified, they were much more likely to be considered 
strongly rather than weakly positive. Although there is a 
great heterogeneity in the results, the impact as evidenced 
in evaluations of actual policy interventions is consistently 
lower than the predictions of theoretical models and 
simulations.
Most evaluations do, however, find positive employment 
impacts and the meta-analysis has allowed those 
circumstances and policy design features that may impact 
on policy effectiveness to be identified. With the necessary 
caveats based on the heterogeneity of policies, target 
groups and methods of evaluation covered in the meta-
analysis, some principal findings are as follows.
First, policies with a specific target group appear to be 
more effective than general or non-targeted policies. 
The target groups most likely to benefit are the long-term 
unemployed and fixed-term employees (conversion to 
permanent status) with less robust findings of positive 
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impact for the categories of female, disabled and low-
skilled workers. Reforms targeted at younger and older 
workers appear less effective, as do measures targeting 
specific groups of companies (identified by sector, 
company size or region). Targeted measures are less 
likely to involve serious deadweight effects by virtue of 
the targeting and also because the targeted categories 
are generally underrepresented in the workforce by 
employment share. In practice, the review of recent policy 
implementations across the EU in Chapter 1 shows that 
there has been a greater tendency in most recent years 
(post-2011) on the part of policymakers to use targeted 
measures than was the case beforehand – even if the 
targeted categories are not always the ones where the 
evaluation literature indicates more positive employment 
impacts are likely to occur.
Second, strong positive employment impacts were 
more likely in policies based on reduced employer 
SSCs (compared with measures such as hiring subsidies) 
and on policies embedded in a package of reform 
measures (compared with standalone measures). Overall, 
however, there was little to suggest that any one of the 
policies under consideration systematically led to better 
employment outcomes than the others.
Third, the positive employment impact of employer 
labour cost-reducing measures seems to be limited to 
the short term and to dissipate over longer time frames.
Fourth, a positive macroeconomic context appears 
to enhance the probability that employer cost-
reducing measures achieve their goal of stimulating 
employment. This could be an argument against their use 
when they are in theory most appropriate and in practice 
most needed – in recessionary or post-recessionary 
periods of depressed labour demand. It also implies that 
they may be more effective at times such as the present 
(2016) with (modestly) improving output and employment 
growth.
Few of the studies analysed carry out a cost-effectiveness 
analysis of the measures covered. This is an area in 
which more research is needed, especially as positive 
employment effects are indicated as modest and are 
likely to be offset by deadweight losses, substitution and 
other effects. If the metric for judging an employment-
generating policy is the cost per new job created, a more 
detailed accounting may be required. This could also 
take into account the relative size of the policy stimulus 
(in budgetary terms) and go some way to answering 
whether observed employment impacts are proportionate 
to expenditure or instead are discontinuous and vary at 
different levels of stimulus ‘intensity’. The strict focus 
of this report on the existence and size of employment 
outcomes means that these related and very policy-
relevant considerations must be left for further research 
and analysis.
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to hire new workers could motivate 
employers to either retain staff who might 
otherwise have been let go or to create 
new jobs. Since the onset of the financial 
crisis in 2008, both types of measure have 
been deployed in many EU Member States. 
This report reviews the effectiveness of 
measures designed to reduce the employer 
part of the tax wedge in an effort to 
stimulate positive labour market outcomes. 
It provides an overview of the reforms 
adopted since 2008 across the EU Member 
States to stimulate labour demand, focusing 
on policies aimed at reducing the cost 
of labour for employers. It analyses the 
effectiveness of shifts in employer social 
security contributions, employer payroll 
taxes and functionally equivalent employer 
incentives as employment-generating policy 
interventions. The findings show mixed 
evidence of positive employment effects 
from relevant policy reforms but suggest 
that measures targeted at specific groups of 
workers are more likely to be successful. 
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